Assignment of leaseholds, whether in itself valuable consideration.

(u) Price v. Jenkins, (1877) 5 Ch. D. 619; 46 L. J. Ch. 805; Harris v. Tubb, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 79 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 434, in which case the consideration was natural love and affection.

(x) It has been held not to apply to cases under the 13 Eliz., Ridlcr v. R., (1882) 22 Ch. D. at p. 81; or to cases under s. 91 of the Bkcy. Act, 1869 (s. 47 of the Act of 1883), Ex p. Hillman, (1879) 10 Ch. D. 622 ; 48 L. J. Bank. 77, in effect overruling Re Doble, (1878) 26 W. R. 407 ; Re

Lulham, (1884) 32 W. R. 1013 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 928 ; affirmed 53 L. T. 9 ; see Hance v. Harding, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 732.

(y) See Harris v. Tubb, sup., judgment of Kekewich, J.

(z) Gardiner v. G., (1801) 12 I. C. L. R. 565.

(a) Per May, C. J., 6 L. R. Ir. 535.

(b) Hamilton v. Molloy, (1880) 5 L. R. Ir. 339.

(c) Lee v. Mathews, (1880) 6 L. R. Ir. 530.

If a post-nuptial settlement is made with the aid of another person whose concurrence is essential to its full validity - as in the case of a settlement by tenant for life and tenant in tail in remainder - this may take from the instrument its voluntary character (d) : but the concurrence of the husband in a settlement of property belonging to the wife for her separate use has been held not to have this effect, since the husband gave no consideration for the settlement (e). So, a family compromise founded on a doubtful intestacy is valid (f). Where A. and B. were seised of lands as tenants in common, and A. at B.'s request conveyed his moiety upon trust for B., if he should survive A., and after B.'s death for A.'s children, and B. by the same deed conveyed his moiety upon the same trusts after his own death in favour of A. and his children, it was held that the limitations of B.'s moiety in favour of A. and his children were for valuable consideration, and were not void as against a subsequent purchaser for value from B. (g). But, of course, the fact of the grantees having had estates in the property, which - as in the case of estates in remainder on an estate tail - have been destroyed by the settlor, will not support the settlement (A).

Post-nuptial settlement, may be supported, when.

Family-compromise.

And the Act extends to a case where A., having contracted to purchase an estate, takes the conveyance in the names of trustees, upon voluntary trusts (i).

Purchase in the name of trustees upon voluntary trusts is within the Act.

(d) Myddleton v. Lord Kenyon, (1794) 2 Ves. 391, 410; Roe v. Mitton, (1767) 2 Wils. 356 ; and cases cited in Doe v. Rolfe, (1838) 8 A. & E., see p. 659 ; but see also that case, inf. p. 925 ; and Tarleton v. Liddell, (1851) 17 Q. B. 390 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 507.

(e) Shurmur v. Sedgwick, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 597; and Butterfield v. Keath, (1852) 15 Beav. 408; but qu., whether there was not valuable consideration in this case; ef. Re Foster and Lister, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 87, 95 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 480; Greene v. 0'Kearney, (1852) 2 Ir. C. L. R. 267 ; and see, on the general subject, Scott v. S., (1854) 18

Jul. 755.

(/) Heap v. Tonge, (1851) 9 Ha. 90 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 661 ; see Stapilton v. S., (1739) 1 Atk. 2; 1 Wh. & T. L. C. 7th ed. ; see sup. p. 752 ; IIar~ man v. Richards, (1852) 10 Ha. 81 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 1066; Ex p. Lucy, (1853) 17 Jur. 1143; Stone v. Godfrey, (1854) 5 D. M. & Gh 76 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 769.

(g) Mullins v. Guilfoyle, (1878) 2 L. R. Ir. 95.

(h) Cormick v. Trapaud, (1818) 6 Dow. 60.

(i) Ration v. Van Heythuysen, (1853) 11 Ha. 126.

It has now been definitely decided that where a person has endowed a charity, he cannot afterwards avoid his own act under the 27 Eliz. c. 4, by a sale to a purchaser for value (A*).

Where a husband made a voluntary post-nuptial settlement on his wife and subsequently became her administrator under the Laws of the Colony of Victoria, and hence trustee of his wife's assets from the date of her death, a conveyance by him of the settled property was held to be, if made for value and so as to defeat the prior settlement, a breach of trust, and if not made in good faith, to be inoperative (/).

Voluntary conveyance to a charity cannot be avoided by subsequent sale for value.

Settlor becoming administrator.

Marriage is in itself a sufficient consideration for an antenuptial settlement upon the husband, wife, or issue (m) : and, in the absence of fraud, the settlement made by one of the contracting parties is not invalidated, by reason of the settlement made by the other proving ineffective ; as e.g., by reason of his or her infancy; nor does any case of election arise as against the other party or his or her representatives (n). The principle of the doctrine of election in such cases appears to rest " not on the particular provisions of the instrument which raises the election, but on the presumption of a general intention in the authors of an instrument that effect shall be given to every part of it. This general and presumed intention is not repelled by showing that the circumstances which in the event gave rise to the election were not in the contemplation of the author of the instrument (o) ; but in principle it is evident that it may be repelled by the declaration in the instrument itself of a particular intention inconsistent with the presumed and general intention " (p). Thus, where, on the marriage of an infant, property was settled to her separate use for life without power of anticipation, and the settlement also contained a covenant by her and her husband to settle after-acquired property, it was held that, on the wife becoming subsequently entitled to a fund for her separate use, she was not put to her election between this fund and the settled property, but was entitled to both, on the ground that the restraint on anticipation constituted a declaration inconsistent with the doctrine of election, and therefore excluded it (q), and the intention is not affected by the wife having become subsequently discovert (r).