Meaning of "wilful default."

(h) Williams v. Glenton, (1866) 1 Ch. 200; cf. Re Mayor of London and Tubbs, 1894, 2 Ch. 524; 63 L. J. Ch. 680.

(i) 1 Ch. p. 208.

(k) Re Woods and Lewis, 1898, 2 Ch. p. 213; Bennett v. Stone, 1903, 1 Ch 509, 525; Re Des Reaux and Setchfield, 1926, Ch. p. 190.

(l) See Bennett v. Stone, 1903, 1 Ch. 509; 72 L. J. Ch. 240.

(m) Per Lindley, L. J., in Re Helling and Merton, 1893, 3 Ch. 269; 62 L. J. Ch. 783.

This statement by Bowen, L. J., that default means not doing what is " reasonable," and a dictum by Stirling, L. J., in Bennett v. Stone (o) to the like effect, were criticised in Re Bayley-worthington and. Cohens Contract (p) by Parker, J.", who pointed out that a person might act reasonably and nevertheless be guilty of breach of duty and accordingly of default. "Default," said Parker, J., "must involve either not doing what you ought or doing what you ought not, having regard to the other parties concerned in the transaction; in other words, it involves the breach of some duty you owe to another. It refers to personal conduct and is not the same thing as breach of contract. ... If the Court decide that an objection or requisition is untenable, it in effect decides that it ought not to have been insisted on, and consequently that the purchaser was in default in refusing to complete till it was complied with or removed. If, on the other hand, the Court decide that the requisition or objection was good, it in effect decides that the vendor was in default in not complying with or removing it, if it was in his power to do so. The honest belief of either party in the validity of his own view will not prevent such party being in default, though it may prevent such default being a wilful default within the meaning of the contract." In this case the conditions provided that if the purchase should not be completed at the time appointed, the purchaser should pay interest on the balance of the purchase-money, subject to a proviso that if the delay should arise "from any cause other than the neglect or default of the purchaser," he might place the balance of the purchase money on deposit in a bank. The purchaser raised an objection to the title which Neville, J., held to be well-founded. The vendor appealed, and the purchaser thereupon placed the balance of the purchase-money on deposit. The Court of Appeal over-ruled Neville, J. The purchaser appealed to the House of Lords, which upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. In completing the purchase, a dispute arose upon the question of interest which came before Parker, J., who held that the purchaser's objection having gone to the root of the title and raised a difficult point of law, which the Court of first instance had decided in his favour, and having regard also to the large amount of the purchase-money (110,000Z.), the purchaser had not acted unreasonably in refusing to complete until the decision of the House of Lords had been obtained. But although the purchaser had acted reasonably, the learned judge held that he had been guilty of "default" within the meaning of the condition and must pay interest accordingly.

(n) Per Bowen, L. J., in Re Young and Harston, (1885) 31 Ch. D. 168, 174; and see per Lindley, L. J., in Re Hetling and Merton, tup.; Re Mayor of London and Tubbs, 1894, 2 Ch. 524; 63 L. J. Ch. 580.

(o) 1903, 1 Ch. 509. (p) 1909, 1 Ch. 648.

Where the vendor fixed a date for completion which he ought to have known was too short for him to procure the concurrence of necessary parties, the delay in completion was held to be due to the vendor's wilful default (q). So, where the vendor went abroad two days before the day fixed for completion, he was allowed no interest beyond a period of a fortnight, which was held by the Court to be a reasonable period within which to obtain the execution of the conveyance by certain necessary parties (r). And, where the draft conveyance was sent to the vendor's solicitors six days before, but was not returned till six days after, the day fixed for completion, and a still further delay then occurred through the absence of the vendor's solicitors, no interest was given, except that allowed by the bank at which the money had been deposited (s).

(q) Re Hetling and Merton,, sup.; Re Earl of Strafford and Maples, 1896, 1 Ch. 235; 65 L. J. Ch. 124. (r) Re Young and Harston, sup.

The mere fact of the abstracts delivered having shown an imperfect title, or being supported by insufficient evidence, will not negative the vendor's claim to interest (t). "When you are dealing with a contract for the sale of land, a long series of decisions has established that you ought not to try the obligation of the vendor by the standard applied by the Common Law in cases of ordinary sales of chattels" (u). Where the vendor claimed rescission of a contract on the ground of mistake and the purchaser obtained a decree of specific performance, it was held in the circumstances of the case that whether or not there had been default on the part of the vendor, the default had not been wilful and that the purchaser must pay interest accordingly (x).

A stipulation binding the purchaser to pay interest during delay in completion, according to an ascending scale, is not in the nature of a penalty from which he may be relieved, but a separate contract which may be enforced against him (y).

Where the condition is for payment of interest according to an ascending scale.

Where, after the title had been accepted, long delay resulted from notice being given of an adverse claim which was subsequently ascertained to be unfounded, the purchaser was held liable to pay interest from the time fixed by the contract (z).

Delay caused by adverse claim.

(s) Re Gold and Norton, (1885) 33 W. R. 333; and see Re Monclton and Gilzean, (1884) 27 Ch. D. 555; 54 L. J. Ch. 257.

(t) Rowley v. Adams, (1850) 12 Beav. 476; Cowpe v. Bakewell, (1851) 13 Beav. 421; Vickers v. Hand, (1859) 26 Beav. 630; Re Mayor of London and Tubbs, 1894, 2 Ch. 524.