A federal tax may be laid upon interstate commerce, its instrumentalities, the articles carried, or the privilege of engaging in it, either as a revenue measure or as a means of regulation. If the tax should be laid for a regulative purpose, its constitutionality would be dependent wholly upon the Commerce Clause, and, not being, except in form, a tax, would not be subject to the express limitations as to apportionment, etc., imposed by the Constitution upon the exercise of the taxing power by the United States.64

A genuine tax imposed for revenue purposes, if assessed upon the commodities of interstate commerce or upon the instrumentalities of commerce as property, would be a direct tax and would have to be apportioned among the States according to their respective populations. That this is so sufficiently appears from the doctrines of Knowlton v. Moore.65

If the tax should be one upon the privilege of engaging in, or carrying on interstate commerce, it would in all probability be construed to be constitutionally an indirect tax.66 The case that would probably be held controlling as to this are Nicol v. Ames67 in which a stamp act on sales made at an exchange or board of trade was held to be not a direct tax on the property sold, but an indirect tax in the nature of an excise on the facilities offered at the exchanges or boards of trade.68

A more doubtful point, however, is whether such an excise tax upon the right to engage in interstate commerce would not come within the constitutional provision that " no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State." That it would be held to be a tax on exports from a State would seem to follow from the reasoning of the court in Brown v. Maryland;69 but, if the doctrine of Woodruff v. Parham70 be followed, it will be held that the prohibition of the Constitution applied only to exports from a State to foreign countries.

64 Cf. Veazie Rank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533; 19 L. ed. 482.

65 178 U. S. 41 ; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; 44 L. ed. 969,

66 Although economically a direct tax.

67 173 U. S. 509; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; 43 L. ed. 786.

68 See ante, p. 618. In Polluck v. Farmers' L. & T. Co. (158 U. S. 601; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912; 39 L. ed. 1108) the court by way of caution say: "We do not mean to say that an act . . . might not lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments and vocations," without needing to be apportioned.