(c) Neesom v. Clarkson, 2 Hare, 163; see p. 165.

(d) Malpas v. Ackland, 3 Russ. 273.

So, notice of the land being in the occupation of a person other than the vendor, has been held to be notice of the occupier's equities (f); even of an agreement for the sale to him of the fee simple (g); but this has always been considered an extreme case (h) and the doctrine of it has not been extended.

So, notice of the legal estate being outstanding, is notice of the trusts on which it is held (i); and notice that the title deeds are in the possession of a third party, is notice of any charge he has upon the property (k); so, notice that the title is a mortgage title, seems to be notice of any dealings by the mortgagee with the mortgagor which may have kept alive the equity of redemption (I).

So, where a person, entitled only for life, represented that she was sesied in fee, and conveyed as if so seised, a person claiming under her for valuable consideration was held to be affected with notice, the settlement being the only document under which she could claim the estate (m); and, as observed by Lord Lyndhurst (n), no one could find fault with that decision; for either the party did or he did not investigate the title; if he did not, he was guilty of great negligence; if he did, he must have seen that the party conveying to him had only a life estate: so a lessee (o), or a sub-lessee (p), has notice of the title of the immediate, and, (in the case of a sub-lessee), original lessor; so, a person has been held to be affected with notice of a fraud affecting a deed, and which the unusual manner in which it was executed ought to have suggested to his solicitor (q); so, where a purchaser had notice of another person having a judgment or warrant of attorney affecting the estate, and refrained from making any inquiry, he was held bound, although the incumbrance was in fact a mortgage (r); and, as a general rule, if a person knows that another has or claims an interest in the property for which he is dealing, he is bound to inquire what that interest is, and if he omit to do so, he will be bound, although the notice was inaccurate as to the particulars or extent of such interest (s): so, a purchaser, having notice that a legatee had released the executrix from a legacy, and that, in lieu thereof, the latter had by will devised a freehold estate to such legatee, was held to have notice of such devise being pursuant to a written agreement between the parties (t): so (u), a mortgagee not inquiring for the deeds was postponed to a prior equitable incumbrancer, upon the ground (w) of his having purposely abstained from making inquiry, the mortgage being for securing a pre-existing debt; that, in short, there was wilful blindness: and it has been held, in a late case, that the mere omission to ask for the deeds is sufficient to postpone a mortgagee, to the equitable lien of the actual holder (x). But, on the other hand, a private Act of Parliament, or a private Act made public (y), is not, in itself, notice to a purchaser; nor is registration of a deed, etc. in a County Register (z), nor registration of a judgment at the Common Pleas (a), nor the entry of a document on the Court Rolls of a Manor (b), notice, unless he make a search extending over a period comprising the entry in the Register or Court Rolls, (as the case may be): nor is a Commission of Bankruptcy in itself notice (c), nor a Decree in a Court of Equity (d), nor a lis pendent, unless registered at the Common Pleas (e): although in all these cases the purchaser has the means of acquiring notice.

Purchaser held to have notice of facts which he ought to have known.

(e) Att.-Gen. v. Flint, 4 Ha. 147.

(f) Allen v. Anthony, 1 Mer. 282; Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. jun. 437, 440; Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 120; Meux v. Maltby, 2 Sw. 281.

(g) Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249; 17 Ves. 433, and Douglas v. Whitterwronge, 16 Ves. 254, cited.

(h) Per V. C. Wigram, 1 Ha. 62; and see 2 Russ. & M. 629, and Sug. 1053; but see also Penny v. Watts, 1 Mac. & G. 150.

(?) Anon. Freem. Ch. Rep. 137.

(k) Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves.; see p. 122; Dryden v. Frost, 3 Myl. & Cr. 670; and see 1 Ha. 61; Worthing-ton v. Morgan, 16 Sim. 547; see Sug. 1055.

(l) See Hansard v. Hardy, 18 Ves.; see p. 462.

(m) Jackson v. Rowe, 2 Sim. & St. 472 and 475; and see Roddy v. Williams, 3 J. & L. 1.

(n) 1 Phil. 255; and see V. C. Wigram's remarks in Neesom v. Clarkson, 2 Ha. 173.

Cases in which a purchaser is not affected with notice.

(o) Att.-Gen v. Backhouse, 17 Ves. 293; Butler v. Lord Portarlington, 1 Dru. & W. 20.

(p) Steedman v. Poole, 6 Ha. 193; and see Conner v. Collinge, 3 Myl. & K. 283.

(q) Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & K. 699.

(r) Taylor v. Baker, 5 Pri. 306.

(s) See Gibson v. Inyo, 6 Ha. 124.

(t) Penny v. Watts, 1 Mac. & G. 150, 158.

(u) Whit dread v. Jordan, 1 Y. & C. 303.

(w) 1 Phil. 255.

(x) Worthington v. Morgan, 16 Sim. 547.

So, notice of a past tenancy is no notice of the tenant's equitable interests (f); nor is a purchaser from a derivative lessee affected with constructive notice of the contents of the original lease (g); nor, although a purchaser of a Lease is bound to know from whom the lessor derived his title, is he affected with notice of all the circumstances under which he so derived it (h): nor, where a sale by fiduciary vendors is apparently regular, need a purchaser inquire into collateral questions - such as the mode in which the sale has been conducted (i), - although he will be affected with notice of a breach of trust clearly deducible from facts appearing on the face of the assurance (k); nor is notice of a tenancy constructive notice of the lessor's title (l); nor, where the vendor is himself the tenant, and has acknowledged payment of the purchase-money both in the body of the conveyance and by the usual indorsed receipt, is the tenancy notice of his lien for any part thereof which may in fact remain unpaid (m); nor will a bond fide purchaser, otherwise without notice, be affected by the mere circumstance of the vendor having been out of possession for many years (n): nor does the mere absence of the title deeds seem in itself to be notice of the interest of the person holding them (o): although it may be otherwise if their absence is not explained or accounted for (p): nor does notice of the preparation of a draft seem in itself to be notice of the executed deed (q).