There is also considerable difference in the method of finance in the two countries. Twenty or thirty years ago in America (and it may happen even now) when a line was built the company bonded it for the full amount of the cost of construction. Then a share capital was issued as a bonus to be divided among the members of the syndicate which promoted the line; so that in this way the ordinary railway capital was really what might be called "water." If the scheme turned out a success the promoters received a handsome profit. If it were a failure they lost nothing, and the only sufferers were the unfortunate bondholders. Very many of the lines owe their existence to this method of financing; but it does not necessarily follow that all of these railways are not now worth the amount for which they are capitalised. In fact the American railway system has experienced the effects of the natural law of the survival of the fittest. Events move much more rapidly there than in this country. Periods of great prosperity and adversity recur more frequently, and act with greater intensity than they do with us. In each period of distress some of the weaker companies have been weeded out, while the stronger have weathered the storm. There is a cycle of good fortune at present; but a very few years ago the railways' earnings were at a very low ebb, and in consequence several of the important railroad companies defaulted. Indeed it is estimated that one-third of the railway mileage was in this position. The defaulting companies, as a rule, were reconstructed, and in the process the fixed charges for interest were heavily reduced; and although the prior bondholders generally escaped without loss, the shareholders and those holding junior securities suffered severely.

Having given the dark side, I must now turn to the points where we are at a disadvantage as compared with America. As I mentioned when discussing the question of British railways, the Americans have been turning their attention to decreasing the working cost; and they have done so by introducing larger trains, larger waggons, more powerful engines, and improved gradients; and in the railroads of highest repute these improvements have to a great extent been defrayed not out of capital but out of revenue.

In addition they are more cautious in dividing the profits, giving a smaller proportion to the shareholders and carrying a larger sum to reserve than we do. I already referred to this point in the lecture on British railways; but to emphasise it I give the following particulars of the Pennsylvania Railroad as an example of the finance of an American railroad of the best class. Its capital stock amounted at 31st December 1902 to 204 million dollars. The net profit for the year, after deducting the interest on debt, etc, amounted to nearly 26 million dollars. It paid less than half of that sum in dividends, spending $12,500,000 out of its revenue in betterment outlays. During the last three years only half of the profit was divided among the shareholders, the other half having been applied either in betterment or carried to reserve. Its railway system aggregated nearly 5000 miles. Its bonded debt was $140,000,000; and this, backed up by a share capital of considerably larger amount ($204,000,000), which has earned a dividend of 5 per cent during the period of depression, and has never had less than 4 1/2 per cent since 1856, forms a security of the highest class. It is difficult to get an example of its obligations exactly suitable for comparison with similar securities in this country; but if we take the best of its bonds, these were selling at the end of the year at a price to yield 3 1/2 per cent, whereas the debenture stock of the London and North-Western was selling at a price to yield about £3, Is. per cent - a difference of nearly 1/2 per cent. One of the disadvantages of the bonds of the American railways, from an investor's point of view, arises from the fact that they are redeemable; and this undoubtedly is one cause of their price being lower than that of our railway debenture stocks, which, you are aware, are irredeemable. In the case of British debenture stock the holder is entitled to dividend in all time coming, and he can neither demand his capital nor can the railway company insist on his taking repayment. From the point of view of the railway company, however, there is no doubt that the advantage lies in the American system. The British railways are saddled in perpetuity with the interest on their debenture debt - interest in most cases fixed at a time when money was much dearer than it is at present. The London and North-Western debenture stock has been borrowed mostly at 4 per cent. If they had retained the power to redeem they could at one time have raised the amount at something like 2 1/2 per cent; and even to-day they could borrow at a rate from 15s. to £1 per cent less than the 4 per cent they are paying. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company has two large mortgages, amounting together to over $40,000,000, on which 6 per cent is payable, which were borrowed between the years 1867 and 1874, and are redeemable partly in 1905 and partly in 1910. If, as is likely, they will be able at maturity to reborrow the money at not more than 3 1/2 per cent, the conversion will effect an annual saving of at least one million dollars; and as time goes on other reductions in its fixed charges will be effected by the same process of reborrowing at a cheaper rate the mortgages which become due.