This section is from the book "A Treatise On The Law Of Vendor And Purchaser Of Real Estate And Chattels Real", by T. Cyprian Williams. Also available from Amazon: A treatise on the law of vendor and purchaser of real estate and chattels real.
We will now consider the effect of the transfer of the rights and liabilities created by the contract pending the completion thereof. This may take place either involuntarily, which is mainly by act of law, or voluntarily, that is, by act of the parties. The former case occurs upon the death, bankruptcy or personal incapacity supervening since the contract of either party thereto, and on the land sold being taken in execution of a judgment against the vendor; the latter upon the assignment inter vivos by either party of his rights under the contract. We will consider each of these cases in turn, first, as regards the vendor, and, secondly, with respect to the purchaser, premising that the contract, once validly concluded, is not avoided by the death, bankruptcy, or supervening incapacity of either party thereto, and remains, as a rule, enforceable not only at law but specifically in equity at suit of either party thereto, his representatives in law or assigns, against the other party or his representatives in law (r). The contract is also specifically enforceable against the vendor's assigns inter vivos of the land other than those who have taken the legal estate therein as purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration actually paid or executed without notice of the contract (s).
Transfer pending com-pletion of the rights and liabilities under the contract.
(m) Greenwood v. Turner, 1891, Oh. HI.
(n) Clarke v. Wilson, 15 Ves.
:317; Gibson v. Clarke, 1 V. & B.
500; Smith v. Lloyd, 1 Madd. 83;
Wickham v. Evered, 4 Madd. 53
Younge v. Duncombe, Younge,275
Tindal v. Cobham, 2 My. & K. 385; Fowler v. Ward, 6 Jur. 547.
(o) Fox v. Birch, 1 Mer. 105.
(p) Gibson v. Clarke, 1 V. & B.
500, 501: Morgan v. Shaw, 2 Mer. 138: Gell v. Watson,:; Madd. 225; Pryst v. Cambrian Rail. Go., L. R. 2 Ch. 444.
(q) Bonner v. Johnston, 1 Mer.
Freebody v. Perry, G . Coop. 91. Note that in Greenwood v. Turner, 1891, 2 Ch. 144. the lease under which the purchaser claimed to be in possession had expired at the time of the motion.
On the vendor's death, his rights under the contract pass to his executors or administrators, who are the proper persons to sue upon the contract either for damages at law or for specific performance in equity (t). But in order to reap the benefit of the contract, the personal representatives must, of course, procure the performance of the vendor's part of the agreement - that is, the conveyance to the purchaser of the land sold - and it is therefore necessary to consider upon what persons the vendor's estate in the land sold devolves upon his death pending completion. This depends upon the nature of the property sold. If it were freehold in fee the vendor's estate therein formerly passed, on his death before completion, to his heir or devisee, according as he had left the same to descend or disposed thereof by his will; and the heir or devisee was obliged to convey the estate to the purchaser (u). The vendor's estate would not only go to a specific devisee thereof, but might also pass under a general devise of all his real estate, if the purposes of such a devise were not inconsistent with this construction (x). If, however, the vendor had devised all his real estate generally to one, and all estates held by him upon any trust to another, it was a question how far the estate sold was held by the vendor upon a trust so as to pass under the devise of his trust estates. Where the title had been accepted prior to the vendor's death, it was held that the property was vested in him upon a trust, and so passed under a devise of his trust estates; but it appears that if the vendor had died prior to the acceptance of the title, the property sold would not have been held by him upon an absolute trust, for the contract had not yet become unconditionally binding on him, and so the land would have passed to his general devisee (y). Under the Land Transfer Act, 1875 (z), freeholds or copyholds held in fee and sold might have passed, on the vendor's death and intestacy, to his legal personal representative, if he had been a bare trustee thereof; but this would only have been the case where the title had been accepted and the purchase money paid(a). Under the Conveyancing Act of 1881 (b), freeholds held in fee and sold may pass, on the vendor's death before completion, to his legal personal representatives, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition thereof, if they were vested in the vendor upon a trust within the meaning of sect. 30 of that Act. This is the case if the title had been accepted and the purchase money paid before the vendor's death (c); and apparently it is so, if before his death the contract had become unconditionally binding on the parties by reason of the purchaser's acceptance of the title ((d), but this point has not been precisely so decided. Under the same Act (e), however, where at the death of any person there is subsisting a contract enforceable against his heir or devisee for the sale of the fee simple or other freehold interest descendible to his heirs general in any land, his personal representatives shall, by virtue of this Act, have power to convey the land for all the estate and interest vested in him at his death in any manner proper for giving effect to the contract. Under this Act, therefore, the legal personal representatives of a vendor of freeholds in fee, or a freehold estate pur autre vie (f), who has died since the commencement of the Act, and pending completion, have been enabled to complete the contract by conveying the legal estate to the purchaser in all cases in which the vendor had in his lifetime entered into a valid contract for sale. But it is to be observed that the power of conveyance given by the 4th section of the Act depends on the existence at the vendor's death of a contract for sale enforceable against his heir or devisee. It seems, therefore, that the power does not arise where the contract for sale was oral only, or put into writing but not signed by the vendor (g), unless this objection to the enforcement of the contract should have been removed under the doctrine of part performance or otherwise (h). And where a conveyance has been made in pursuance of this enactment, it appears to be a necessary part of the title to prove that the power so exercised duly arose; and for this purpose production of a contract for sale, duly put into writing and signed, may, it seems, be required (i). As we have seen, under the Land Transfer Act, 1897 (/.), a deceased person's freehold estate of inheritance now passes, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition thereof, to his personal representatives, as trustees for the persons by law beneficially entitled thereto. It appears, therefore, that if a vendor of freeholds in fee die since the commencement of that Act, and pending the completion of the contract, his estate therein must devolve upon his executors or administrators in any event. If the contract should have been so far performed that the vendor was, at the date of his death, an absolute trustee of the land for the purchaser, the vendor's estate appears to pass to his executors or administrators, under sect. 30 of the Conveyancing Act of 1881 (l); otherwise they appear to take the estate under the Land Transfer Act, 1897 (m).
 
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