(c) Re Ailesbury and Iveagh, 1893, 2 Oh. 345, 358, 359; ' Re Mandy and Roper's Contract, 1899, 1 Oh. 275, 298.

(d) See Re Spencer's Settled Estates, 1903, 1 Ch. 75; Re Coull's Settled Estates, 1905, 1 Ch. 712.

(e) Re Keck and Hart's Contract, L898, l Ch. 617; Re Du Cam and Nettle/old's Contract, 1898, 2 Ch. 96, approved Re Mundy and Roper's Contract, 1899, 1 Ch. 275, 296. The earlier case of Re Tib-bits' Settled Estates, L897, 2 Ch.

149, which at first occasioned great difficulty to the profession, must now be taken as haying decided no more than that it is within the jurisdiction of the Court to treat a deed of settlement followed by deeds exercising powers contained therein;as together constituting a compound settlement and to a]'point trustees of such compound settlement accordingly.

(f) Wheelwright v. Walker, 23 Ch.'D. 752.

(g) Re Knowles' Settled Estates, 27 Ch. D. 707; Re Du Cane and Nettlefold's Contract, 1898, 2 Ch. 96, 101.

(h) See Re Wright's Trustees and Marshall, 28 Ch. D. 93.

(i) Re Wimborne and Browne's Contract, 1904, 1 Ch. 537; and see Re Mundy and Roper's Contract, 1899, 1 Ch. 275, 296, 297; below, pp. 318, 324.

(k) Above, p. 309.

As above stated, the principle governing these decisions is that in determining whether a man is tenant for life under a series of instruments constituting a so-called compound settlement, or under what settlement he is tenant for life for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts, the true test is not whether he is in of his old estate or whether an intention of keeping alive the powers annexed to any former life estate of his has been expressed, but regard is to be had solely to the intention of the Acts and the definitions therein contained; for the powers conferred by the Acts acquire their validity, not from any antecedent act or intention of the parties to a settlement, but from the sovereign power of the legislature alone (n). This principle, however, appears to have been disregarded by Farwell, J., in the case of Re Cornwattis West and Munro's Contract (o), of which the material facts appear to be these: - By virtue of a settlement made by will lands were limited to the use of A. for life, with remainder to the use of B. in tail male, and a jointure rentcharge was limited to issue thereout to the use of C, A.'s wife. A. and B., by a disentailing assurance duly enrolled, granted the lands to X. and Y. and their heirs, to such uses as A. and B. should jointly appoint; and by a deed of re-settlement A. and B., in exercise of this power, appointed the lands to such uses as they should by deed jointly appoint, and, in default of appointment, to the use that B. should receive thereout a yearly rentcharge, and subject and charged as aforesaid to the use of A. for life in restoration of his former estate under the will, with remainder to B. in fee; and D. and E. were appointed to be trustees of the deed of resettlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts. A. afterwards contracted to sell the lands as tenant for life selling under these Acts, and he proposed to make title as tenant for life under the deed of re-settlement, the purchase money being paid to the trustees appointed thereby, and C, the jointress, concurring in the conveyance to release her jointure. The purchaser objected to the title so offered on the ground that the will and the re-settlement constituted a "compound settlement," and that, without the appointment by the Court of trustees of such compound settlement, a good discharge for the purchase money could not be given. Farwell, J., upheld this objection on the ground that A.'s old life estate under the will had been restored to him, and so the only settlement under which A. could exercise his statutory power of sale was either the compound settlement created by the will and the deed of re-settlement together, or else the original settlement created by the will(p). In so deciding the learned judge professed to follow the case of Re Mundy and Roper"s Contract (q); but it is respectfully submitted that his decision is exactly opposed to the principles governing the judgment in that case and is manifestly wrong (r).

Principle to determine under what settlement one is tenant for life.

(l) See Re Mundy and Roper's Contract, 1899, 1 Ch. 275, 294, 296, 298; ft Spencer'i Settled Estates, 1903, 1 Ch. 75.

(m) Re Du Cane and Nettle/old's Contract, 1898, 2 Ch. 96;: ft Mundy and Roper's Contract, 1899, 1 Ch. 275, 295 - 296.

Re Cornwattis West and Munro's Contract.

(n) See Re Ailesbury and lveagh, 1893, 2 Ch. 345; Re Mundy and Roper's Contract, 1899, 1 Ch. 275, 293 - 297

(o) 1903, 2 Ch. 150; 72 L. J. Ch. 499.

It appears, then, that in the common case of a settlement of lands on one for life with remainder in tail followed by a disentailing assurance and a re-settlement again limiting a life estate in the lands to the original tenant for life, the following courses are open to him in selling the lands under the Settled Land Acts. First, whether his life estate were or were not limited to him in restoration of his former estate, he may sell as tenant for life under the old settlement, the purchase money being paid to trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts duly appointed under the old settlement. Secondly, he may sell as tenant for life under the compound settlement constituted by the settlement and the re-settlement together and convey the whole estate limited by and still subsisting under such compound settlement: but then trustees of the compound settlement must first be appointed; and, unless all persons beneficially interested be sui Juris and concur in making the appointment (s), this can only be done by the Court (t). Thirdly, it is submitted that, on the principles laid down in Re Mundy and Roper's Contract (u), he may sell as tenant for life under the re-settlement alone, when the trustees of the re-settlement may receive the purchase money; but in that case he can only convey the estate which was the subject of the re-settlement. This is certainly so where his life estate was not limited to him in restoration of his former estate (a?); and should be so, although his life estate were limited in restoration of his former estate. But in the latter case, a difficulty is raised by the decision in Cornwallis West's case (y); and so long as that decision is not overruled, a purchaser could not be advised to accept the title as upon a sale under the re-settlement alone, if the estate of the tenant for life had been thereby given to him in restoration of his former estate.