The writer must apologise to all purchasers of his first volume for his delay in completing the second. He confesses that, when the first volume appeared, he had under-estimated the difficulties attendant on finishing his work, and had formed too sanguine an expectation as to the time when the second volume would be published. A temporary publication, containing about half of the present volume, was issued in November, 1904, and the writer then explained the circumstances that prevented his earlier completion of the entire work. He must acknowledge that on that occasion he again made too hopeful an estimate of the time which would be required to finish the second volume. For this he must express his sincere regret. But he may perhaps be allowed to say that he afterwards found that, in order to carry out his design of a complete treatise on the law of Vendor and Purchaser, he was obliged to write at far greater length than he had expected. In particular, he thought it necessary to add an entire chapter, which he had not previously contemplated - that on the Discharge of the Contract.

The order of the subjects proposed for consideration in Volume II. has been changed since the publication of Volume I. The second volume begins with the discussion of the grounds for avoiding the contract, and then treats successively of Mistake, Fraud, Misrepresentation, Duress and Undue Influence, Illegality in the Contract, and Personal Incapacity. Then come chapters on Incapacity in equity arising from the relations between the parties (such as the disability of a trustee or an agent for sale); on the Discharge of the Contract; and on the Remedies for breach of the contract, including the consideration of the remedies available in any respect after completion of the purchase. And the book ends with a chapter on the Sale of registered land.

The writer has pursued the plan adopted in the first volume of not avoiding the discussion of difficult or doubtful points. These have proved to be so numerous that his adherence to this design has certainly contributed to retard the completion of his treatise: but for this he hopes to meet with the reader's indulgence. He may mention that at the very outset he has found himself beset with many doubts and difficulties as to the true theory of English law with respect to mistake as a ground of avoiding a contract. The view he has put forward is warranted, he believes, by the English authorities; and it is supported by the statements made in the late Mr. Benjamin's classical treatise on Sale. On the other hand, it seems to conflict with the opinion maintained by Mr. Justice 0. W. Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States, who is perhaps the most brilliant and original of all living writers on the Common Law, and with that adopted by Professor Holland. And it is with extreme diffidence that the writer ventures to criticise their conclusions (a). The question, how far mistake is available, either as a ground of avoiding a contract for the sale of land at law, or of resisting its specific performance in equity, was raised in an acute form in the recent case of Van Praagh v. Everidge(b), which unfortunately went off in the Court of Appeal on the point of non-compliance with the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. The writer has fully discussed this case in both of these aspects (c). Another difficult point, relating partly to the law of mistake and partly to that of misrepresentation, is the effect upon the contract at law and in equity of non-disclosure by the vendor of a latent defect of quality, of which he is aware; and the authorities on this point have been carefully considered(d). A full examination has been made of the questions, whether one may well claim the rectification of a written executory agreement together with the specific performance of the agreement as rectified (c), and whether rectification ought ever to be granted where the mistake has been unilateral and not common to both parties (f). In connection with these questions, the cases of May v. Platt(g), Garrard v. Frankel(h), Harris v. Pepperell(i), Bloomer v. Spittle (j) and Paget v. Marshall (k) have been criticised. Under the head of fraudulent misrepresentation, the much-discussed case of Cornfoot v. Fowke (l) has been considered; and it is suggested that the decision there given may yet be in point where an agent has innocently and without express authority made a false statement as to some fact, on which his principal was accurately informed, and it is sought on this ground to set aside the contract after completion (m).

(a) See pp. 667, 668, and note(i). (b) 1902, 2 Ch. 266; 1903, 1 Ch. 434.

(c) Pp. 678, 679, 693 and note (p).

(d) See pp. 681 - 688.

The writer has entered a strong protest (n) against the acceptance as law of the decision of Bacon, V.-C, in Taylor v. Johnston(o) that an infant is capable of making a perfectly valid gift of money or other choses in possession; he has remarked upon the oft-cited but probably misreported dictum of Lord Mansfield in Buckinghamshire v. Drury(p); and he has discussed the question, whether an infant, who has purchased land assured to him in fee simple, can recover the purchase-money if he elect to avoid the conveyance (q). Under the head of the incapacity of married women (a subject of the most appalling intricacy), it is submitted that the inconvenient consequences of the decision in Be Harkness and Allsopp's Contract (r) are not so easily obviated as might be supposed from the decision of Farwell, J., in Re West and Hardy's Contract (s); that a subsequent purchaser's objection to a conveyance by a married woman alone is not removed by the fact that he has no notice that she was a trustee; and that, as the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, only confers on wives a special and not a general capacity to alienate their lands, it is incumbent on any person making title through a conveyance by a married woman alone to prove either that she was entitled to the estate assured as her separate property, or that, if she were a trustee thereof, she had power to convey the same as a bare trustee (t). It is contended that the decision of Chitty, J., in Be Hodson (u), as to the capacity of a married woman to confirm or avoid her voidable conveyance or contract made whilst she was an infant and single, is at variance with the earlier authorities on this point in equity as well as at law (x): and further, that the principle followed by the Court of Appeal in Viditz v. O'Hagan (y), with regard to the incapacity to consent imposed on a wife by Austrian law, is exactly the same as that which determined the rule of the English common law(z). And attention has been called to the unsatisfactory state of the authorities with respect to the devolution, when a corporation is dissolved, of lands of which it was seised in fee; a point of practical importance owing to the frequent dissolution of companies after being wound up (a).