This section is from the book "The Constitutional Law Of The United States", by Westel Woodbury Willoughby. Also available from Amazon: Constitutional Law.
The court in its opinion was, however, careful to confine the doctrine laid down to the particular ease before it. "This case,"' it declared, "does not involve the validity of a divorce granted on constructive service, by the court of a State in which only one of the parties ever had a domicile, nor the question to what extent the good faith of the domicile may be afterward inquired into. In this case, the divorce in Kentucky was by the court of the State which had always been the undoubted domicile of the hus-band, and which was the only matrimonial domicile of the hus-band and wife. The single question to be decided is the validity of that divorce, granted after such notice had been given as was required by the statutes of Kentucky." The court did, however, affirm the general doctrine that "the purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relations of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind the other. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law."
The facts of the case of Haddock v. Haddock26 very much resembled those of Atherton v. Atherton. The only important difference, if indeed it was an important difference, was that here the decree which was sought to be used as conclusive in another State, had been granted the husband by the courts of a State which was not the matrimonial domicile, but was the then domicile of the husband. The wife, residing in the State of the original matrimonial domicile, had received only constructive notice. The courts of the State of the wife's domicile refused to recognize the validity of this decree, on the ground that the separation had occurred through the fault of the husband, and their action was upheld by the federal Supreme Court, that court thus, in effect, deciding that the husband, though divorced in the State (Connecticut) where lie had obtained his decree, was not divorced in another State (New York) where his wife - or former wife -ided. In effect, then, limiting the case to the particular facts involved, the doctrine was laid down that where the complainant has abandoned the wife, and obtained a domicile in a State, other than that of the original matrimonial domicile, and only constructive service has been had upon the defendant, no decree of divorce can be granted to which full force and credit must be given in the courts of other States.
26 201 U. S. 562; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525; 50 L. ed. 8G7.
In order to distinguish this case from previous adjudications, and especially from that of Atherton v. Atherton, the court, in its majority opinion, reviewed the whole subject and laid down the following doctrines as having been definitely established: "First The requirement of the Constitution is not that some, but that full, faith and credit shall be given by States to the judicial decrees of other States. That is to say, where a decree rendered in one State is embraced by the full faith and credit clause, that constitutional provision commands that the other States shall give to the decree the force and effect to which it was entitled in the State where rendered. (Harding v. Harding, 198 IT. S. 317; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. (679; 49 L. ed. 1066.) Second. Where a personal judgment has been rendered in the courts of a State against a nonresident merely upon constructive service. and, therefore, without acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, such judgment may not be enforced in another State in virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Indeed, a personal judgment so rendered is, by operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, void as against the non-resident, even in the State when- rendered; and. therefore, such non-rrsident. in virtue of right- granted by the Constitution of the United States, may successfully resist, even in the State where rendered, the enforcement of such a judgment. (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed. 565.)"
Applying these principles to the case at bar the court held, in the first place, that a suit for divorce is essentially an action in personam and not in rem; and, in the second place, that, by wrongfully deserting his wife, the domicile of the wife, contrary to the general rule, did not continue that of the husband when he removed to Connecticut, but continued to be in New York, the State of the original matrimonial domicile. Therefore, it was held that the Connecticut courts, never having obtained personal service upon the wife, and the action not being in rem, no decree could be rendered against her that would affect her status anywhere except in the State where the judgment was rendered. In effect, it was held that in order to render a decree of divorce that would have to be recognized by the courts of other States, a court must have jurisdiction of both of the parties, that is, of the complainant by bona fide residence creating a domicile, and of the defendant either by domicile in the State, by personal service, or actual appearance, or by constructive service. But that this constructive service cannot be relied upon in cases where the defendant, having had good reason for separating from the complainant, has obtained or retained a domicile in another State.
In the Atherton case, it was argued that the constructive service upon the wife had been sufficient to give the court jurisdiction because the wife had not been able to obtain a domicile apart from her husband by wrongfully separating herself from her husband. In the case at bar, however, the complainant had deserted the defendant and matrimonial domicile, and, therefore, she had been entitled to retain her domicile in New York, after the removal of her husband to Connecticut.
Four justices dissented. In the opinion concurred in by them it was argued that the case was governed by the doctrines laid down in Atherton v. Atherton. In that case it was held that jurisdiction over a domiciled complainant and constructive service over the defendant were sufficient to support a decree which was entitled to full force and credit in other States. In the case at bar the domicile of the complainant was a bona fide one, and, it was argued, the facts that it was or had been a matrimonial domicile or that the complainant had wrongfully left his wife were irrelevant. The fact that the Connecticut court had granted the divorce was, or should have been, it was argued, conclusive upon the New York courts that the defendant had deserted the complainant and not vice versa. It was denied that a proceeding for divorce is a personal one (though a suit in personam is often incorporated with it). In short, then, the bona fide domicile of the complainant being granted, and constructive service such as the lex fori demanded being had, and decree for divorce actually rendered, the merits of the case, that is, as to which of the parties was responsible for the separation, the dissenting justices argued, were no longer open for examination, and hence the question as to where was or had been the matrimonial domicile became irrelevant.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Haddock v. Haddock undoubtedly came as a great surprise to lawyers generally, and its correctness has been questioned by many.27
It is possible that the assertion made in the dissenting opinion that the decision of the Connecticut court that the wife had deserted the husband, and not he her, should have been held conclusive of that fact in the New York courts, may be met by the argument of Justice Peckham's dissenting opinion in Atherton v. Atherton. This was that the court in which the full force and credit of a decree of divorce of a court of another State is demanded, may exercise its own judgment as to the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the separation of the defendant from the complainant in order to determine whether or not such defendant had been able to obtain a domicile apart from the complainant, and, therefore, whether or not such defendant was properly beyond the jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree; that, in other words, the decree of such court is not conclusive upon this point as it goes to a question of jurisdiction.
27 For acute, and. to the author's mind, destructive criticisms of the position assumed by the majority of the court in Haddock v. Haddock, see articles by J. H. Beale,. Jr.. in the Harvard Law Review, XIX, 586, and by H. A. Bigtlow in The Greenbag,). XVIII, 348.
But in other respects it does appear that the principles laid down by the majority of the court in the Haddock case are open to objection. Especially open to objection are the following statements: that a suit for divorce is to be treated as a proceeding mi personam; that the fact that the domicile of the complainant was not the original matrimonial domicile is important; and, finally. that a decree of divorce which though not necessarily valid in other jurisdictions is valid in the State where rendered, and that thus, the husband, though legally divorced in one State, is still married in another State. The author is, therefore, inclined to believe that either these doctrines will ultimately be overruled, or, if not, that they will be strictly limited in their application to the precise facts of the Haddock case.
 
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