Purchaser, whether affected by notice of construction of doubtful instrument.

Constructive notice - nature of are capable of extension - semble.

(l) Farrow v. Rees, 4 Beav. 18; and see Lacey v. Ingle, 2 Ph. 413; Gibson v. Ingo, 6 Ha. 124.

(m) See Sug. 1060; Davies v. Davies, 4 Beav. 54.

(n) Thompson v. Simpson, 1 Dru. & War. 459.

(o) Sheldon v. Cox, Amb. 626.

(p) 2 Anstr. 438; and see Sug-1041.

In a recent case, before V. C. Wigram, it was asserted by the Court, that the cases in which constructive notice has been established resolve themselves into two classes; first, cases in which the party charged has had actual notice that the property in dispute was, in fact, charged, incumbered, or in some way affected; and the Court has, thereupon, bound him with constructive notice of facts and instruments to a knowledge of which he would have been led by an inquiry after the charge, incumbrance, or other circumstance affecting the property, of which he had actual notice; and, secondly, cases in which the Court has been satisfied, from the evidence before it, that the party charged had designedly abstained from inquiry, for the very purpose of avoiding notice (s): and, in a later case, the V. C, with reference to his previous judgment, repudiates the notion, (which had been attributed to him,) "that there may not be a degree of negligence so gross that a Court of Equity may treat it as evidence of fraud impute a fraudulent motive to it - and visit it with the consequences of fraud, although (morally speaking) the party charged may be perfectly innocent"; and further remarks, "Negligence, as I understand the term, supposes a disregard of some fact known to the purchaser, which at least indicated the existence of that fact, notice of which the Court imputes to the purchaser" (t).

Propositions of Wigram, V. C. as to constructive notice.

(q) See 1 Phill. 253. (r) 2 Sim. & St. 475.

(s) Jones v. Smith, 1 Ha.; see p. 55.

The propositions of the V. C. seem, however, scarcely to provide for those cases in which a purchaser is affected with constructive notice, not through his personal knowledge of any fact leading him to actual notice, but by his neglect of the usual and recognised means for acquiring such knowledge or notice; for instance, a public Act of Parliament is notice to all the world (u); so is a lis pendens (w), if registered under the Act of 2 Vict. c. 11 (x), or a deed or will registered in a register county or entered on Court Rolls (if the purchaser search over the period within which the instrument is registered (y) or the entry is made); or a judgment entered at the Common Pleas, if the purchaser search the register; so, if a purchaser, without any fraudulent intention, (the absence of which might be evidenced by his payment of a full price for the property), were to accept a conveyance without any previous investigation of title, relying on the mere assurance of the vendor that he was absolute owner, he would, nevertheless, be held to have constructive notice of any defect appearing on the title (z); although he could be scarcely said to have actual notice of any fact indicating the existence of such defect.

Mere negligence may have the effect of notice.

(t) West v. Reid, 2 Hare, 257, 259.

(u) Sug. 1044; although it be a local Act, Barraud v. Archer, 2 Sim. 433; S. C., 2 Russ. & Myl. 751. Quaere, as to a private Act made public; Sug. ubi supra.

(w) Ibid.

(x) See sect. 7. But it is said to be only notice of what is charged on the bill, and not of equities which may possibly arise out of the matters in question in the suit; see Shalcross v.

Dixon, 5 Jarm. Conv. by S. 493; but see Jennings v. Bond, 2 J. & L. 720, et quaere. An administration suit is a lis pendens as respects estates sold under the decree; Drew v. Earl of Nor-bury, 3 J. & L. 267; tiling of the bill, and not service of the subpoena, is the commencement of a lis pendens, S. C.

(y) Hodgson v. Dean, 2 Sim. & St. 221; see, as to the extent to which a memorial is notice, Rochard v. Fulton, 1 J. & L. 413.

To consider, however, the cases falling within the rules laid down by V. C. Wigram, and which, with the above exceptions, seem to comprise the authorities on the subject: it has been held, that notice of a postnuptial and apparently voluntary settlement is constructive notice of the antenuptial agreement on which it is founded (a); that actual notice to a purchaser, of an instrument as one affecting the estate, is constructive notice of all instruments to which an examination of the first would have led him (b); even although such prior instruments are not actually recited, but there is only a recital that the property is subject to limitations which in fact correspond with the limitations thereby created (c); so, a recital that the property was held upon such trusts for the use of A., B. and C. (parties to the conveyance) "for such estates in possession, reversion, or remainder as they became entitled to after the death of D." was held to be notice of prior trusts in favour of other parties which would have been discovered by an examination of the instrument creating the trusts which were referred to in the recital (d); so, notice of an equitable claim, as affecting an unspecified portion of the property, is notice of the claim as in fact affecting the entirety (e).

Purchaser having notice of a particular fact or instrument held to have notice of connected facts and instruments.

(z) See Lord Lyndhurst's remarks on Jackson v. Rowe, in 1 Phil. 255; and see to the same effect Sir J. Wi-gram's remarks in Neesom v. Clark-son, 2 Ha. 173, and West v. Reid, 2 Ha. 260.

(a) Ferrars v. Cherry, 2 Vern. 384; as to the authority of the case, which has been questioned, see Mr. Raithby's note, 3rd ed.

(b) Coppin v. Fernyhough, 2 Bro. C. C. 291; Bisco v. Earl of Banbury, 1 Ca. in Chan. 287, 291; Tanner v. Florence, ib. 259, 260; Davies v. Thomas, 2 Y. & C. 234; (where however it was also held that notice of a prior conveyance and of the then vendor's title was notice of his lien for unpaid purchase-money, on which point the decision cannot it would seem be supported; see Sug. 879); and Butler v. Lord Portarling-ton, 1 Dru. & War. 20; and see cases cited, supra, n. (z).