As has already been said, the power of Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce is not in terms exclusive, nor is it construed as excluding state regulation which incidentally affects such commerce, or even directly affects it for local purposes, so far as no congressional legislation exists. But the very purpose of the commercial clause in the federal constitution was to exclude discriminating restrictions and unnecessary interference on the part of the states, and it is to be presumed, therefore, that so far as these kinds of commerce are to be subjected to general regulations affecting them, not locally but throughout their entire extent, such regulations must come from Congress and not from the states. It must be assumed that, so far as general regulations are concerned, it is the intention of Congress that commerce shall be unrestricted save as congressional relations may have been adopted. Thus it has been held in Welton v. Missouri that a state cannot require a license for the selling within the state of goods brought into the state from another state or from a foreign country. A so-called license tax on drummers or commercial agents is therefore invalid as applied to such agents soliciting orders of goods from without the state (see Rob-bins v. Shelby County Taxing District); for freedom of intercourse involves the right of persons living in other states or in foreign countries to come into the state for the purpose of selling their goods save so far as restrictions may have been interposed by Congress, as, for instance, by the requirement for payment of import duties.

On the other hand, the control of persons carrying on business within the state, not necessarily involving the bringing of goods into the state for sale, is a matter for state regulation, and any business carried on within the state which is a proper subject for state taxation or police regulation is under state control. The state may impose a license tax upon transient merchants, or authorize cities to do so, without interfering with freedom of commerce, even though such a transient merchant may be selling goods brought from another state; and it has been held in Emert v. Missouri that the business of peddling, being one which is subject to regulation in the exercise of the police power, may be restricted by state statute, although the peddler is actually engaged in the sale of goods brought from without the state. In this connection, it is necessary, however, to bear in mind the provision of the federal constitution that " The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states" (Art. IV, § 2, ¶ 1), and therefore any state law or municipal regulation based on a discrimination between citizens of the state and citizens of other states, which excludes citizens of other states from all the privileges in this respect accorded to citizens of the state, and which bears harder on citizens of another state than the state's own citizens, are invalid. (See below, § 190.) Consequently any state legislation which only incidentally affects foreign or interstate commerce is invalid if it imposes a burden on such commerce as compared with commerce which is wholly within the state.