This section is from the book "A Treatise On The Law Of Vendor And Purchaser Of Real Estate And Chattels Real", by T. Cyprian Williams. Also available from Amazon: A treatise on the law of vendor and purchaser of real estate and chattels real.
Discharge of a contract by breach.
(r) Above, p. 725.
(s) Hotham v. East India Co., 1 T. It. 638, 645; Bettini v. Gye, 1 Q. B. D. 183, 186, 187; above, pp. 726 and n. (n), 935.
(t) Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1010 sq.; Seaward v. Wil-lock, 5 East, 198, 202; Flight v. Booth, 1 Bing. N. C. 370, 375, 376; Michael v. Hart, 1902, 1 K. B. 482, 490; above, p. 726.
Breach of warranty of quality or similar representation.
Breach of the duty to convey or pay the price.
(u) Glazebrook v. Woodrow, 8 T. R. 366; Poole v. Hill, 6 M. & W. 835; Laird v. Pirn, 7 M. & W. 474; above, p. 726.
(x) Above, p. 27, n. (b).
(y) Hoggart v. Scott, 1 Russ. & My. 293, 295; Weston v. Savage, 10 Ch. D. 736; Brewer v. Broad-icood, 22 Ch. D. 105, 109; Zee v. Soames, 36 W. R. 884; above, pp. 133 - 135, 148, 149, 152; and see above, pp. 634 - 640, 679, 6S0, as to a breach of contract occurring by reason of a deficiency in quantity of the land or estate promised to be conveyed.
(z) Above, pp. 681, 683, 686, 724 - 728, 731, 732, 736, 738; and see Ellinger v. Mutual, etc. Co., 1905, 1 K. B. 31.
(a) Above, pp. 724 - 728, 731.
(b) Above, pp. 509, 510, 726.
(c) Engel v. Fitch, L. R. 3 Q. B. 314, 4 Q. B.659; Bain v. Fothergill, L. R. 7 H. L. 205, 209; Day v. Singleton, 1899, 2 Ch. 320, 329, 333, 334; and see Jones v. Gardiner, 1902, 1 Ch. 191, 195.
(d) Poole v. Hill, 6 M. & W. 835; Laird v. Pirn, 7 M. & W. 474; Soper v. Arnold, 37 Ch. D. 96, 14 App. Cas. 429.
A breach of contract may be committed, not only by the failure to perform some obligation under the contract at the time when it ought to be fulfilled, but also by the renunciation of performance of the contract; and this may occur in two ways. If either party absolutely refuse, or if by his own act he make it impossible for him to carry out his part of the agreement, the other is entitled at his election either to treat such renunciation of performance as a breach of contract, and at once to rescind or sue upon the contract accordingly, or else to treat the agreement as still subsisting, wait till the time is gone by for the renouncing party to perform the acts promised, and then sue him for the breach occasioned by such non-performance (g). If the injured party adopt the former alternative, he will be entirely discharged from his own obligation under the contract; so much so, that if he choose to treat the renunciation as a breach and to sue at once for damages in affirmance of the contract, he will not be bound to prove the performance of, or any offer to perform, his own part of the agreement, but may recover if the other party's conduct alone prevented him from performing it (h). If, on the other hand, he elect not to treat the renunciation as an immediate breach, but to keep the contract open till the time arrives for its performance, the agreement remains subsisting in the interval for the benefit and at the risk of both parties equally; and if the injured party wait to sue upon the breach occasioned by the ultimate nonperformance of the agreement, he must perform or offer to perform all stipulations in the contract, whereof performance is a condition precedent to the other's liability (i). Besides which, if he keep the contract alive, the other party will be in the same position as if he had never renounced performance, and may avail himself of any defence to an action for the breach occasioned by his ultimate non-performance of his contractual obligations in the same manner as if he had all along been ready and willing to perform them (k). Thus, if the contract were to be performed only in case of the fulfilment of some condition, so that it might be discharged for impossibility of performance (l), and after a renunciation, not chosen to be accepted as a breach of contract, but before the time for carrying out the renouncing party's obligations, the conditions were by some extraneous cause rendered impossible of fulfilment, the renouncing party would be excused, equally with the other, from any further performance of the contract. So if by some event occurring during the same interval the completion of the contract were rendered illegal (m), the renouncing party would be entitled to take advantage of that defence (n). Renunciation of performance of a contract may be made by words or conduct, but in either case the words or acts relied on must amount to an absolute and unqualified repudiation of all intention to complete the contract; otherwise there is no such renunciation as may be treated as a breach (o). And if a party renounce performance of some particular stipulation only, and not of his whole duty under the contract, that does not entitle the other to rescind or sue upon the contract as for an immediate breach thereof, unless the particular stipulation were such as goes to the root of the whole consideration, its performance being a condition precedent to the renouncing party's right to enforce the agreement (p). If one party elect to treat the other's renunciation as a breach of contract, he cannot afterwards recede from this position and claim to treat the contract as subsisting (q). And if he definitely claim to treat some words or conduct, which he wrongly supposes to be a renunciation, as a breach of the contract discharging him from his own obligations thereunder, such claim amounts to a renunciation of the contract on his part, and may be so treated by the other party (r).
Breach of contract by renunciation of performance.
(e) Noble v. Edwardes, 5 Ch. D. 378, 393; above, pp. 726, n. (x), 93G; see also Powell v. Marshall, 1899, 1 Q. B. 710; above, p. 481.
(f) See previous note, and Bennett v. Stone, 1902, 1 Ch. 226, 236, 1903, 1 Ch. 509, 517, 523, 527.
(g) Hochster v. Delatour, 2 E. & B. 678; Be Bernardy v. Harding, 8 Ex. 822, 824; Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111; Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q. B. D. 460; Michael v. Hart, 1902, 1 K. B. 482; see also Ogdens, Ld. v. Nelson, 1903, 2 K. B. 287, 1904, 2 K. B. 410, 1905, A. C. 109.
 
Continue to: