Another effect of sect. 50 of the Settled Land Act, 1882 (m), is that on the bankruptcy of a tenant for life his statutory powers do not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy but remain exercisable by him; and it is thought that the trustee cannot be said to be an assignee for value of the bankrupt's estate. It is also submitted that a purchaser from the trustee of the bankrupt's life estate is not "an assignee for value of the estate or interest of the tenant for life" within the meaning of sub-sect. 3 of this enactment (n), which seems to be intended to save only the rights of an assignee for value who has obtained the life estate by the direct assurance of the tenant for life himself (o). Where a contract for the sale of the settled land has been signed by the tenant for life, the subsequent commission by him of an act of bankruptcy, whether followed or not by an adjudication of bankruptcy, can be no bar to his effectual completion of the sale under the powers of the Settled Land Acts, and the purchaser need not require the consent or concurrence of the trustee in the bankruptcy or of any assignee from him of the bankrupt's life estate. For the trustee and any purchaser from him of the life estate would take the vendor's property subject to all equities affecting it, and to the right of the purchaser from the tenant for life to have his contract specifically performed, and the purchase money is payable, not to the trustee in the bankruptcy, but to the trustees for the purposes of the Acts or into Court (p). And if a tenant for life, who has already committed an act of bankruptcy or been adjudicated bankrupt, afterwards sell the settled land under the Settled Land Acts, there appears to be no doubt that he can well complete the sale in exercise of the power of conveyance given by the Acts, if the life estate has not then been sold by the trustee in the bankruptcy. Until it is established by decision that the power of the tenant for life to sell and convey is altogether paramount to the rights of his trustee in bankruptcy and any purchaser of the life estate from the trustee, it appears advisable for a purchaser of the settled land from a tenant for life, who has committed an act of bankruptcy or been adjudicated bankrupt, to ascertain, before paying his purchase money, either that no bankruptcy proceedings have been taken or no adjudication made (in either of which cases the vendor would clearly have full power to convey), or that no sale of the life estate has been made by the trustee. And if the trustee should have sold the life estate, it is thought that the purchaser from the tenant for life should require to be satisfied, before paying his purchase money, that the purchaser of the life estate does not claim to be entitled to keep hold of the settled land while the life estate endures but will peaceably yield up possession to him on completion (q).

Bankruptcy of tenant for life.

Act of bankruptcy by the tenant for life after sale, but before completion.

(k) Re Wimborne and Browne's Contract, 1904, 1 Ch. 537; see above, p. 324; Re Phillimere's Estate, 1904, 2 Ch. 460; Re Mar-shall's Settlement, 1905, 2 Ch.

(l) See Re Mundy and Roper's Contract, 1S99, 1 Ch. 275, 297.

(m) Above, p. 321.

(n) Above, p. 321.

(o) If this were not so, then the rights of a purchaser for value from a gratuitous assignee of the life-tenant's estate could not be affected without his con-sent. Rut it is submitted that this is not the law.

Sale under the Settled Land Acts by a bankrupt tenant for life.

(p) See and compare below, Chap. XL, Sec. 2.

(q) It is thought that if the trustee in bankruptcy or the purWhere a debtor's life estate is vested in a trustee under a composition or scheme of arrangement approved by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings prior to any adjudication of bankruptcy (r), it is thought that the trustee is an assignee for value taking the life estate directly from the tenant for life; for the trustee acquires the life estate, not by mere operation of law, but by the debtor's own act and agreement under a contract sanctioned by the Court and in consideration of the creditors relinquishing their right to proceed to an adjudication of bankruptcy. The trustee appears in fact to be in the same position as a trustee under a deed of assignment of the life-tenant's estate executed for the benefit of his creditors without any bankruptcy proceedings having been taken. And it is thought that in either of these cases the trustee's rights cannot without his consent be affected by a sale subsequently made by the tenant for life of the settled land.

Trustee taking the life estate under a composition or scheme of arrangement in bankruptcy proceedings.

As the tenant for life is only empowered to convey the settled land for the estate or interest which is the subject of the settlement, and with the exceptions above mentioned (s), and cannot displace the rights of his assignees for value without their consent (t), it is of the highest importance for a purchaser from a tenant for life selling under the Settled Land Acts to ascertain, first, that the estate or interest which is the subject of the settlement is the whole fee simple or other estate contracted to be sold; and, secondly, that there is not any subsisting estate, interest, or charge, in or upon the lands sold which will not pass under the vendor's statutory conveyance. With regard to the first of these requirements, the purchaser's counsel must ascertain from the abstract whether the settlor were seised of or otherwise well entitled to the whole estate in fee simple or other interest sold. And if this were the case, the tenant for life under the settlement can well convey the same estate or interest by an exercise of his statutory power of sale, even though the settlor did not dispose of his whole interest by the settlement. For the Settled Land Act, 1882 (u), provides that an estate or interest in remainder or reversion not disposed of by a settlement, and reverting to the settlor or descending to the testator's heir, is, for the purposes of the Act, an estate or interest coming to the settlor or heir under or by virtue of the settlement, and comprised in the subject of the settlement. In order to ascertain whether there are any estates or interests coming within the exceptions out of a tenant-for-life's statutory power of conveyance, a purchaser from him should inquire, first, whether there are still subsisting in or upon the lands sold any estates, interests, or charges having priority to the settlement; secondly, whether any estates, interests, or charges in or upon the lands sold have been conveyed or created for securing money actually raised; thirdly, whether any such leases or grants as are mentioned in the third exception (x) have been made of the lands sold or any part thereof or any interest therein; and, fourthly, whether the tenant for life has made any assignment for value, whether absolute, partial, qualified or by way of charge, of his life estate. As the conveyance or creation of such an estate, interest, or charge, or the making of such a lease or grant, or such an assignment of the life estate, is an event which, if it took place, must necessarily have affected the title, it appears that the purchaser is entitled not only to insist upon an answer to this inquiry, but also to require evidence that no such event has occurred (y). But if the abstract be satisfactory, sufficient evidence may be afforded as to the subjects of this inquiry by a statutory declaration by the vendor that he has not made and does not know of any such estate, interest, charge, lease, or grant, and by solicitors, who have acted for the vendor and his predecessors, that they know of none, coupled with the facts of possession of the lands sold having gone and the custody of the title deeds being in accordance with the abstracted title (2). It is submitted that the making of these inquiries and the requisition of this evidence is not prohibited by the rule in the case of Re Ford and Hill discussed above (a). Sect. 20 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, does not confer on the tenant for life selling under that Act a general or an unlimited power of conveyance, but only gives him a limited power, subject to certain exceptions (b). It is thought, therefore, that the onus lies on him of proving that these exceptions have no application in his own particular case, and that he is bound to answer the above-mentioned inquiries as far as his knowledge is concerned. The practice, moreover, on sales under the Settled Land Acts is to abstract the limitations of the settlement down to the estate or interest, in virtue of which the vendor claims to have the statutory power of sale, but not further; and it is obvious that such an abstract is by no means conclusive of the vendor's ability to confer a good title. The purchaser is entitled to be satisfied that the vendor has not assigned, mortgaged or charged his life estate in any way, and that no charge or power of charging given by the settlement has been actually put in use or exercised by raising money, and that no lease or grant of the land sold has been made under any statutory or express power; for if any one of these events has occurred, the vendor cannot make title by himself alone (c). And the usual abstract standing by itself affords no information on these points. For instance, a term on trust to raise portions for younger children is generally limited in remainder after their parent's life estate (d); and a portion is sometimes raised thereunder in the father's lifetime, and he joins in the mortgage to secure, either by his covenant or by a charge on his life estate, the interest on the amount advanced (e). In such a case the father could not sell under the Settled Land Acts without the concurrence of the mortgagees in the conveyance to the purchaser. Their consent alone would not suffice to assure their legal estate under their mortgage of the portions term. Here it should be noted that the second and third exceptions above mentioned from the life-tenant's power of conveyance prevent him from conveying the settled land, on a sale under the Settled Land Acts, discharged from any estates or interests falling within the terms of those exceptions and conveyed or created after the contract for sale but before the date of the deed of conveyance (f). Thus where since the contract but before the conveyance some estate, interest or charge has been conveyed or created under some trust or power for the purpose contained in the settlement (g) for securing money then actually raised, or some lease or grant has been made, or even agreed to be made, for value under some express or statutory power (A), the tenant for life cannot convey the settled land free from the estates or interests so arising, unless the persons entitled thereunder concur in the conveyance to the purchaser and assure the same to him. It follows that the above-mentioned inquiries with respect to the second and third exceptions (i) ought to he repeated by the purchaser and an answer obtained immediately before the execution of the deed of conveyance. But it is thought that this extra precaution is not required with regard to mortgages or other assignments for value made by the tenant for life of his own life estate under the settlement. It is now decided that any estates or interests conveyed or created by such mortgages do not fall within the second exception above referred to, and the tenant for life has power to sell and convey the settled land freed from any estate arising under his own assignment (whether absolute or by way of charge) of his life estate, provided only that he obtain the consent of every assignee for value (k). Where a tenant for life has made no assignment of his life estate, either absolutely or by way of charge, at the time of entering into a contract for the sale of the settled land under the Settled Land Acts, it appears that by making such a contract he exercises a statutory power which is paramount, not only in equity but at law, to the rights of any subsequent assignee of his own life estate. And it is thought that the purchaser's claim to have the contract duly completed by conveyance has priority, not only in equity but at law, over the rights of any subsequent mortgagee or assignee for value of the life tenant's estate, even though the mortgagee or assignee should have obtained a legal estate without notice of the contract for sale (l).