The effect of the above enactment.

(h) Sect. 3, sub-s. 9. (i) Sect. 3, sub-s. 11. (j) Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co. v. Butler, 15 Q. B. D.

261, 272; 16 Q. B. D. 778. (k) Above, pp. 38, 39. (l) Above, pp. 95, 96.

Phillips v. Caldcleugh.

(m) Above, p. 165.

(n) L. R. 4 Q. B. 159

13 (2)

Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co. 7. Butler.

(o) Above, pp. 37, 38. (p) 15 Q. B. D. 261; 16 Q. B. D. 778.

Re Marsh and Earl Granville.

(q) See above, pp. 73, n. (t), 175, 176.

(r) 24 Ch. D. 11.

(s) Above, p. 109. (t) Above, p. 106. (u) Above, p. 107.

If a vendor of his own accord allow the purchaser to inspect title deeds of earlier date than the time agreed on for commencement of title, and the purchaser so discover a defect in the title, the latter may insist on such defect as a bar to specific performance, notwithstanding the provisions of the above enactment (x).

Vendor disclosing a defect of title.

Any misrepresentation as to facts, however innocently made, will preclude the vendor from enforcing the specific performance of the contract with the limitations imposed by the above enactment. On this point the leading case is now He Banister, Broad v. Mtinton (y), where, upon the sale of a farm by order of the Court, a condition was made requiring the purchaser to assume that E. B. was seised of and entitled to the entire property sold in fee simple in possession, free from incumbrances, in L835 and up to and at her death, stating that it was not known and could not be explained how E. B. acquired the property, and expressly stipulating that no other title than as above should be required or inquired into. It was shown that it was within the knowledge of the vendor that E. B. was not seised of the property free from incumbrances in 1835, and how E. B. acquired the property. The vendor was held to have acted in perfect good faith, inasmuch as he had furnished a statement of the facts known to him, upon which the condition had been drawn by one of the con-veyancing counsel of the Court. But it was held that, the statement which the purchaser was required to assume as correct being untrue to the knowledge of the vendor, the former had been induced to make the contract by a misrepresentation; for he was entitled to presume that what was so stated was true. It was considered therefore that the vendor could not oblige the purchaser to take a title as limited by the condition, and the purchaser might decline specific performance unless the vendor would show a good title irrespective of the condition. But it was declared that the purchaser, having bought under such a condition, was entitled to require a good holding title only and not a good marketable title.

Misrepresentation.

Re Banister, Brand V.

Munton.

(v) Sellick v. Trevor, 11 M. ft W. .

(w) Waddell v. Wolfe, L. R. 9 Q. B. 515.

(x) smith v. Robinson, 13 Ch. D. 148.

(y) 12 Ch. D. 131; see also Harnett v. Baker, L. R. 20 Eq. 50.

The reader will observe that, as the above enactment has no greater force in binding either party than an express stipulation to the same effect, it is construed with the aid of decisions given before the Act upon the construction of contracts containing similar express provisions. In arriving at such decisions, the question generally considered was whether the terms of the contract simply exonerated the vendor from the obligation of showing or answering any requisition as to the title prior to some specified time (z), or whether they bound the purchaser to refrain altogether from investigating such prior title and so obliged him to accept the title shown without objection, even though a ground of objection were ascertained from other sources than the vendor (a). It appears from the above-mentioned case of Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co. v. Butler (b) that the stipulation made by sect. 3, sub-sect 3, of the Conveyancing Act (c) does not bind the purchaser to refrain from investigating the earlier title in other sources than the vendor; and special stipulation must be made, if such inquiry by the purchaser is intended to be precluded. The reader will have noticed, however, that this enactment expressly precludes objection as well as inquiry by the purchaser with regard to the earlier title; and it may be asked whether these expressions are absolutely without effect. They certainly do not preclude the purchaser from resisting specific performance on account of any objection to the title, which was known to the vendor when he made the contract, but not disclosed thereby (d). And, as we have seen (e), they do not, even at law, preclude a purchaser from objecting to a title subject to a present defect, which is apparent on the face of the abstract, though arising out of the earlier title. But if a good title were shown by the abstract for the time for which title was agreed to be shown, and there were no active misrepresentation on the vendor's part (f), it appears that a purchaser would not be allowed to rely upon an objection barred by the letter of the above enactment in proceedings to recover his deposit (g). And if the objection arising out of the earlier title were unknown to the vendor when he sold, the case is altogether different and is not covered by any of the authorities cited; and it must not be assumed, without argument, that in such circumstances the purchaser would not be precluded by the above enactment from resisting specific performance, if he discovered the objection elsewhere (h).

Construction of express stipulations before the Conveyancing Act, 1881.

(z) Shepherd v. Keatley, 1 C. M. & R. 117; Darlington v. Hamilton, Kay, 550: Waddell v. Wolfe, L. R. 9 Q. B. 515.

(a) Hune v. Bentley, 5 De G. & Sm. 520; Waddell v. Wolfe, L. R. 9 Q. B. 515, 519; Jones v. Clifford, 3 Ch. D. 779, 790.

(b) 10 Q. B. D. 778; above, p. 196.

(c) Above, p. 193.

(d) Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co. v. Butler, 16 Q. B. D.