By. Co., 5 C. B. N. S. 174; Harrison v. Rutland, 1893, 1 Q. B. 142; Hickman v. Maisey, 1900, 1 Q. B. 752.

(g) See Salisbury v. Great Nor-thern By. Co., ubi sup.

(h) See cases cited in note (k), p. 417. below.

(i) Doe d. Bring v. Pearsey, 7 B.

& C. 304; Scoones v. Morrell, 1 Beav. 251; Holmes v. Bellingham, 7 C. B. N. S. 329 (as to private roads). As to cases where a road adjoins an open common, see the first two cases cited in note (m), below. It should be noted that, where a high road, having un-metalled strips of land on either side of it, runs between fences, and there is nothing to show that the fences are not the boundaries of the highway, the presumption is that the public right of way extends over the whole of the land between the fences; B. v. United Kingdom Telegraph Co., 6 L. T. N. S. 378; Harvey v. Truro Rural Council, 1903, 2 Ch. 638; Offin v. Rochford Rural District Council, 1906, 1 Ch. 342; cf. Neeld v. Hendon Urban District Council, 81 L. T. 406; Belmore v. Kent County Council, 1901, 1 Ch. 873.

Streets within an urban district.

Mines and minerals thereunder.

(k) Simpson r. Dendy, S C. B. N. S. 433, affd. 7 Jur.N. S. 1058; Berridge v. Ward, 10 C. B. N. S. 400 (where the land conveyed was described by reference to .1 plan not including any part of the toad): Re White's Charities, L898, 1 Ch. 659; and see London & North Western Ry. Co. v. Westminster Corpn., L902, 1 Ch. 269, 279, affirmed. 1905, A. C. 426, 128, 129, 438.

(l) Re Popple and Barratt't Con-25 W. R. 248.

(m) Grose v. West, 7 Taunt. 39; Doe v. Kemp, 2 Bing. N. C. 102: Beckttt v. Leeds Corpn., L. R. 7 Ch. 421: Haigh v. West, 1893 B. 1!). 20.

(n) Salisbury v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 5 ('. B. N.S. 174 . Palm-stead Board of Works v. British Land Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 16, 203, 206; Leigh v. Jack, 5 Ex. D. 264; Pryor v. Petre, 1894, 2 Ch. 11; Mappin v. Liberty & Co., Ltd., L903, 1 Ch. 118. The above presumptions have no application in the case where a railway runs through one man's land, or [as it appears) between the lands of different owners; Thompson v. Hickman, 1907, 1 Ch. 550, 556.

(o) Stat. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, 9. 149. By s. 4, street includes any highway (not being a turnpike road), and any public bridge (not being a county bridge), and any road, lane, footway, square. court, alley or passage, whether a thoroughfare or not.

(p) Coverdale v. Charlton, 4 Q. B. D. 104. L21; Tunbridgt Wells Corpn. v. Baird, L896, A. C. 134; Finchley Electric Light Co. v. Finchley Urban District Council, w.

Streets in the metropolis.

Public.

Conveniences under roads in London.

Main roads 1903, 1 Ch. 437; Wednesbury Corpn. v. Lodge Holes Colliery Co., Ltd., 1905, 2 K. B. 823, 826; 1907, 1 K. B. 78, 89, 90; 1908, A. C. 323; Foley's Charity Trustees v. Dudley Corpn., 1910, 1 K.B. 317, 322, 324, 325.

(q) Stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 96. By s. 260, street is defined in the same way as in the Public Health Act, 1875; see note (o), p. 417, above.

(r) Rolls v. St. George's Vestry, Southward, 14 Ch. D. 785; Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co., 13 Q. B. D. 904; Battersea Vestry v. County of London, etc. Lighting Co., Ltd., 1899, 1 Ch. 474.

(s) Stat. 54 & 55 Vict. c. 76.

(t) London and North Western By. Co. v. Westminster Corpn., 1902, 1 Ch. 269, affirmed 1905, A. C. 426; Westminster Corpn. v. Johnson, 1904, 2 K. B. 737. See cases cited in note (p), above, p. 417.

(u) Stat. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 11 (1,6).

(x) Stat, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 13.

(y) See Finchley Electric Light Co. v. Finchley Urban District Council, 1902, 1 Ch. 866, reversed 1903, 1 Ch. 437.

(z) Curtis v. Kestercn County Council, 45 Ch. D. 504.

The like presumptions;are made with respect to the soil of rivers (where they are not tidal rivers) as with regard to the soil of roads (c). If the lands on both sides of the river belong to the same owner, it is presumed that he is the owner of the river-bed (d); that the whole of the river-bed passes on any conveyance or sale (e) of the lands on both sides of the river; and that one-half of the river-bed, up to mid-stream, passes by the conveyance or sale (e) of the land lying on one side of the river. And if the river divide the lands of different owners, it is presumed that each of them is the owner of that part of the river-bed which adjoins his own land, up to mid-stream, and that a conveyance or sale of the adjoining land carries with it the ownership of half the river-bed (f). These presumptions may equally be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, as in the case of roads (g). Where there is an ancient island in the middle of a river, and the lands on either bank of the river belong to different owners, the presumption that each riparian proprietor is the owner of half the river-bed applies only as far as the middle of the stream running between either bank and the island, and not so as to raise any presumption as to the ownership of the island (h). It must not be forgotten that, where there has been a grant of a several fishery in any river, it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the owner of the fishery is the owner of the soil of the river (i). In the case of tidal and navigable (k) rivers, estuaries and inland arms of the sea, the presumption is that the soil of the river-bed or sea-bed up to high-water mark belongs to the Crown (l); but such ownership is subject to the public right of navigation (m). The Crown is also presumably entitled to the soil of the seashore below high-water mark of ordinary tides, between the spring and the neap (n). But a subject may have become the owner of the soil of the foreshore - that is, the land lying between high and low-water mark of medium tides (o) - by grant from the Crown either conveying it in express terms (p), or presumed from the exercise of long-continued and uninterrupted acts of ownership to have included it (q), or to have been made (r). And the owner of a several fishery extending over the foreshore is presumed to be the owner of the soil thereof (s). A subject may also have derived from the Crown a title to the soil of the sea shore or of a tidal river below low-water mark: but in all such cases the owner holds subject to the right of public navigation (t). And if stone or shingle on part of the foreshore granted to a subject form a natural barrier against the incursion of the sea, he is not entitled to remove it (u). Where land conveyed is described as bounded by the seashore, that means by the inland limit of the foreshore, i.e., high-water mark of medium tides; and there is no presumption that any part of the foreshore is included in the conveyance (x). The owner of land abutting on the seashore or situated on the bank of a tidal and navigable river, has the like right of access over the foreshore to and from the sea or river for the purpose of navigation and otherwise as is enjoyed by the owner of land on the bank of a non-tidal river (y). But the public have no general right to use the foreshore whether in the hands of the Crown or of a subject) for bathing or other purposes (save such as may be incident to the proper exercise of the public rights of navigation and fishing), or to pass and repass over it when not covered by the sea (z). The Crown is not entitled of common right to the soil of any inland lake, whether navigable or not; and it is a question whether the presumptions as to the soil of inland rivers (a) apply to inland lakes (b).