This section is from the book "Hypnotism Or Suggestion And Psychotherapy", by August Forel, Dr. Phil. Et Jur.. Also available from Amazon: Hypnotism; Or, Suggestion and Psychotherapy.
The most obscure chapter in the physiology of the central nervous system is that of the function of the so-called basal ganglia of the brain, the mid-brain, and the cerebellum. There is no doubt that the unget-at-able position of these organs is not alone responsible for the difficulties. One has to deal with the fact that our subjective "ego" - i.e., our cerebral supercon-sciousness - does not stand in any subjective relationship with the consciousness subjected to it, although its activity can be proved to work objectively in harmonizing concord with the cerebral activity. In short, we call all these obscure processes sometimes unconceived brain activity, sometimes brain reflexes, sometimes brain automatisms, and so on; but by using the expression "uneonceived" one risks bringing these processes into contradistinction to the contents of our superconsciousness, and such a contrast is certainly not possible.
The fact, that an animal deprived of its cerebrum cries out when the trigeminus is stimulated, seems to show that a production of the sensation of pain takes place in the mid-brain or cerebellum, and therefore that this center also possesses its consciousness for sensations of pain; but the pain - i.e., the subjective sensation - appears in the cerebral consciousness of the animal when the stimulation is transmitted from this center to the cerebrum. There is no doubt that the same applies to us. A poor youth, who had a transverse lesion of the spinal cord, laughed in astonishment when he saw that his foot was drawn up in response to (he application of the actual cautery to the sole. He felt absolutely nothing. "Still," I said to him, "it hurts your spinal cord, even though you - i.e., your brain - does not recognize it." In the same way the physiologist Golz's well-known dog, whose cerebrum had been removed, showed a number of simple inferior mental capabilities which corresponded to the mental life of the "lower order" brain centers of the dog.
Further conclusions arrived at by analogy show that we must accede various forms of consciousness, corresponding to the complicatedness of their structure and size, to all the various nerve centers of the animal world. The chief consciousness - i.e., the consciousness of the guiding, reasoning chief activity or brain activity - must always be associated with the most complicated, largest centers. The experiments of Isidor Steiner1 appear to prove that the chief activity in fishes takes place in the mid-brain. The same author2 believes that one can define the brain as "the general center of movement in connection with the functional activity of one at least of the nerves of the higher senses." This definition has a great deal in its favor, hut it is too absolute and too limited. The brain is merely the largest and the most complicated nerve center. It has, therefore, the most developed and the most reasoning activities - i.e., possesses those activities which are capable of fitting all that is most complicated in the outer world and in the brains of other beings. In consequence, this activity takes the general leading part in the alternating action of the motor centers.
Numerous experiments and comparative biological and anatomical studies have led rue to believe, that I am more than ever justified in placing the brain of ants in the corpora pedun-culata of the upper oesophageal ganglion. 3 At a later date I expressed my opinion on the question of comparative psychology more minutely. 4
The conception of consciousness, as we define it, is an elementary conception which cannot be further divided up. It is only the activity of the brain, which is reflected by it, which can be divided up. It therefore appears that we can ascribe generalities to the conception of consciousness, as well as to the conception of energy, in spite of the fact that on account of its subjective existence it is only possible to prove it by indirect induction with the required certainty outside the subject in complicated nerve centers. It may appear to be very easy to disprove my view on this subject by means of syllogisms, but they appeal forcibly to every investigator who thinks inductively. Otherwise, how could an unanalyzable subjectivism suddenly be produced which cannot be compared with any known natural phenomenon, and which cannot be derived from any phenomenon ? From what should it be produced i Should it be produced with the first neuron, with the first living cell? Nature reveals itself to this very subjectivism.
1Isidor Steiner. "On the Cerebrum of Vertebrate Fishes" (Reports of the Bert. Academy of Phys. Math. Clave, January, 1886).
2Ibid., "'The Function of the Central Nervous System of Intervertebrate Animals" (ibid January, 1890).
3"Fourmte de la Suisse," 1874.
4 "The Physical Capabilities of Ants and other Insects" with an Appendix on (he peculiarities of the sense of smell of these insects (Munchen; E. Rhein-hardt, 1901).
If one wishes to avoid again and again arriving in the "vicious circle," in the empty battle of words conducted by a sterile scholastic dualism, one has only to study these arguments deeply. One will then see that one cannot divide the substratum, which causes the abstract conception of consciousness as we understand it from the substratum of the conception of energy. As soon as one attempts such a division, one is drifted in one of two directions. Either one accepts the "haunting" of all spiritism and spiritualism, which assigns all sorts of qualities and personal power over "matter," which is individualized in the same way, to the independent spirit or independent spirits (why not attribute legs and arms to these as well?); or one must turn to uncompromised materialism, which is untenable from the point of view of philosophy. This materialism seeks to construe or change "mind" and "consciousness" into the equally unknown abstract ideas "atom" and "energy." Thereby one only enters on a stupid play of words. Man analyzes the phenomena down to the abstract ideas which appear to him to be the elementary conceptions of energy, consciousness, qualitative difference, time and space. The last-named three he deals with as ideas relatively lying between the phenomena, and not as a phenomenon itself. But these things are covered by monistic metaphysical conceptions, which we can only infer from the phenomena of undoubtedly true things of the world, which must include all our apparently elementary conceptions. It (the metaphysical conception) appears as the essence of the universe, as a real but unfathomed conception of God, which stands completely outside the power of our understanding (this must not be understood to mean "personal"), or the original conception of the unknown in the world. The fact, that we cannot investigate the monistic existence of things, does not prevent us from concluding inductively as to its identity of existence, for we realize that all the phenomena which are available for our power of understanding concur with this. 1
 
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