(e) Cuff v. Hall, 1 Jur. N. S. 972; Devaynes v. Robinson, 24 Beav. 86; Fry v. Fry, 27 Beav. 144. See Re Davidson, 11 Ch. D. 341, 348, on the question how far concurrence in the postponement of a sale directed to be made with all convenient speed may amount to an election by the beneficiaries to take the property in specie.

When lands are settled by deed on trust for sale, and to hold the proceeds of sale for the benefit of certain persons successively and after their death for their children or others absolutely, which is a very common form of marriage settlement, it is usually provided that the sale shall be made at the request or with the consent of the tenants or tenant fur life, and after the death of every tenant for life at the discretion of the trustees (i). In such cases there is no intention that the trustees should proceed to sell immediately (k); the trust is well exercised if the sale be made during the lifetime of any tenant for life or within a reasonable time after the beneficiaries entitled to the capital of the purchase money have become entitled in possession (l). If, however, the lands remain unsold for a long time after the interests of all persons absolutely entitled to the proceeds of sale have vested in possession, the question arises whether they have not elected to take the property in specie, and so put an end to the trust for sale (m). If so, it would he necessary to obtain their concurrence upon a sale of the property. The same question of election by the beneficiaries to take the property may of course arise in the case of a trust for sale created by will (m). If a trust for sale be declared by a will merely for the purposes of a settlement of the purchase-money made by the will, the same considerations apply with regard to the time of sale as in the case of a like settlement made by deed (n). Trusts declared by will for the sale of lands are, however, generally created for the purpose, amongst other objects, of raising money to pay the testator's debts or debts and legacies; and in all well-drawn wills a power for the trustees to postpone the sale is invariably inserted (o). Such a power remains effective until all the beneficial interests in the settled property have vested absolutely in possession; and where the whole of certain lands are devised to trustees on trust for sale with power at their discretion to postpone the sale, and the proceeds of sale are bequeathed in definite shares, each share being given in trust for one for life with remainder to his or her children, the vesting in possession of one or more of the shares will not put an end to the power of postponement, which will continue until all the shares have vested absolutely in possession (p). Trusts created by will for sale of lands in order to pay the testator's debts appear to fall within the rule already mentioned (q) with regard to the time for exercising the power given by statute to sell real estate charged by will with debts (r) - namely, that if the sale be made within twenty years after the testator's death, the purchaser is not bound to inquire whether any of the testator's debts remain unpaid. After the expiration of that period, the purchaser should inquire whether any debts remain unpaid, if the only object of the trust for sale be to raise money to pay debts; but of course if the trusts of the purchase-money be not only to pay debts, but to hold the surplus on trust for certain persons in succession, the question of the propriety of selling a long time after the testator's death depends on the same considerations as occur in other cases of settlements. Here it may be noted that the powers given to executors b}' the Land Transfer Act, 1897 (s),of selling their testator's real estate to satisfy his debts appear to be governed by the same rules as were previously applicable to sales by executors of their testator's leaseholds (t); so that if real estate be sold by executors under such powers more than twenty years after the testator's death, the purchaser will be entitled to presume that the sale is rightly made, and need not inquire whether any of the testator's debts remain unpaid. In regard to the general question of the time for exercising trusts for sale, Lord St. Leonards observed that "people who deal with trustees raising money at a considerable distance of time, and without an apparent reason for so doing, must be considered as under some obligation to inquire and look fairly at what they are about" (u). But it appears that an out-and-out trust for sale of lands, if not determined by the beneficiaries' election, may be exercised after any lapse of time (x).

Trusts for sale and settlement of the purchase-money.

(f) Truell v. Tysson, 21 Beav. 137; Sug. Pow. 270,271, 8th ed.; Farwell on Powers, 152, 2nd ed.

(g) Above, p. 257.

v. Day, 13 East, 118; fit Head's Trusted and Mac-dmald, 15 Ch. I). 310.

(i) 3 Davidson, Prec. Conv. 858, 3rd ed.: Williams on Settlements, L26 , 2 Key & Elph. Prec Conv. 506, 4th ed.; 497, 8th ed.

(k) See 1 Dart, V. & P. 59, 5th ed.; 64, 6th ed.; 66, 7th ed.

(l) Bigg, v. Peacock, 22 Oh. D. 284; fit Tweedie and Miles, 27 Ch. 1). 315; Be Douglas and Powell's Contract, 1902, 2 Oh. 296, 313; Re Horsnaill, 1909, 1 Ch. 635.

17 (2)

Trusts declared by •will for sale in order to pay testator's debts.

Re Horsnaill.

(m) Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 680; Davies v. Ashford, 15 Sim. 42; Mutlow v. Bigg, 1 Ch. D. 385; Me Gordon, 6 Ch. D. 531; Me Davidson, 11 Ch. D. 341; Holder v. Lofts, cited Me Lewis, 30 Ch. D. 654, 656; and see Me Douglas and Powell's Contract, 1902, 2 Ch. 296; Me Grimthorpe, 1908, 2 Ch. 675.

(n) See 1 Dart, V. & P. 59, 5th ed.; 64, 6th ed.; 66, 7th ed.; and cases cited in nn. (I), (m), above.

(o) 4 Davidson, Prec. Conv. 6, 7, 49, 3rd ed.; 2 Key & Elph. Prec. Conv. 781, 782, 788, 4th ed.; 745, 746, 752, 8th ed.; Davidson's Concise Precedents, 566, 575, 18th ed.