(e) Berkeley Peerage Case. 4 Camp. 401; Reilly v. Fitzgerald, Dru. 122; Gee v. Ward, 7 E. & B. 509; Sheddern v. Patrick, 2 Swa. & Tr. 187; Sug. V. & P. 418; Hubback, Ev. Succ. 68, 69; Taylor, Evidence, Sec. 571 sq., 5th ed.: Stephen, Evidence, Art. 31.

(f) Hubback, Ev. Succ. 66, 67.

(g) Taylor, Evidence, Sec. 653 sq.; 712 sq., 5th ed.; Stephen, Evidence, Arts. 15, 16.

(h) Taylor, Evidence, Sec. 54 3 sq.; 602 sq.; 630 sq., 5th ed.; Stephen, Evidence, Arts. 25, 27, 28, 30.

(i) Burnett v. Lynch, 5 B. & C. 589, 601; Bringloe v. Goodson, 5 Bing. N. C. 738.

(k) Moulton v. Edmonds, 1 De G. F. & J. 246, 251; Burton, Comp. pl. 480; Me Wallis and Grout's Contract, 1906, 2 Ch. 206.

May be evidence, if the document be lost.

Apart from the stipulation now incorporated in contracts as above mentioned (n) by the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, and except so far as recitals or statements are evidence admissible in litigation, the vendor's obligation to furnish evidence of all facts material to the title (o) is in no way discharged by reason of any such facts being stated or recited in deeds or other instruments appearing on the abstract (p). But conveyancers can generally accept statutory declarations made on some previous sale and produced by the vendor from among the muniments of title as evidence of the facts deposed to therein; as, if there be no reason to suspect the authenticity of the declaration and the facts asserted are such as are usually proved on sales by statutory declaration, a new statutory declaration would seldom afford better evidence than an old one. And, as we have seen, in some cases an old statutory declaration may have become good evidence through the death of the deponent.

Recitals of facts do not excuse vendor from proof.

Now that the purchaser is, as a rule, bound to pay the expense of procuring all evidence necessary to verify the abstract but not in the vendor's possession (q), his natural endeavour is to obtain satisfactory proof at the least cost to himself. Hence it frequently happens in practice that a purchaser accepts irregular evidence - evidence which he could not be required to accept - to save himself the expense of the regular mode of proof. Great caution should always be observed in admitting such proof. It is true that if any fact on which title depends be established, the purchaser may suffer no inconvenience from not having the regular conveyancing evidence in his possession. If he sell, the purchaser from him will by the rule be at the cost of procuring it. But if a fact admitted on irregular evidence be not verifiable by regular evidence, the purchaser may obviously find himself at serious disadvantage on a re-sale. As an example of the reception of irregular evidence, where a man's death is the fact to be proved, a purchaser may, it is conceived, usually rest satisfied with production of the probate of his will or of letters of administration to his effects (r), or even of the receipts for succession duty paid as on his death. Indirect evidence of this kind is often to be found in the vendor's possession, and may save the expense of getting a certificate. In this case it will be observed that the fact of death is inferred, not only from the presumption that things are rightly done (s), but also from the fact that the survivors have done an act against their own interest in paying death duty; and such payment and the granting of probate or administration are acts extraneous to the title. Again, the presumption that things are rightly done is greatly strengthened whenever valuable consideration has been given on the faith of certain events having taken place.

Acceptance of irregular evidence.

(l) Gillett v. Abbott, 7 A. & E. 783.

(m) Moulton v. Edmonds, 1 De G. F. & J. 246, 252.

(n) Above, p. 136.

(o) Above, p. 115.

(p) 1 Jarm. Cony. 3rd ed. by Sweet, 120; 1 Dart,V. & P. 328, 5th ed.: 372, 6th ed.; 366, 7th ed.; Williams. Real Prop. 451, 13th ed.

(q) For many years before the oommenoemenl of the Convey-auciujj Act, 1881, it was usual for vendors to stipulate specially that the purchaser should bear this expense; Juridical Society Papers, ii. 589, 590; 1 Davidson, Prec. Conv. 506, 555, 609, 4th ed.

(r) Coventry, Conveyancers' Evidence, 278, 279; Sug. V. & P. 418.

(s) Above, p. 118.

Thus if the death of a joint mortgagee be stated, and it appear that, on a subsequent transfer or purchase, a conveyance has been accepted from the surviving mortgagees as having become entitled in consequence of his death, it is hardly a rash assumption that the death took place as alleged. But it would not be advisable to dispense with proof of the alleged recent death of a trustee merely because in a subsequent deed a new trustee is appointed as upon his death. In this case no act extraneous to the title has been done on the faith of the event in question having occurred.

The extreme importance of the proper verification of the abstract is too often overlooked. The abstract being the chief document delivered and the only document laid before and commented on by counsel, there is always a certain danger of losing sight of the fact, that the mod perfect abstract is no evidence at all of title. It is only when we turn away from the abstract to the verification of it that the real proof of title begins. The most severe scrutiny of the abstract may be utterly useless if the purchaser's advisers are lax in exacting or examining the evidence in support of it. Extreme care should therefore be observed in dispensing with any of the evidence regularly necessary to verify the abstract; and if it be proposed to accept any irregular or indirect evidence, the conveyancer should weigh well the reasons why the same may be regarded as affording substantial proof.

Great importance of the verification of the abstract.

It seems needless but is really very necessary to point out that no part of the verification of the abstract is more important than the examination of the title-deeds. This is especially the case at the present day, when abstracts are constantly delivered, which have been drawn in the most slovenly and unskilled manner. This fact enhances the necessity of Lord St. Leonards' emphatic warning, that the examination of the title-deeds with the abstract should never be left to an incompetent person (t). As Mr. Dart pointed out, it is a duty requiring the most scrupulous care, the object of the examination being four-fold: to ascertain, first, that what has been abstracted is correctly abstracted; secondly, that what is omitted is clearly immaterial; thirdly, that all the documents are perfect as respects execution, attestation, endorsed receipts, registration, stamps, etc.; and fourthly, that there are no endorsed notices, nor any circumstances attending the mode of execution or attestation, etc, which are calculated to excite suspicion (u). Every part of every document, especially of a will, should be read through (x). And very particular attention should be given to the execution of the documents; for, as we have seen (y), it is not the practice on sales to require any other evidence of the execution of the documents of title than is apparent on the documents themselves.