. (q) Donellan v. Read, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 899, 904; 1 L. J. N. S. K. B. 269; Hoby v. Roebuck, (1816) 7 Taun. 157; Manny. Nunn, (1874) 43 L. J. C. P. 241.

Agreements to charge land (t), or a rent (u), are within the section. So also is an agreement for a legal mortgage - or, it would seem, any mortgage of land other than one created by deposit of title deeds - to secure further advances (x); an agreement to assign or charge a debt secured on land (y); and an agreement that mortgaged property, in respect of which an order nisi for foreclosure has been obtained, shall be sold, and the balance remaining after payment of the mortgage debt be paid to the mortgagor (z). An agreement to deposit title deeds as security is within the section (a); but a deposit of deeds is sufficient part performance of the agreement to execute a legal mortgage implied in such transactions (b) to exclude the operation of the section (c). Where a mortgage is created by deposit of title deeds, an agreement to extend the security to further advances need not be in writing (d). An agreement to devise land must be in writing (e). Not only the agreement creating an option to purchase land, but the contract made in exercising the option, must be in writing (f); so also an agreement between rival purchasers not to compete against each other, but that one of them shall purchase the land and sub-sell part to the other (g).

Dealings relating to mortgages.

(r) O'connor v. Spaight, (1804) 1 Sch. & Lef. 306.

(s) Donellan v. Read, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. p. 905.

(t) Lacon v. Mertins, (1743) 3 Atk. 1; Whitmore v. Farley, (1880) 43 L. T. 192, 196.

(u) Ex p. Ball, (1879) 10 Ch. D. 615; L. P. Act, 1925, s. 205 (1) (ix).

(x) Ex p. Hooper, (1815) 19 Ves. 477; 1 Mer. 7.

(y) Jarvis v. J., (1893) 63 L. J. Ch. at p. 14; Driver v. Broad, 1893, 1 Q. B. 744; 63 L. J. Q. B. 12.

(z) Cox v. Peele, (1788) 2 Br. C. C. 334.

(a) Ex p. Coombe, (1819) 4 Madd. 249.

(b) Pryce v. Bury, (1853) 2 Drew at p. 42; affd. 18 Jur. 967; 23 L. J. Ch. 676; Carter v. Wake, (1877) 4 Ch. D. at p. 606; 46 L. J. Ch. 841; Harold v. Plenty, (1901) 70 L. J. Ch. 562.

(c) Russel v. E., 2 Wh. & T. L. C. 9th ed. 69; and see L. P. Act, 1925, s. 2 (3) (i) and s. 13.

(d) Ex p. Langston, (1810) 17 Ves. 227; Ex p. Kensington, (1813) 2 Ves. & B. 79; James v. Rice, (1854) 5 D. M. & G. 461; 23 L. J. Ch. 819; Russel v. R., 2 Wh. & T. L. C. 9th ed. p. 83.

(e) Maddison v. Alderson, (1883) 8 A. C. 467; 52 L. J. Q. B. 737. Cf. Lowry v. Reid, 1927, N. Ir. 142.

An easement must be distinguished from a licence. For an easement to exist there must be both a servient and a dominant tenement. Both the benefit and burden of the easement are annexed to the land. A contract to grant an easement is required to be in writing; although where there has been part performance, the objection that the agreement is verbal cannot be maintained (h). A licence, on the other hand, is a purely personal right; hence is neither binding on the assignee of the land, nor assignable by the licensee. It confers no interest in the land itself (i). Its only effect is to condone an act which would otherwise be unlawful. A licence is not required to be in writing (k);. and, at law, might be revoked at any moment, even though given for valuable consideration and by deed (l); but such right of revocation, where valuable consideration had been given, did not hold good in Equity (m). If the licensee persists in attempting to enjoy the licence after a valid revocation, he becomes a trespasser; but he is entitled to reasonable notice of revocation and to time to remove goods which he has been licensed to place there (n); and it seems that where the agreement for a licence is supported by valuable consideration, an injunction to restrain a revocation of the licence may be obtained, such injunction amounting in substance to a decree for specific performance (o).

Licences.

(f) Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 421; 48 L. J. Ch. 552. See, however, where there has been part performance, Brough v. Nettleton, 1921, 2 Oh. 25.

(g) Lamas v. Bayly, (1708) 2 Vern. 627.

(h) Mcmanus v. Cooke, (1887) 35 Ch. D. 681; 56 L. J. Ch. 662.

(i) Frank Warr & Co. v. L. C. C, 1904, 1 K. B. 713; King v. David Allen & Sons, Ltd., 1916, 2 A. C. 54.

(k) Wells v. Kingston, etc. Corp., (1875) L. R. 10 C. P. 402; 44 L. J. C. P. 257; Kerrison v. Smith, 1897, 2 Q. B. 445; 66 L. J. Q. B. 762.

(l) Thomas v. Sorrell, (1672) Vaughan, 351, cited in Wood v. Lead-bitter, (1845) 13 M. & W. at p. 844; 14 L. J. Ex. 161.

(m) Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd., 1915, 1Kb, 1; James Jones & Sons v. Tankerville, 1909, 2 Ch. 440.

(n) Cornish v. Stubbs, (1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 334; 39 L. J. C. P. 202; Mellor v. Watkins, (1874) L. R. 9 Q. B. 400; Aldin v. Latimer, etc. Co., 1894, 2 Ch. 437, 448; 63 L. J. Ch. 601; Wilson v. Tavener, 1901. 1 Ch. 578; 70 L. J. Ch. 263; Lowe v. Adams, 1901, 2 Ch. 598; 70 L. J. Ch. 783.

Where an interest in property is granted, and in the grant a licence is conferred on the grantee, or is necessarily incident to the grant because essential to the enjoyment of the property, the licence will be irrevocable for as long as may be necessary according to the nature of the grant (p). If the subject-matter of the grant amounts to an interest in land, the contract to confer the licence incident thereto must be in writing (q); and, further, even though ,the interest conferred on the licensee, by virtue of which the licence arises, does not amount to an interest in land, yet if the licence confers such exclusive possession on the licensee that he can maintain trespass (r), or if the licence amounts to a demise (s), then the contract to confer the licence must be in writing.

Licence "coupled with an interest."

In James Jones & Sons v. Tankerville (t), the plaintiffs entered into a written contract for the purchase of timber growing on the defendant's property and were to have the right to enter and cut the same, which they proceeded to do, but the defendant stopped the work when it was in progress. Parker, J., in granting an injunction, said - "A licence to enter a man's land is, prima facie, revocable, but is , irrevocable even at Law if coupled with a legal interest, and the interest so conferred may be a purely chattel interest or an interest in realty. ... If A., by instrument not under seal, for consideration agrees that B. shall have the right of shooting and carrying away game on A.'s estate for a term of years, the licence is at Law revocable, because the interest intended to be conferred is a profit a prendre and cannot at Law be created otherwise than by deed. The agreement, however, confers on B. a good interest in Equity, and the licence is, in Equity, irrevocable, and Equity would accordingly restrain its revocation" (u).