Whether the valuation is to be considered when the question is whether it would be worth while to repair, see Irving v. Manning, 1 H. L. Cas. 287; Allen v. Sugrue, 8 B. & C. 561; Orrok v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 456; Hyde v. La. Ins. Co. 14 Mart. La. 410.

(n) Brooks v. Oriental Ins. Co. 7 Pick. 250; Orrok v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 456; Louisville Ins. Co. v. Bland, 0 Dana, 148.

(o) See post.

(p) Fiedler v. New York Ins. Co. 6 Duer, 282; Hall v. Ocean Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 472, 478.

(q) Bradlie v. Maryland Ins. Co. 12 Pet. 378.

(r) Pezant v. National Ins. Co. 15 Wend. 453. In Massachusetts, owing probably to this clause making the right to abandon depend upon the loss amounting to fifty per cent, when adjusted as a partial loss, it is held, that those charges which are properly the subject of general average contribution are not to be considered, in making up the fifty per cent. Orrok v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 456; Ellicott v. Alliance Ins. Co. 14 Gray, 318; Greely v. Tremont Ins. Co. 9 Cush. 415. See also Fiedler v. New York Ins. Co. 6 Duer, 282. In respect to the cargo it has been held, that goods lost by jettison may properly be taken into the esta right to have the damage done by the peril insured against, thoroughly repaired, and the fact that the vessel can be rendered seaworthy at an expense less than fifty per cent, is not enough to prevent an abandonment. (s) If repaired in fact, the actual expense of making the repair is to be taken; unless the ship could have been temporarily repaired at that place for a slight cost, so as to enable her to go in safety to a port of repair, and there be fully repaired with a material saving of cost on the whole. (t) For then it would be the duty of the insured to make this saving, and he could charge the underwriters, not only the cost of the temporary repairs, but the expense of going to the place of full repair; (u) and he cannot charge the underwriters with the loss of a saving which he ought to have made, and must therefore allow them whatever might have thus been saved.

It would seem, though it may not be certain, that the insurers have a right to take a ship abandoned to them, and repair her and return her to the insured, if in perfectly good condition; (v) and it is said, that if in making this repair they incur expenses which the insured could not have recovered of them under the policy, they may recover these from the assured. (w) If the master actually begins repairs before the abandonment is made, it is held, that the abandonment is not valid. (x)

The fifty per cent. rule, and the law of abandonment generally, apply to the cargo as well as the ship. It is obvious, however, that there may be a total loss of the ship but not of the cargo, or a total loss of the cargo but not of the ship.

And in our chapter on contracts of shipping, we have conmate in making up the amount of more than fifty per cent. Forbes v. Manuf. Ins. Co. 1 Gray, 371.

(s) Lincoln v. Hope Ins. Co. 8 Gray, 22.

(t) Center v. Am. Ins. Co. 7 Cow. 664, 4 Wend. 45; Orrok v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 456; Hall v. Franklin Ins. Co. 0 Pick. 466. But see Satires v. Sun Ins. Co. 2 Sandf. 482.

(u) Lincoln v. Hope Ins. Co. 8 Gray, 22. So, of the expense of raising a submerged vessel and taking her into a port for repairs. Sewall v. U. S. Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 90; Ellicott v. Alliance Ins. Co. 14 Gray, 818.

(v) This is so held in Massachusetts. Wood v. Lincoln Ins. Co. 6 Mass. 479; Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Chase, 20 Pick. 147; Reynolds v. Ocean Ins. Co.

22 Pick. 191. See also, Marine Dock & Mut Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 4 Am. Law Reg. 481. See contra, Peele v. Merchants Ins. Co. 8 Mason, 27; Cin. Ins. Co. v. Bakewell, 4 B. Mon. 541; Ruckman v. Merchants Ins. Co. 5 Duer, 860; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curtis, C. C 322. It has been held, that if the insurer repairs he must do so in a reasonable time. Peele v. Suffolk Ins. Co. 7 Pick. 254; Reynolds v. Ocean Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 191.

(w) Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Chase, 20 Pick. 142.

(x) Humphreys v. Union Ins. Co. 8 Mason, 429; Dickey v. Am. Ins. Co. 8 Wend. 658; Depau v. Ocean Ins. Co. 5 Cow. 63. See Ritchie v. U. S. Ins. Co. 5 S. & R. 501.

sidered the duty and power of the master in respect to the cargo, when the ship is wrecked.

If any part of the goods insured arrives in safety at its port of destination, we think the rule of fifty per cent. does not apply to it. Thus, if a stranded ship is saved by a jettison of sixty per cent. of the cargo, and forty per cent. arrives safely at its destination, this partial loss cannot be made total by abandonment. Nor can a loss of a part of the goods, however large, the residue being saved and arriving uninjured, be made a constructive total loss by abandonment. (y) It seems now to be well settled in this country, that if memorandum articles arrive at the port of destination, and then and there exist in specie, the underwriters are not liable as for a total loss, whatever may be their condition or loss of value. (z) But if the goods reach an intermediate port, in such condition that, although existing in specie, there is no reasonable hope of their being carried forward safely and reaching in specie their port of destination, it is both the right and the duty of the master to sell them, if they are still salable, and thus obtain whatever value may remain to them; and the assured may recover as for a total loss. (a) And if the goods are in such a condition at the intermediate port that they cannot be carried forward consistently with the health of the crew and the safety of the vessel, the loss is considered as total. (b) If the ship or cargo be released from capture by a compromise of more than half the * value, this may be made by abandonment a constructive total loss. (c)

Freight is totally lost when there is a total loss of ship and cargo, (d) or of the cargo alone; (e) and it has been held, that the constructive total loss of the ship carries with it the loss of freight, and that the assured by abandoning can recover as for a total loss. (f) But this seems opposed to well settled principles of insurance law. (g) And it has been held, that a loss of goods of over fifty per cent. at the port of departure, does not authorize the assured to abandon and recover a total loss of freight. (h) If the goods remain in specie, and are so delivered to the consignee, whatever may be their deterioration, there is no loss whatever of freight. And if a ship arrive at an intermediate port, or return to the port of shipment, damaged, but capable of repair, and may be made capable, by repair, of carrying the goods to the port of destination, and so earning the freight, the owner, who is insured on his freight cannot abandon it, and claim as for a total loss, by reason of the expense or delay of such repair. (i) If the ship be abandoned, and thereby become the property of the insurers, and afterwards earn freight, the insurers on freight take by abandonment the freight earned before the abandonment, and the insurers on the ship take the freight earned after the abandonment. (j)

(y) Forbes v. Manuf. Ins. Co. 1 Gray, 371; Seton v. Delaware Ins. Co. 2 Wash. C. C. 175. But see Moses v. Columbian Ins. Co. 6 Johns. 219.

(z) Morean v. United States Ins. Co. 1 Wheat. 219, 3 Wash. C. C. 266; Brooke v. La. State Ins. Co. 16 Mart. La. 681; Skinner v. Western Ins. Co. 19 La. 278: Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 8 Sumner, 224. In respect to what is an existence in specie, it has been held, that the value of the article has nothing to do with its existence in specie. Thus fish, though absolutely spoiled (Cocking v. Frazer, Park, Ins. 151), and corn which was putrid (Neilson v. Col. Ins. Co. 8 Caines, 108), and pork which was roasted (Skinner v. Western Ins. Co. supra), have been held to exist in specie. But If merely the wheels of a chariot remain, the chariot no longer exists in specie. Judah v. Randal, 2 Caines, Cas. 324.

(a) See Aranzamendi v. Louisiana Ins. Co. 2 La. 432; Williams v. Kennebec Ins. Co. 31 Maine, 466; Poole v. Protection Ins. Co. 14 Conn. 47; Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 8 Sumner, 220; Hugg v. Augusta Ins. Co. 7 How. 595; Tudor v. New England Ins. Co. 12 Cush. 664.

(b) Hugg v. Augusta Ins. Co. 7 How. 696; Williams v. Kennebec Ins. Co. 81 Maine, 455; Poole v. Protection Ins. Co. 14 Conn. 47; De Peyster v. Sun Ins. Co. 19 N. Y. 272.

(c) Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co. 1 Johns. 406; Clarkson v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 9 id. 1; Waddell v. Columbian Int. Co. 10 id. 6l.

(d) Idle v. Royal Exchange Ass. Co.

8 Taunt. 755.

(e) See cases infra.

\f) See Thwing v. Wash. Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 443; Am. Ins. Co. v. Center, 4 Wend. 46.

(g) In the first place, it may be necessary to state, that the fact that the ship is insured and being constructively lost, the freight passed to the abandonees of the ship, does not necessarily carry with it a total loss of freight, for as between the parties the question is to be treated as if the ship were uninsured. Scottish Ins. Co. v. Turner, 4 H. L. Cas. 312, n.f more fully reported 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 24 ; Lord v. Neptune Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 109, per Shaw, C. J.; Fiedler v. New York Ins. Co. 6 Duer, 282. See contra, Cool-idffe v. Gloucester Ins. Co. 16 Mass. 841. We have already seen, that if the vessel is at an intermediate port, and the master, although he cannot send the goods on in his own vessel, can procure another, it is his duty to do so. If this is done it is considered as done under the original contract. See Shipton v. Thornton, 0 A. & E. 314; Rosetto v. Gurney, 11 C. B. 176. In Thwing v. Washington Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 448, it was considered that, in such a case the master ceased to be the agent of the ship, and became the agent of the shippers, and it was intimated, that the cases might be reconciled on the theory that the ship-owners might ratify the acts of the master, and treat him as their agent. But we are at a loss to see how the ship-owners can adopt the acts of the agent of the shippers to the disadvantage of the latter. If the master can send on the goods, and fails to do so, the insurers on freight should not be liable. See Bradhurst v. Col. Ins. Co. 9 Johns. 17; Hugg v. Augusta Ins. Co. 7 How. 009.

(h) Lord v. Neptune Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 109.

(i) Jordan v. Warren Ins. Co. 1 Story, 842; Saltus v. Ocean Ins. Co. 14 Johns. 138; Clark v. Massachusetts Ins. Co. 2 Pick. 104; Mordy v. Jones, 4 B. & C. 894; Herbert v. Hallett, 3 Johns. Cas. 98; M'Gaw v. Ocean Ins. Co. 23 Pick. 406; Lord v. Neptune Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 109; Griswold v. N. T. Ins. Co. 1 Johns. 206; Ogden v. Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. 2 Duer, 204.

(j) Coolidge v. Gloucester Ins. Co. 15 Mass. 341; United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Cas. 377, 2 id. 443; Leavenworth v Delafleld, 1 Caines, 578; Simonds v. Union Ins. Co. 1 Wash. C. C. 448.

It may be true, theoretically, that profits (k) and commissions (l) may be abandoned; but we can hardly see in practice how such an abandonment can be operative.