Signature of party to be charged, or his agent, sufficient.

Memorandum subsequent to the contract.

Cases where agreement enforceable without compliance with Statute of Frauds.

1. Sale by Court.

2. Where defence of Statute not taken.

(a) Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N. C. 735; Reuss v. Picks-ley, L. R. 1 Ex. 342.

(b) Waller v. Hendon. 5 Vin. Abr. 524, pl. 45; Sug. V. V P. 145; Suns v. Landray, L894, 2 Ch. 318.

(c) Re Holland, 1902, 2 Ch. 300.

(d) Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801; Maddison v. Alterson, 8 App. Cas. 407, 474, 488.

(e) A.-G. v. Day, 1 Ves. sen. 218, 221; Sug. V. & P. 109; Dart. V. & P. 197, 1201, 5th ed.; 227, 1329-30, 6th ed.: 218, 1168, 7th ed.; Fry, Sp. Perfce. Sec. S62.

(f) R. S. C, Order 19, r. 16 . Clarke v. Callow, 40 L. J. X. S. Q. B. 53; see Odhams v. Brun-ning, 12 Times L. R. 303, reversed 13 Times L. R. 65.

(g) See R. S. C, Order 19. rr. 13-20.

3. Fraud.

4. Part performance.

(h) Olley v. Fisher, 34 Ch. D. 367; James v. Smith, 1891, 1 Ch. 384.

(i) Under the old Chancery practice, an oral agreement would be specifically enforced, if it were admitted by the defendant's answer, and he did not insist on the Statute; Limondson v. Sweed, Gilb. 35; Gunter v. Halsey, Amb. 586; Ridgway v. Wharton, 3 De G. M. & G.677, 689-692. But at common law, it was not necessary or proper to plead the Statute specially. If the defendant pleaded the general issue (that is, a general denial of the contract), the plaintiff had to establish a contract enforceable at law; and if he failed to prove compliance with the Statute of Frauds, the defendant might then raise the defence of the Statute; see Buttemere v. Hayes, 5 M. & W. 456, 460; Leaf v. Tuton, 10 M. & W. 393. And see Futcher v. Futcher, 45 L. T. N. S. 306.

(k) Eldon, C, Mestasr v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 627-8; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. 469, 474; Rochefoucauld v. Boustead, 1897, 1 Ch. 196, 206.

(l) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 20, pl. 5; Walker v. Walker, 2 Atk. 98; England v. Codrington, 1 Eden, 169; Lincoln v. Wright, 4 De G. & J. 16, 22; Douglas v. Culver-well, 3 Giff. 251; 4 De G. F. & J. 20.

(m) See Peniber v. Mathers, 1 Bro. C. C. 52; Clarke v. Grant, 14 Ves. 519; Jerris v. Berridge, L. R. 8 Ch. 351; Fry, Sp. Perfce. Sec. 568, 809.

(n) Maxwell v. Montucute, Prec. Ch. 526. But unless there be which the existence is so inferred, must be duly proved by oral evidence (x). And the agreement so proved must be a contract enforceable (in all respects save the absence of signed writing) under the equitable as distinguished from the common law jurisdiction of the Courts (y). To give examples, taking possession of land under an oral agreement for the purchase or lease of it is the strongest case of an act of part performance raising the equity in question. For "the acknowledged possession of a stranger in the land of another is not explicable save on the supposition of an agreement, and has therefore constantly been received as evidence of an antecedent contract" (z). But mere holding over by a tenant whose term has expired is not unequivocally referable to a new contract with his landlord (a). So payment of part and possibly the whole of the purchase-money is not sufficient to let in oral evidence of a contract for the sale of land; for "the payment of money is an equivocal act, not (in itself), until the connection is established by parol testimony, indicative of a contract concerning land" (b).

(o) See Selborne, C, Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467, 474 et seq. A party sued for damages on an oral contract under the common law jurisdiction of the Courts is not precluded from raising the defence of the Statute on account of part performance of the contract; Lavery v. Pur-sell, 39 Ch. D. 508, 518.

(p) Above, p. 11.

(q) See the words of the Statute; above. p. 3.

(r) See Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 475-8.

(a) Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 479.

(t) Bee Witts v. Stradling, 3 Ves. jun. 878, 381; Morphett v. Jones, 1 Sw. 172, 181.

(u) Buckmasier v. Harrop, 7 V 341, 345; Redesdale, Ir. C, Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22, 41; Mundy v Joliffe, 5 My. & Cr. 167, 177.

In regard to the expression of the parties' consent, the formation of a contract for the sale of land is governed by the general law of contract, subject of course to the requisite of form (c) (namely, signed writing), which has just been considered. Thus in order that the acceptance of an offer (d) may make a contract, it is essential that there should be communication of the offer and its acceptance to each party respectively (e), and the acceptance must he absolute and identical with the terras of the offer (f). If therefore you offer to sell me your land, though I make up my mind to accept, there is no contract between us until I duly signify to 3-ou my acceptance. And this will be the ease, even though you state in your offer that, unless you hear from me, you will consider the matter as concluded; for though you may indicate to me the manner in which my acceptance shall he signified, you are not at liberty to stipulate that my acceptance shall be implied. if I do nothing (g). Again if I offer to sell you my land for 1,000l., an answer that you will give 950l. for it is no acceptance of my offer, hut a counter-proposal on your part; it is a rejection of my offer; and if I should decline your proposal, you would not be at liberty to bind me by accepting my terms, unless I had renewed my offer to you (h). An offer may be revoked (i) at any time before its acceptance be duly communicated to the proposer: but, as in the case of acceptance, mere change of mind is not enough to revoke an offer; the change must be communicated to the other party (k). When the acceptance of an offer is duly communicated to the proposer, the contract is completely formed, and neither party is at liberty to recede (l). Here we may notice that, where the parties are in communication through the post, or where the post is the natural channel for sending the answer to a proposal of contract, acceptance of the offer is held to be duly signified when a letter of acceptance is posted (m). So that the proposer is bound, notwithstanding that the letter be delayed in the post beyond the time when he naturally expected to receive it (n), and even though the letter be lost in the post and he never received it (o); and he cannot withdraw his offer after a letter accepting it has been posted to him (p). This is a rule of convenience, and its best explanation seems to be that a proposer making an offer, to which he might naturally expect the answer to be sent by post, must be taken, if not to have authorized that mode of communication, at least to have accepted its usual conditions and risks. Posting a letter of acceptance of such an offer is therefore considered as a compliance with the conditions of the offer as regards the signification of acceptance (q). It follows that the acceptor ought not to be prejudiced by anything which may occur after his letter has been posted. Thus it would be unjust, and it would be impossible to carry on business through the post, if the proposer were allowed to withdraw in the interval between the posting of the acceptance and its arrival. So delay or loss of a letter in the post is no fault of the sender, who parts with all control over it when it is posted; and he ought not to suffer therefrom (r). This doctrine, it should be stated, has no application in the case of the revocation of an offer; which, if communicated by post, only takes effect when the letter actually reaches the person to whom it is addressed; for the revocation of an offer is not a matter which its recipient can be expected to contemplate, and his acceptance of the exigencies of postal communication cannot be inferred (s). In order to bind the proposer, an offer must in general be accepted within a reasonable time after it is made (t). What is a reasonable time is of course a question of fact in each particular case (u). Here it may be noticed that a promise to keep an offer open for a particular time is unenforceable for want of consideration (x); so that an offer accompanied by such a promise may be withdrawn, provided it has not been accepted, before the time specified has elapsed (y).