Congress has, by a series of acts, beginning with that of 1893, sought to increase the safety of trains crossing state lines, by requiring that they shall be equipped with certain approved safety devices. The constitutionality of the first of these measures has been affirmed by the Supreme Court.14 And in Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co. Justice Moody in his dissenting opinion declared, "if the statute now before us is beyond the constitutional power of Congress surely the safety appliance act is also void, for there can be no distinction in principle between them." This was, of course, obiter, and, it would seem, a statement unadvisedly made, for it is clear that the requirement that safety appliances be used has a direct relation to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes the authority to regulate the instrumentalities by which it is carried on has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court.15

Cook in his Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution (§§ 38, 39), argues that the federal power under the Commerce Clause should be held to justify only those regulations which are for the benefit of those enjoying the benefit of interstate transportation. "For instance." says Cooke, "in the case of a corporation there are many matters of internal management, thus the amount and character of capital stock and indebtedness, as to which it seems doubtful whether any regulation thereof would be for the benefit of transportation by such corporation. Much at least of such regulation would seem to be merely for the benefit of the public, and though within the power of the States, beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. ... By this test a mere regulation of, for instance, the liability of a carrier to its employees for negligence seems not within such scope."

In Hoxie v. N. Y. N. H. & H. Ry. Co. (73 Atl. Rep. 754) the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has held not only that the act of 1908 does not, and constitutionally could not compel state courts to enforce rights, or adopt procedure not recognized by the laws of its own State, but that the act is unconstitutional and void in its entirety, in that it does not confine its application to accidents due to the negligence of employees while engaged in interstate commerce. It is provided that the person injured must, to come within the terms of the act, be engaged at the time in interstate commerce. but the court point out, the injury may be occasioned by the negligence of an employee not then so engaged. Also, it is declared, the provision of the act which declares void any contract between an interstate carrier and his employees intended to enable it to exempt itself from the liability created by the act, is in violation of the due process law clause of the Fifth Amendment.

14 St. Louis, etc., Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616; 52 L. ed. 1061.

In Johnson v. Southern Pacific R. Co.16 the Safety Appliance Law was considered and applied without question as to its constitutionality.

In United States v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co.17 these acts were held applicable to lines of railroad lying wholly within a State, but serving as a link in an interstate route.