And even where there is a condition for compensation to the vendor, his rights, in any given case, seem far from clear: as is observed in a recent work on conveyancing (u), "It must indeed be a very strong case of mistake for a vendor (who has full means of ascertaining, with the utmost accuracy, what he intends to sell) to succeed in obtaining compensation, or, in other words, an increase of his purchase-money, for an alleged mistake he has himself made:" in a case (w) where fields described as "fourteen acres more or less," were sold for 973l., under an order of the Court, and with the usual condition as to misdescription, a petition stating that the fields in fact contained twenty-seven statutory acres (the acres mentioned in the particulars being intended for customary acres) and that the real value was 1600l., and praying that the purchaser might pay the difference or that the property might be resold, was dismissed with costs; the decision however was chiefly on the ground of delay, four years having elapsed since the sale; this case may, perhaps, be considered to differ in principle from cases where there is a misstatement of quantity incapable of being explained by the difference between statutory and customary measurement; for, possibly, the purchasers at the sale might have bid under the full impression that the fourteen acres were in fact customary acres, and this was alleged to have really happened; Sir Edward Sugden's remark (a?) upon the case is, " that no doubt it would be difficult in such a case to make a bond fide purchaser buy an estate twice as large as that for which he had contracted, and pay double the amount of the purchase-money for it:" and it may, perhaps, be doubted whether, in any ordinary case, a purchaser could be compelled under such conditions to pay a sum materially exceeding the contemplated amount of purchase-money; such an unexpected liability might, it is obvious, be often productive of the most oppressive and ruinous consequences: in the above case the Court seems to have considered that had any relief been granted, it must have consisted in avoiding the sale altogether.

Vendor's right to compensation is generally questionable.

Alleged under-value from measurement being given in custom(r) And see Portman v. Mill, 2 Russ. 570.

(s) See Att.-Gen. v. Sitwell, 1 You-& C , Ex. 559; Marquis Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328; see Tyler v. Beversham, Rep. t. Finch, 80; ary instead of statutory acres - no compensation.

Alvanley v. Kinnaird, 2 Mac. & G. 1.

(t) 17 Ves. 394, 401.

(u) Davidson, vol. iii. p. 34.

(w) Price v. North, 2 Y. & C, Ex. 620.

As to the right to compensation in respect of variations in the quality of the estate, - there does not appear to be any case in which a vendor has obtained an increase of purchase-money upon the ground of the character of the property being better than he had himself described it.

On the other hand, the purchase-money is liable to be diminished by deductions, either in respect of proceeds of the estate received, or which ought to have been received by the vendor, and which belong to the purchaser; or in respect of mere deteriorations to the estate; or of original defects in the estate.

Difficulty of forcing a more expensive purchase on a purchaser.

Variations in quality of estate - no allowance semble in favour of vendor.

Purchase(x) Sug. 372. money, how diminished.

As to deductions of the first description; - We have already seen that the entire inheritance belongs to the purchaser from the date of the contract (y), but that the profits or income belong to him only from the time fixed for completion; if, therefore, timber be blown down (z), or felled, or stone or minerals be quarried or worked after the date of the contract, the proceeds must be accounted for at completion: so, the vendor must account for such rents and profits as he has, or might, but for his wilful default (a), have received, from the time appointed for completion up to such time as the purchaser has, or might safely have, taken possession (b): and in one case, where many years' delay had occurred by the default of the vendor who had received part of the purchase-money and retained possession of the estate, he was charged with interest at 4l. per cent, upon a proportionate part of the rents (c).

As to deductions of the second description; - The vendor from the date of the contract holds the estate in trust for the purchaser, subject to payment of the purchase-money; with a right until the time fixed for completion to receive the interim profits; if, therefore, by his wilful acts (d), or mere negligence, he permit the property to deteriorate, - as by allowing hedges and fences to get out of repair, or the land to remain uncultivated (e), or by an improper course of husbandry (f), or by ejecting tenants, or acting so improvidently as to occasion their loss (g), - the purchaser is entitled to an allowance: and, of course, deterioration may be of such a nature, or to such an extent, as to relieve him from the contract (h); and the vendor must answer for deteriorations occasioned by the conduct of his tenant, even although the lease has expired (i): but not for deteriorations after the time fixed for completion, if the title shown were such that the purchaser ought to have taken possession (j).

By proceeds of estate received or which might have been received by vendor.

By amount of deteriorations to estate, through fault of vendor.

(y) Supra, p. 116.

(z) Ibid.

(a) Acland v. Gaisford, 2 Madd. 28; Wilson v. Clapham, 1 Jac. & W. 36.

(b) Vide supra, p. 294.

(c) Burton v. Todd, 1 Swanst. 255.

(d) 3 Madd. 395.

(e) Foster v. Deacon, 3 Madd. 394.

So, also, compensation may be due to the purchaser out of the purchase-money in respect of original defects in the estate, either as respects its quantity, or quality, or the extent of the vendor's interest therein: it may be con-venient here to consider those questions which relate merely either to the quantity or quality of the estate; reserving for separate discussion, under the head of specific performance, those questions which are in fact questions of title (k).