(s) Ex p. Manning, (1727) 2 P. W. 410; Owen v. Davies, (1747) 1 Ves. sen. 80; Child v. Lord Abingdon, (1790) 1 Ves. 94; Davy v. Barber, (1742) 2 Atk. 490; Trefusis v. Lord Clinton, (1828) 2 Si. 359; Vesey v. Elwood, (1842) 3 D. & War. at p. 82; Sug. 14th ed. 631 et teq.; Hutchinson v. Cathcart, (1839) J. & C. 260; Champernowne v. Brooke, (1835) 3 C. & F. 4; Wallis v. Sarel, (1852) 5 De G. & S. 429; 21 L. J. Ch. 717; Bailey v. Collett, (1854) 18 Beav. 179; 23 L. J. Ch. 230.

(t) Williams v. Glenton, (1866) 1 Ch. 200, 206; 35 L. J. Ch. 284.

(u) Morris v. Wood, 15th Nov. 1850, Ms.

Where timber is agreed to be taken at a valuation, and the valuation is delayed after the time fixed for it, or if no time is fixed after the date for completion, interest upon the purchase-money is payable only from the date of the actual valuation (y), the reason for the rule being, that its augmented value by growth is included in the valuation, and is an equivalent to interest: nor does it appear that in the case of timber which has arrived at maturity interest ought, as a general rule, to be paid prior to the valuation; for there has been no increase nor any advantage to the purchaser; the case might, however, probably be different if the purchaser had been the cause of, or consenting to, the delay in valuation: or if the chief value of the timber consisting in its ornamental character, he had been in possession of the estate. And, on the other hand, it does not seem that the purchaser has any claim against the vendor where the delay has been caused by the vendor, even though the timber is decaying: for the decreased value is covered by the valuation; but in the case of perishing ornamental timber it might conceivably be otherwise. If no time were originally fixed either for valuation or for completion, the time for valuation might, it is conceived, be fixed by notice from either party requiring it to be made immediately.

Interest upon valuation of timber, from what date payable.

The case of fixtures, agreed to be taken at a valuation, seems to be the converse of that of growing timber; fixtures being a deteriorating property. Where they are of large value, the purchaser, if let into possession after the time at which the valuation ought to be, but before it is actually made, should, it is conceived, pay an occupation rent for the intermediate period: the case seems to be conversely within the principle of Dyer v. Ear grave (z), where it was decided that when, upon the sale of leaseholds, the vendor retains possession after the time fixed for completion, he must pay an occupation rent to the purchaser, and receive interest upon the purchase-money.

Interest upon valuation of fixtures. occupation rent in respect of; and of leaseholds.

(x) Wallis v. Bastard, (1853) 4 D. M. & G. 251. (y) See Waldron v. Forester, (1807) cited Sug. 14th ed. 631. (z) (1805) 10 Ves. 505; and see Cheetham v. Sturtevant, (1849) 3 De G. & S. 468.

35 (2)

Where through the vendor's fault there was a delay of two years in completing the purchase of a mine, and during the interval the vendor continued to work the colliery, specific performance was granted at the suit of the purchaser, with compensation for the coal so worked (a). Where there was delay in completion without default on the part of either the vendor or the purchaser, and after the date fixed for completion the vendor received arrears of rent, he was held liable to the purchaser to account for such arrears (b).

Coal worked or rents received during delay.

Where the price is payable by instalments, and nothing is said as to possession, it would appear that the purchaser is entitled to possession only from the time of paying the last instalment (c).

Where price payable by instalments.

The rule that a vendor remaining in occupation after the time fixed for completion must pay an occupation rent to the purchaser is not an invariable one. Thus, where on a sale to a railway company the delay in completion was solely attributable to the purchasers, and, under the pressure arising from their default, the vendor continued to occupy the premises for his business, which he carried on for his own benefit, the company were held liable to pay interest upon the purchase-money as from the date fixed for completion, without being entitled to any allowance for occupation rent (d). In this case it is to be observed that the premises (a public-house) were not sold as a going concern, or with a view to the business being carried on by the purchasing company. The case is therefore distinguishable from the

Golden Bread Co. v. Hemmings (e), which was a case of a business being sold as a going concern.

The general rule is subject to variation.

(a) Brown v. Bibbs, (1878) 37 L. T. 171; and see 8. C. as to mode of valuation.

(b) Pleivs v. Samuel, 1904, 1 Ch. 464.

(c) Kenney v. Wexham, (1822) 6 Mad. 355.

(d) Leggott v. Metr. R. Co., (1870) 5 Ch. 716; but the vendor had to pay the outgoings during his occupancy; and see Metr. R. Co. v. Defries,. (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 189.

;Where, upon a sale of the lease of a public-house, and the stock in trade, the purchaser wrongfully refused to perform the contract, and the vendors retained possession and carried on the business, the purchaser was compelled to pay interest on his purchase-money, and also all sums which the vendors had laid out for the rent, taxes, and other necessary outgoings, with interest, and was not allowed to charge the vendors with an occupation rent; but it was held that the business must be treated as carried on at the vendor's risk, so that the purchaser could not be made liable for losses (f). In the case just cited, it should be observed that the business was carried on without giving any notice to the purchaser, or giving him any opportunity of deciding the course to be adopted (g). If it had been carried on with the purchaser's sanction, he would no doubt have been held liable for the loss thus incurred (g).