As to covenants against known defects.

(q) Sec Howes v. Brush field, (1803) 3Ea. 491.

(r) Sug. 11th ed. 602.

(s) See Woodhousc v. Jenkins, (1832) 9 Bing. 431 ; Ireland v. Birchum, (1835) 2 Sc. 207.

(t) As to the word"suffer "having a passive, and not an active, signification, see Roffey v. Bent, (1867) 3 Eq. 759 ; see, too, a case of mistake in parcels, Wild v. Hillas, (1859) 4

Jur. N. S. 1166 ; on appeal, 28 L. J. Ch. 170.

(u) Stannard v. Forbes, (1837) 6

A. & E. 572.

(x) Hobson v. Middleton, (1827) 6

B. & C. 295 ; 5 L. J. (0. S.) K. B. 160. (y) lb., see p. 303; and see notes to Conv. Act, 1881, s. 7 (1) F. in Wolst. Conv. and S. L. Acts.

(2) Thackeray v. Wood, (1865) 6 B. & S. 766 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 226, sed queers.

In the case of a lease, the effect of a covenant for quiet enjoyment as against parties claiming under the lessor is not restricted by the introduction into the words of demise of the qualification "so far as in his power lies or as he lawfully can or may;" there being nothing else on the face of the lease to intimate that there was any doubt as to the title (d).

Qualification in words of grant.

The ordinary covenant to do all "reasonable " acts for further assurance, or all such acts, etc, as the purchaser shall reasonably require, is not broken by a refusal to do an unnecessary act (e); or by a refusal occasioned by the act of God; e.g., the insanity (f), death, or severe illness of the party whose further assurance is required (g) ; or by a refusal to give a bond for quiet enjoyment (h), or, according to some authorities, a covenant for production of title deeds (i) ; or, perhaps, to enter into fresh covenants for title (k). And a Court of Equity has refused, in a suit for the specific performance of the covenant for further assurance, to compel a mortgagor, tenant in tail, to execute a disentailing assurance; there being, in the opinion of the Court, nothing on the face of the deed to show that the parties contemplated the enlargement of the base fee created by the deed into a fee simple absolute (/). But it is otherwise, where the covenant is specific and shows an intention to enlarge the estate (m).

Covenant for further assurance, what acts not comprised in ;

(a) Page v. Midland R. Co., 1894, 1 Ch. 11 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 126, overruling Hunt v. White, (1868) 37 L. J. Ch. 326 ; Re Ford, (1890) 63 L. T. 537 ; 35 Sol. J. 24 ; Wallis v. Bands, 1893, 2 Ch. 75, 84; 62 L. J. Ch. 586 ; and see Co. Litt. 384a,

Butler's note, ad fin.

(b) See Winter v. Anson, (1823) 1 S. & S. 434, 445.

(c) See Mag v. Platt, 1900, 1 Ch. 616, 621; 69 L. J. Ch. 357.

(d) Calvert v. Sebright, (1852) 15 Beav. 156.

But such covenant will be broken by a refusal to convey any interest acquired in the estate, even by purchase for valuable consideration (n) ; or to remove a judgment or other incumbrance (o) : or to execute a duplicate of the conveyance, if the original has been burnt (p), or (semble) has been handed over to a sub-purchaser of part of the estate (q) : but, in such cases, either the conveyance should bear an indorsement expressing that it is a duplicate (r), or it should upon the face of it purport to be merely a deed of confirmation.

What are comprised in.

(e) Warn v. Bickford, (1821) 9 Pr. 43.

(/) Pet and Cally's case, (1859) 1 Leon. 304.

(g) See Nash v. Aston, (1682) T. Jones, 195; and. Anon., (15S2) Moore, 124, where sickness was held a valid reason for a married woman not levying a fine : and the Court agreed that the case would he the same " si la feme soit grosement enseint sic ut ne poit traveller."

(h) Staynrodev. Locock, (160G) Cro. Jac. 115 ; but see 5 Jarm. Conv. 4th ed. 247, 248.

(i) See Hallett v. Middleton, (1826) 1 Rus. 243 ; Sug. 14th ed. 613 ; but see Fain v. Ayers, (1820) 2 S. & S. 533, 535, et quarc.

(k) Coles v. Kinder, (1620) Cro. Jac. 571 ; but the point is not clear; see Sug. 14th ed. 614 ; and 5 Jarm. Conv.

4th ed. 247, 248 ; Lassels v. Catterton, (1670) 1 Mod. 67.

(I) Davis v. Tollemache, (1856) 2 Jur. N. S. 1181 ; but see the special circumstances of this case.

(m) Bankes y. Small, (1881) 36 Ch. D. 716; 56 L. J. Ch. 832.

(n) Taylor v. Debar, (1676) 1 Ch. Ca. 274 ; 2 Ch. Ca. 212 ; Otter v. Lord Faux, (1856) 6 D. M. & G. 638; 26 L. J. Ch. 129; but see Davis v. Tollemache, (1856) 2 Jur. N. S. 1181, a case of mortgage.

(o) King v. Jones, (1814) 5 Taun. 418, 427 ; Be Jones, 62 L. J. Ch. 996; 1893, 2 Ch. 461, at p. 471 et seq. ; otherwise, if the deed were voluntary, ib. 474.

(p) Dennett v. Ingoldsby, (1676) Finch, 262 ; Sug. 14th ed. 438, 613.

(7) Napper v. Lord Allington, (1700) 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 166.

The party called upon to execute the further assurance may claim a reasonable time in which to procure professional assistance (s) ; and according to modern practice, which the Courts would doubtless recognize, a draft of the proposed assurance is furnished to him, that he may submit it to his legal advisers (t) : and his costs ought, in strictness, to be tendered to him along with the assurance (u).

Time allowed to party required to execute further assurance.

A vendor's covenants for title are, as we have seen, generally limited to the acts of himself, his ancestors, devisors, grantors, or donors (if he have taken the estate otherwise than by purchase for value), and persons claiming by, through, under or in trust for him or them respectively; and this is so with the implied statutory covenants (x). It, however, frequently happens either that some of the covenants are general and others limited, or that the limited covenants are not consistent in their restrictions: in such cases, questions arise as to how far the restrictions in one covenant affect another.

Covenants for title, how-restricted.

A covenant, general in terms, will be so construed, unless a contrary intention clearly appear (y) ; this, however, may be evidenced by any part of the instrument (z).