(i) Stat. 4.') & 46 Vict. c. 38, s. 2 (8).

(k) Sect. 38.

(l) See Re Moore, 1906, 1 Ch. 789.

(m) Stat. 53 & 54 Vict. c. 69, s. 16. As to cases affected by this amendment of the law, see Re Brown's Will, 27 Ch. D. 179; Wheelwright v. Walker, 23 Ch. D. 762, 761; Re Horne's Settled Estate 39 Ch. D. 84. When lands are limited to trustees in fee in trust for one of them for life and after his death on trust for sale or for others with power of sale, it has been held that all the trustees, including the tenant for life, are the trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts; Re Jackson's Settled Estate, 1902, 1 Oh. 258.

W

As above stated (o), it is usual on sales by auction to stipulate for payment of a deposit to the auctioneer or the vendor's solicitors. If the sale be made by a tenant for life selling under the Settled Land Acts, the purchaser must see that the deposit is duly paid to the trustees of the settlement for the purposes of the Acts, or into Court, as the vendor may require, before he accepts a conveyance and pays the balance of his purchase money. Otherwise he cannot be assured that he is obtaining a valid conveyance; for unless the whole of the purchase money be paid to the trustees or into Court, as required by the Acts, the statutory power of sale is not well executed (p).

Deposit on sale by auction of settled land.

With regard to the question, whether all the estate, to which title is alleged or required to be made, has been or will be sufficiently assured by the exercise of the statutory power of conveyance (q), the Settled Land Act, 1882 (r), empowers the tenant for life to convey by deed any land sold under the power of sale conferred by the Act for the estate or interest which is the subject of the settlement, and provides that such a deed shall be effectual to pass the land conveyed discharged from all the limitations, powers and provisions of the settlement, and from all estates, interests and charges subsisting thereunder, but subject to and with the exception of - (i) All estates, interests and charges having priority to the settlement; and (ii.) all such other (if any) estates, interests and charges as have been conveyed or created for securing money actually raised at the date of the deed; and (iii.) all leases and grants at fee-farm rents or otherwise, and all grants of easements, rights of common, or other rights or privileges granted or made for value in money or money's worth or agreed so to be, before the date of the deed, by the tenant for life, or by any of his predecessors in title, or by any trustees for him or them, under the settlement, or under any statutory power, or being otherwise binding on the successors in title of the tenant for life.

As to the power of conveyance under the Settled Land Acts.

(n) Stat. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 53, s. 47, replacing 53 & 54 Vict. c. 69, s. 17, passed to amend the law laid down in Re Wilcock, 34 Ch. D. 508.

(o) Above, p. 57.

(p) Above, pp. 299 - 302.

(q) Above, p. 301.

(r) Stat. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, s, 20. Exactly the same power of conveyance is given in the same section with regard to land exchanged, partitioned, leased, mortgaged or charged in exercise of the powers conferred by the. Act, and also with regard to easements or other rights or privileges sold or leased under the same powers.

The Act contains (s) a very wide definition of the term settlement, extending it to any instrument or any number of instruments under or by virtue of which any land, or any estate or interest in land, stands for the time being limited to or in trust for any persons by way of succession. And this definition has received a liberal interpretation. Thus, in lie Ailesbury and Iveagh (t), lands had been limited by deeds dated in 1796 and L826 to such uses as Charles and George should jointly appoint, and in default to the use of Charles for life with powers of jointuring a future wife; and Charles appointed a jointure rentcharge to Maria. Then by a deed of 1837 the lands were limited in exercise of the joint power of appointment, subject to the rentcharge, to the use of Charles for life, remainder to George for life, remainder to Ernest for life, remainder to Ernest's first son in tail male. In 1863, the estate tail so given to Ernest's first son was barred and the lands were re-settled to the use of Ernest for life, remainder to his eldest son George John for life, remainder to uses for securing a jointure rentcharge to Evelyn, the son's wife, remainder to George John's first son in tail male. George John died leaving Thomas his eldest son, and in 1885 Thomas's estate tail was barred and the lands were re-settled to the use of Ernest for life in restoration of his former estate, remainder to Thomas for life. Ernest died, and Thomas sold the lands under the Settled Land Acts to Lord Iveagh. And it was held by Stirling, J., that the series of instruments constituting the settlement for the purposes of the Acts comprised not only the deeds of settlement of 1885 and 1863 taken together, but also those of 1837, 1826 and 1796, and consequently that Thomas was empowered to convey the lands sold discharged from Maria's as well as from Evelyn's rentcharge. This decision at first met with adverse criticism (u), but it has been approved by the Court of Appeal in the case of He Mundy and Roper's Contract (x). In that case lands were limited in 1861 to the use of John for life, remainder to uses for securing a jointure rentcharge to Elizabeth, remainder to trustees for the term of one thousand years from John's death on trust to raise portions for his younger children, remainder to Francis for life, with powers of jointuring and charging portions for younger children and limiting a term to secure such portions, remainder to Francis's first son in tail male. In 1865 Francis appointed a jointure rentcharge to Louisa his wife, charged the lands with portions for his younger children, and limited a term of 1,500 years to secure such portions. John died, and in 1889 Francis and his eldest son disentailed, and the lands were re-settled with the concurrence of John's younger children, who released their portions, to the use that Francis might charge the lands with 5,000/., remainder to uses for securing rentcharges to Millicent and Sophy (two of John's younger children) and Francis's eldest son, remainder to Francis for life without expressing that this should be in restoration of his former estate. Francis then sold the lands under the Settled Land Acts, and the purchaser objected that his life estate under the settlement of 1861 was not kept alive, and that he could not convey the lands discharged from his wife's jointure or his younger children's portions. It was held, however, by the Court of Appeal, that the deeds of 1861, 1865 and 1889 together constituted the settlement within the meaning of the Settled Land Acts, and that the tenant for life was accordingly empowered to convey the settled lands discharged from his wife Louisa's jointure and his younger children's portions charged in 1865 under the powers given by the deed of 1861; and it was considered that this result was effected by the intention of the Acts, and that it was immaterial that Francis's life estate under the deed of 1861 was not expressed to be restored to him by the re-settlement of 1889. These cases establish that when lands have been limited to various beneficiaries successively by a series of family settlements or re-settlements, and there is still subsisting in the lands any estate or interest (though it be no more than a rentcharge or a charge of portions) limited to a beneficiary by any deed of settlement earlier than that which conferred the estate of the tenant for life, then these deeds of settlement together constitute a settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts, and the tenant for life can sell and convey the settled lands free from the estates or interests limited to beneficiaries by any of the earlier deeds (y). The term beneficiaries is here applied to persons taking some estate or interest by way of settlement, that is to say, in consideration of marriage or natural affection or of effecting a family settlement or re-settlement; the rule does not extend to estates created by way of mortgage, or, apparently, on a sale in the strict sense of the word (2). The definition of the settlement has been further extended by the Settled Land Act, 1890 (a), providing that every instrument whereby a tenant for life, in consideration of marriage or as part or by way of any family arrangement, not being a security for payment of money advanced, makes an assignment of or creates a charge upon his estate or interest under the settlement, is to be deemed one of the instruments creating the settlement, and not an instrument vesting in any person any right as assignee for value within the meaning or operation of sect. 50 of the Act of 1882 (b).