Here the reader may be warned of a pitfall, which the writer has several times encountered in practice; namely, the omission, since the Conveyancing Act of 1881 took effect (i), to limit an estate in fee simple to a grantee to uses in deeds intended to take effect under the Statute of Uses. The consequence of this omission is that such grantee takes an estate for life only (A), and the uses declared are executed by the statute or turned into legal estates (l) only during the life of the grantee to uses and no longer (m). Uses declared of the inheritance in such circumstances are of course, generally speaking, valid in equity and enforceable as trusts: but the legal fee remains in the grantor; and on a subsequent sale of the land by persons entitled under the uses, the purchaser must require the legal estate of inheritance to be conveyed to him by the original grantor, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns.

Estate of grantee to uses.

Expressed in the proviso (see 16 Ves. 370, 371), and any variation in the limitation thereby made from the mortgagor's former estate raises a question, whether any alteration was intended; Davidson, Prec. Conv. vol. ii. pt. ii. pp. 38-43, 4th ed. An unusual proviso for redemption occurred in Williams v. Morgan, 1906, 1 Ch. 804.

(A) See 1 Prest. Abst. 149, 2nd ed., where note that the author appears to be speaking of a proviso for redemption in the old form making void the conveyance to the mortgagee on repayment (see Davidson, Prec. Conv. vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 31, 4th ed.; 5 Bythewood & Jarm. Prec. Conv. 3rd ed. by Sweet, 544, 555), and that, according to the principles there laid down, it should always be shown, in abstracting a proviso for reconveyance, to whom the reconveyance is limited to be made.

(i) Such an omission was not previously common, as it was the regular practice to limit estates to all grantees and their heirs. The mistake has generally arisen where use has been made of the statutory limitation to a grantee in fee simple; and the draftsman has forgotten that it is equally necessary to limit the lands to the grantee to uses in fee simple as to assure by apt words an estate of inheritance to cestui que use intended to take the benefit of the conveyance.

(k) Wms. Real Prop. 112, 21st ed.

(l) Ibid. 173-176, 21st ed.

(m) Dyer, 186 a; Jenkins v. Young, Cro. Car. 230; Meredith v. Joans, ibid. 244; Sug. Pow. 149, 8th ed.: Williams on Settlements, 7; Re Hunter and Hewlett's Contract, 1907, 1 Ch. 46.

It is the duty of a conveyancer perusing an abstract on the purchaser's behalf to see that the vendor discharges his obligation of proving the identity of the property sold with that described in the various documents abstracted (n). The conveyancer must therefore carefully compare the abstracted parcels as he proceeds, and ascertain that the descriptions in the title deeds agree with each other and with the description in the contract. Where the abstracted descriptions wholly or partially fail to show the identity of the property comprised in the title deeds with that sold, further evidence of identity should be required, notwithstanding that the purchaser may have bought subject to the usual condition as to such evidence (o). The identity of the property sold with that comprised in the title deeds is the most important link in the whole chain of proof of the vendor's title; without evidence of such identity, the most perfect title shown by the deeds proves nothing. Purchasers cannot therefore be advised to dispense with such evidence (where they are entitled to require it), on the ground that they must bear the expense of it, if not in the vendor's possession (p).

Identity.

It is the duty of the purchaser's counsel or solicitor, besides seeing that the documents which ought to be abstracted are abstracted and are properly abstracted, to note all facts material to the title stated on or appearing from the abstract, and to require them to be proved by the usual conveyancing evidence. What this is has been already sufficiently considered (q). But we may remark that, owing to the rule which now throws upon the purchaser the expense of procuring all evidence of title not in the vendor's possession (r), it is a convenient plan to frame requisitions calling for evidence of facts in the following form: - "Has the vendor any evidence of any kind in his possession of (the death, marriage, or other fact required to be proved)? If so, he is required to produce such evidence. If not, purchaser reserves his right to call for the usual formal evidence of such (fact) at his own expense." As we have already pointed out (s), it is often material to a title to prove that some event has not happened. This should not be forgotten upon the perusal of the abstract; and the conveyancer should, in these cases, call for such evidence as he can require.

Calling for evidence of

(n) Above, pp. 38, 65; Sug.

V. & P. 413.

(o) See above, pp. 65, 72. (p) See above, pp. 45, 1 36.

Another matter to be attended to on the perusal of the abstract is the incidence of the death duties. Whenever the death is stated of a person interested in the lands sold, it must be considered whether this death gave rise to a claim for legacy, succession, estate or settlement estate duty in such a manner that the duty will, if unpaid, remain a charge on the land; and if so, the receipts for duty payable must be required to be produced or the claim discharged. The subject of the death duties is more fully considered below (t).

Death duties.

It is not the practice for vendors to mark on the abstract what stamps are impressed on the various title deeds: but the purchaser's solicitor must ascertain this on the examination of the abstract with the deeds (u), and he should note in the margin of the abstract what stamps each abstracted document bears, or their absence, where a document required by law to be stamped is unstamped. If the abstract come to counsel after it has been compared with the deeds, he must of course consider whether all the abstracted documents appear to be rightly stamped. If he receive the abstract before the examination of the deeds, he should remind his client, in advising on the title, that it must be ascertained whether the abstracted documents are duly stamped. If any document, which ought to be stamped, be unstamped or insufficiently stamped, the vendor should be required to procure it to be properly stamped; which, as we have seen, he is bound to do at his own expense (x).