In certain. peculiar cases of somnambulism two or more consciousnesses (the author apologizes for the use of the plural here) which are sharply differentiated from one another have been observed, and various theories have been built up from this. These consciousnesses cannot only follow one another in point of time (alternately appear), but they can exist simultaneously in the same brain (the double ego and automatic writing of Max Dessoir).1 These extraordinary occurrences, when considered in the light of monism and hypnotism, no longer appear to be so inexplicable, if we regard our waking consciousness simply as the introspection of an associated chain of cerebral activities - that is, of the most important, highest, and most concentrated activities. There is nothing which prevents the existence in the same brain of other chains of activity, which also possess their connection with introspection, but which are prevented from becoming linked to the first by an inhibitory mechanism. Connections which arc apparently unconceived as far as the memory is concerned, and which are only interrupted from subjective illumination, can and must be present in both chains, for the influence of one chain on the other is ascertainable.

' Max Dessoir, "The Double Ego," 1889 (Berlin: W. Karl Sigismund). Dessoir very rightly and carefully says at the end of this most interesting and instructive study: " Human personality consists of at least two spheres, which can be schematically divided from each other." Dessoir calls waking consciousness "superconsciousness," and he calls the other consciousness, which is less well recognized by our waking consciousness (dream consciousness, second consciousness, etc.), "hypoconsciousness" (Unterbewusstaein).

I once drove in a carriage, absorbed in thought As the carriage passed a certain place, where I was accustomed to alight from the electric tram to take a steep footpath, I felt or believed that I had got out and was beginning the steep climb. The consciousness of sitting in the carriage and of being driven had disappeared for the moment from the chain of my supercon-sciouaness, and had been replaced by a kind of dream hallucination, although the abstract train of my thoughts had not in the least been disturbed thereby. Suddenly I became aware of my illusion.

In other words, it is possible for differing activities, which occur simultaneously or which follow one another in the same brain, to possess common elementary coordinating connections, and nevertheless to appear to us subjectively to be completely, or nearly completely, divided from one another, in virtue of their waves of higher intensity or synthesized concentration, which alone are illuminated by the conceived memory. Example: dream and waking.

It is a known fact that one need not turn to dream consciousness in order to find an interruption in the linking of our thinking capabilities. One can understand that during every more marked concentration of thought - e.g., in the case of the erroneously termed "absent-minded" savant - a number of accustomed activities of the brain continue to take place, and at the same time lose all subjective connection with the contents, which is concentrated on abstract idea3 of the chief consciousness - i.e., the chief cerebral activity. For example, I frequently have the habit of continuously humming melodies softly to myself unconsciously, when engaged in concentrating work. I attempted to catch myself when doing this, and to write down the names of the tunes (popular melodies). In the course of a few weeks I have caught myself in this way at twenty-four different songs, some of which are old melodies of my childhood, of which I never consciously think, and some of which are songs learned later in life. One frequently calls this activity "unconeeived." Dessoir attributes his "hypo-consciousness" to this. But in reality there are innumerable transitions, interruptions, renewals, etc. The chain of consciousness of many people rapidly loses the connection, while that of others (people who are said to possess a "good memory," as well as observant people) has very extensive and cohesive linking capacity. The characteristics of concentration (attention) and imagination are usually badly developed in the latter. The reflection of consciousness can appear to us to be clear, moderately clear, and hazy. Its field can reveal itself as being wide or moderately wide, both in regard to time and space. An important relationship exists between the intensity and duration (Grasbey's aphasia) of the brain activity on the one hand, and its conceived capability of remembering on the other.

We cannot receive a direct subjective insight into the consciousness other than our superconsciousness, or at the most than the hypoconsciousness of our cerebrum, no matter whether these belong to other nerve centers of our own nervous system or to other people or animals. That which we know of other people depends on the conclusions of analogy obtained by speech. And even the insight which we obtain into the dream consciousness, or possibly into a second or third consciousness (cases quoted by MacNish, Azam, etc.), is mostly scanty enough. If the telepathists were right, this would certainly be otherwise.

Nevertheless, we can assume - and analogy almost forces us to do so theoretically - that the activity of other nerve centers - e.g., cerebellum, mid-brain, medulla, spinal cord, ganglia - too, possesses an analogous subjective reflection. But this spinal cord capability, to choose one for an example, remains absolutely without any subjective - i.e., consciously linked - association with our consciousness of self - i.e., with our cerebral superconsciousness. The activity of the subcerebral centers only becomes conceived by us, if it is transformed into an activity of the cerebrum by means of wavelike transmission in the latter. For example, after destruction of our cervical spinal cord our superconsciousness on the brain side of the rupture remains completely unscathed. Innumerable facts relating to this in the physiology, anatomy, and pathology of the brain are only explainable by means of this assumption.