This section is from the book "Dart's Treatise On The Law And Practice Relating To Vendors And Purchasers Of Real Estate", by J. Henry Dart . Also available from Amazon: A treatise on the law and practice relating to vendors and purchasers of real estate.
By the Tithe Act, 1918, the method of computation of tithe rent-charge is altered, and provision is made for redemption on the application of the owner of the land charged to the Board of Agriculture, and without the consent of the owner of the rent-charge. By s. 192 of the L. P. Act, 1925, an order of apportionment of a charge on land by way of annuity for redemption of tithe rent-charge may be made by the Minister under ss. 10 - 14 of the Inclosure Act, 1854, on the application of any person interested in the land charged.
The tithe rent-charge may, under the Tithe Act, 1836, s. 71, be merged by the tenant in fee or in tail thereof; or, under the Tithe Act, 1838, by any person or persons seised of, or having power to acquire, the fee therein (s. 1); or by tenant for life in possession of both land and tithe, etc. (s. 3); and the merger might be effected in copyholds (s. 4); or, under the Tithe Act, 1839, s. 6, by persons holding glebe or other lands, and the tithes, etc, by virtue of any benefice, or ex officio. By s. 1 of the same Act, incumbrances upon merged tithes, etc, are made primary charges on the lands themselves; and by the Tithe Act, 1846, s. 19, the powers of merger given by former Acts are extended, retrospectively and prospectively, so as to give equitable owners a power of legal merger, but so as to make charges on the tithe, etc. primary charges on the land.
Merger of tithe rent-charge.
Defects in the early title, or in the evidence thereof, are occasionally rendered immaterial by the Prescription Act, 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71), and the Real Property Limitation Acts, 1833 and 1874.
Defects in title, when supplied by Prescription Act, and Statute of Limitations.
The claim to an easement by prescription may be made either at Common Law or under the Prescription Act. The enjoyment of the right must be for the required period in the character of an easement, as distinct from the land on which the easement is sought to be imposed (p); and, except in the case of an easement of necessity, the right, if acquired, is extinguished by the union of the ownership of the dominant and servient tenements, for estates of an equally high and durable nature (q); though it is only suspended where the estates are not of the same duration, and will revive on their severance (r). In the case of an easement of ancient light, it has been held that unity of seisin for an estate in fee will not cause such an easement to be extinguished where there is no unity of possession and enjoyment (s). Each of the respective periods necessary under the Prescription Act to confer the statutory title must be deemed and taken to be the period next before some action, wherein the claim or matter to which such period may relate shall have been or shall be brought in question (t). A user which is neither capable of interruption nor actionable cannot be the foundation of an easement (u).
Nature of title under Prescription Act.
(p) Harbidge v. Warwick, (1849) 3 Ex. 552; 18 L. J. Ex. 245; and see and consider Ladyman v. Grave, (1871) 6 Ch. 763; 25 L. T. 52.
Under s. 3 of the Prescription Act, a claim to light becomes absolute and indefeasible after twenty years' uninterrupted enjoyment (x); unless such enjoyment be shown to have been by virtue of 6ome consent or agreement, expressly made or given for that purpose . by deed or writing (y); and local customs to the contrary are expressly rendered inoperative (z); the section does not, however, bind the Crown or its lessees (a). The right to light may, however, be taken away by Act of Parliament, empowering another to erect buildings which will destroy or affect the light. In such a case the only remedy open to the party injured is under s. 68 of the L. C. C. Act, 1845 (6). But rights to light and other easements are not extinguished by the mere purchase by a railway company under compulsory powers of the servient tenement, but still exist unless compensated for, and revive on a resale to an individual (c). Where reliance is placed on the statute, the title to light, acquired thereunder, now depends on positive enactment (d). Where, however, the provisions of the statute are inapplicable, e.g., where there has been recent unity of possession, as distinguished from title, and it can be proved that before such unity commenced the access of light has been enjoyed as far back as living memory goes, a title will be deemed to be established independently of the statute; for the statute has not taken away any mode of claiming the easement which existed before its passing in cases which do not come within its provisions (e).
Claims of light.
(q) See Co. Litt. 313 a; Thomas v. T., (1835) 2 C. M. & R. at p. 41; 4 L. J. N. S. Ex. 179; Simper v. Foley, (1862) 2 J. & H. 555; 5 L. T. 669.
(r) Simper v. Foley, sup., and cases there cited; and cf. Ladyman v. Grave, (1871) 6 Ch. 763; 25 L. T. 52.
(s) Richardson v. Graham, 1908, 1 K. B. 39.
(t) S. 4. See Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores, 1904, A. C. 179, 189, 190; 73 L. J. Ch. 484; Hymen v. Van Ben Bergh, 1907, 2 Ch. 516; 1908, 1 Ch. 167.
(u) Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852; 48 L. J. Ch. 785; and cf. Webb v. Bird, (1863) 13 C. B. N. S. 841; 31 L. J. C. P. 335; Chasemore v. Richards, (1859) 7 H. L. C. 349; 29 L. J. Ex. 81; Bryant v. Lefever, (1879) 4 C. P. D. 172; 48 L. J. Ch. 380; Dalton v. Angus, (1881) 6 A. C. 740; 50 L. J. Q. B. 689; Liverpool Corp. v. H. Coghill & Son, Ltd., 1918, 1 Ch. 307.
(x) So long as the owner of the building has the amenity or advantage of using the access of light, it is not necessary that the user should be actually continuous. See Cooper v. Straker, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 21; 58 L. J. Ch. 26; Colls v. Home and Col. Store, 1904, A. C. 179, 206.
(y) As to the form and requisites of such an agreement, see Bowley v. Atkinson, (1879) 13 Ch. D. 283; Mitchell v. Cantrill, (1868) 37 Ch. D.
56; 57 L. J. Ch. 72; and cf. Haynes v. King, 1893, 3 Ch. 439; 63 L. J. Ch. 21; Boston v. Isted, 1903, 1 Ch. 405; 71 L. J. Ch. 442; 72 L. J. Ch. 189; Ruscoe v. Grounsell, (1903) 89 L. T. 426; Hymen v. Van Den Bergh, 1907, 2 Ch. 516; 1908, 1 Ch. 167; Mallam v. Rose, 1915, 2 Ch. 222; Foster v. Lyons, (1926) 70 Sol. Jo. 1182.
 
Continue to: