(f) Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558, 569, 570; Kenworthy v. Scho-field, 2 B. & C. 945; Peirce v. Corf, L. R. 9 Q. B. 210; Rishton v. Whatmore, 8 Ch. D. 467.

(g) Western v. Russell, 3 V. & B. 187. See also Cave v. Hastings, 7 Q. B. D. 125 (reference to "our arrangement for the hire of your carriage").

(h) Verlander v. Codd, T. & R. 352.

(i) Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H. L. C. 238.

(k) Baumann v. James, L. R. 3 Ch. 508.

The signing contemplated by the Statute appears to be writing the name (p) of the party to be charged or his authorized agent (q), so as to authenticate the memorandum (r). And as the Statute requires signing only and not subscribing, it does not much matter in what part of the document the signature is placed, provided the name be inserted in such a manner as to govern the whole memorandum (s). Thus in the case of memoranda drawn up in the third person, the mention of the names of the parties at the beginning has frequently been held to be a sufficient signature (t). So writing a person's name at the head of a memorandum of an agreement, to which he is a party, has been held to be a sufficient siguature (u). But where a name inserted in the body of a memorandum relates only to particular sentences, it cannot be regarded as a signature of the whole document (x). And writing the names of the parties in a memorandum of agreement (even so as to govern the whole) will not be considered to be signing, if the terms of the instrument show that the parties intended it to be authenticated by further signature (y). If, however, the terms of a memorandum, in which the parties' names are inserted, leave a doubt, whether further signature was intended, parol evidence is admissible to show that either party made, authorized or adopted such signing of his name as his signature (z).

The signature required.

(l) Long v. Millar, 4 C. P. D. 450; see also Studds v. Watson, 28 Ch. D. 305; Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. D. 205; in which cases writings referring to "the purchase-money" were allowed to be explained by parol evidence and so connected with other documents containing the remaining terms of the purchase.

(m) Bramwell, L. J., Long v. Millar, 4 C. P. D. 450, 454; Field, J., Cave v. Hastings, 7 Q. B. D. 125, 128; Kekewich, J., Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. D. 205, 209.

(n) Pearce v. Gardner, 1897, 1 Q. B. 688.

(o) Hinde v. Whitshouse, 7 East, 556, 569, 570; Kenworthy v. Sehofield, 2 B. & C. 945;Peirce v. Corf, L. R. 9Q. B. 210; Risk-ton v. Whatmore, 8 Ch. D. 167.

(p) The party's usual signature, with initials for the Christian names, will do; R. v. Avery, 18 Q. B. 576. Writing the initials only of the Christian name and surname, or even making a mark, appears to be a sufficient signature, if the signer be otherwise sufficiently described in the memorandum; Selby v. Selby, 3 Mer. 2; Hubert v. Moreau, 12 B. Moore, 216, 219. And it Seems that signature by initials only may be enough without any other description of the signer, parol evidence being admissible to identify him: Chichester v. Cobb, 14 L. T. N. S. 433; of. Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & Gr. 452, 460. But signature by mark alone without name or description is open to the objection that the memorandum is incomplete in not showing the party to be charged; Hubert v. Moreau, 2 C. & P. 528. A description, which may be sufficient to identify the person described as a party to the agreement see ante. p. 5), may not be sufficient to constitute his signature of the memorandum; Selby v. Selby, 3 Mer. 2.

(q) Phillimore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513; White v. Proctor,' 4 Taunt. 209.

(r) Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox, 219.

(s) Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Mer. 53: Lobb v. stanley, 5 Q. B. 574; Caton v. Caton, L. R. 2 H. L. 127, 143.

(t) See cases cited in preceding note: and Propert v. Parker, 1 Russ. & My. 625: Bleakley v. Smith, 11 Sim. 150.

(u) Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286; Evans v. Hoare, 1892, 1 Q. B. 593, where note that the letter was written by the defendants' clerk by their authority, and then presented to the plaintiff for signature; so as that the defendants' name was actually written by their authorized agent; Sims v. Landray, 1894, 3 Ch. 318.

(x) Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox, 219; Caton v. Caton, L. R. 2 H. L. 127.

(y) Hubert v. Treherne, 3 Man. & Gr. 743; S. C, nom. Hubert v. Turner, 4 Scott, N. R. 486.

(z) Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. &W. W. 653; see also Schneider v. Norris and Evans v. Hoare, ubi sup. which were decided upon this principle; Hucklesby v. Hook, 82 L. T. 117.

The memorandum mentioned in the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds is required to be signed by the party to be charged, or his agent. It is settled that the other party need not sign the memorandum, in order to enforce the agreement; it is sufficient that he be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract (a). An agent authorized to sign a memorandum of contract for his principal need not, it is held, be thereunto authorized in writing (b). And the memorandum may well be made or signed at any time after the contract has been entered into, but before an action is brought to enforce it (c). Agreements made without complying with the requirements of the Statute are held to be, not void, but only not enforceable (d).

An oral agreement for the sale of land may be enforced in certain exceptional cases, although the requirements of the Statute of Frauds have not been complied with. These are, first, where the sale is made by the Court, when the judicial character of the proceedings is held to preclude the danger of the mischief, which the Statute was intended to prevent (e). Secondly, according to the present practice, the defence of non-compliance with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds must be specially pleaded in an action upon a contract (,/'). So that if one sued in respect of an oral agreement for the sale of land omit to plead the defence of the Statute, the agreement may be established either by the admission of its existence in the defendant's pleading (g), or if not so admitted by oral evidence (h). And the Courts will now enforce an agreement so established, whether the relief claimed be the specific performance of the contract or damages for its breach (i). Thirdly, an agreement may be established by oral evidence, notwithstanding the terms of the Statute of Frauds, where it would be a fraud to repel proof of the agreement under cover of the Statute (k). Thus if an absolute conveyance of land be obtained under an oral agreement for a mortgage, the mortgagee will not be allowed to set up the Statute of Frauds as a defence to an action to enforce the right of redemption (l). So if one be induced to sign a written contract for the sale or purchase of land on the faith of some variation being made in the terms of the written agreement or of the performance of some collateral stipulation, oral evidence of the variation or stipulation so agreed upon will not be excluded by reason of the Statute (m). So where it is arranged that an agreement made orally shall be put into writing, but this is prevented by the fraud of one of the parties, he will not be allowed to avail himself of the defence of the Statute (n). Fourthly, if an oral contract for the sale of land be partly performed by one of the parties thereto, that may preclude the other from setting up the defence of the Statute of Frauds to an action under the equitable jurisdiction of the Courts for the specific enforcement of the contract (0). For it is held in equity that when there has been part performance of an oral contract for the sale of land (which, as we have seen, is not void (p)), the parties are to be charged not so much upon the contract (q) as upon the equities arising from the acts of performance. The case is considered to have gone beyond the stage of mere contract and therefore to be outside the mischief aimed at by the Statute; and in order to do justice between the parties, oral evidence of the contract is admitted (r). But to have this effect, the acts of part performance must, according to the authoritative phrase, be "unequivocally and in their own nature referable to some such agreement as that alleged" (s). That is to say, the acts must be such that the existence of an agreement such as alleged is the only reasonable inference therefrom; they must be not only consistent with the contract asserted but referable to no other title (t). The acts moreover must be such as would render it a fraud to raise the defence of want of signed writing (n). The terms of the agreement, of fraud, an oral agreement to put in writing and sign the terms of a contract regulated by the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds cannot be enforced; Wood v. Midgley, 5 De G. M. & G. 41, 45; see Fry, Sp. Perfce. Sec. 575, p. 267, 3rd ed.; p. 2.54, 4th ed.; Johns-ion v. Boyes, 42 Sol. J. 610; S. C, on further proceedings, 1899. 2 Ch. 73.