Upon the first question, (considered merely as one of principle,) it is submitted, that where the limitations over are in favour of the collateral relations or connections, not of the settlor, but of the other contracting party, (whether wife or husband,) the settlement itself may be considered prima facie evidence of such other party having stipulated for their insertion: so, where, on a settlement of the intended wife's estate, the limitations over are in favour of her own collateral relations, in derogation from the husband's marital right by survivorship, (in case of personalty,) or as tenant by the curtesy, (in case of realty:) where, in any case, other than that last referred to, the limitations over are in favour of the collateral relations or connections of the settlor, such presumption cannot so readily arise; but it might be proved that the other party stipulated for their insertion: if such a stipulation cannot be presumed or proved, the limitations must, it is conceived, be considered voluntary, and void as against a subsequent bond fide purchaser.

Marriage a sufficient consideration for settlement.

Whether limitations to collaterals are valid.

Such limitations

(t) Myddleton v. Lord Kenyon, 2 Ves. J. 391; see 410, and cases cited in Doe v. Rolfe, 8 Ad. & E., see p. 659; but see also that case, infra, 423.

(u) See Brown v. Jones, 1 Alk.190

(v) Davenport v. Bishopp, 1 Ph. 698; S. C., 2 Y. & C. C. C. 451; in which see the earlier cases cited.

(w) 18 Ves. 92.

Nor do the reported cases (x) where limitations in a marriage settlement in favour of collaterals have been held invalid, appear to be inconsistent with the above suggestions.

As to the second point - If upon marriage the husband's estate were settled upon the wife, giving her an absolute power of sale and control over the purchase-money, effectually excluding him from any future participation therein and without securing to him the indirect advantage of a permanent provision for her, the marriage, it is conceived, would clearly be a sufficient consideration for such a settlement; although she might at once sell the estate and hand over the purchase-money to her own relations: and, if so, upon what principle can it be contended that the marriage would not equally have been a sufficient consideration for any limitations in favour of such relations, should be considered within the marriage contract - when.

If within the contract, marriage forms a sufficient consideration to support them, semble.

(x) See Osgood v. Strode, 2 P. Wms. 245; Johnson v. Legard, 3 Madd. 283; Cotterell v. Homer, 13 which might, upon her stipulation, have been introduced into the settlement? The case of a woman marrying, and stipulating for a provision in favour of parents, or others, who had previously been dependent on her exertions for support, may suggest the hardships which might result from maintaining a contrary doctrine. The impossibility of restoring the consideration by replacing either party in his or her original status, is, in itself, a sufficient reason why full effect should be given to any arrangements which were considered to form the equivalent, or part of the equivalent to such consideration (y).

Sim. 506; Stacpoole v. Stacpoole, 2 Con. & L. 489.

And where the settlement is made by a party other than the husband and wife, - as where, on the marriage of a tenant in tail, the tenant for life in possession concurs in barring the entail and re-settling the estate, - the validity of limitations in favour of other branches of the family; or (it is conceived) of strangers, seems to be unquestionable (z): so, even the mother of the husband releasing the lands from an annuity, and accepting a substituted security for its payment, has been held a sufficient consideration for limitations in favour of her younger children (a). A settlement, not on marriage, by tenant for life and tenant in tail, was, under special circumstances, held void as against a purchaser in a modern case (b); but the decision seems to be disapproved of by Sir E. Sugden (c).

And limitations to collaterals, which precede a limitation in favour of issue of the marriage, will, it seems, be valid (d): so, the remoteness of a limitation (e), or its being subsequent to a vested estate tail (f), may perhaps be sufficient to sustain it.

Such limitations supported by necessary concurrence of third person in the settlement; or by preceding lirni. tations to issue of marriage.

(y) See Jenkins v. Keymes or Keymis, 1 Lev. 237; where it was held that the wife's marriage portion was a sufficient consideration for limitations to the issue of the husband by a second marriage.

(z) See Jenkins v. Keymes or Keymis, 1 Lev. 150, 237; Osgood v.

Strode, 2 P. Wms., see p. 256; and Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 92.

(a) Roe v. Mitton, 2 Wils. 356.

(b) Doe v. Rolfe, 8 Ad. & E. 650.

(c) Sug. 935.

(d) Clayton v. Earl Winton, 3 Madd. 302, n.; and see Sug. 934.

(e) 2 P. Wms. 255.

And a settlement by a widow, before her second marriage, upon her children by a deceased husband, is not fraudulent within the Act; even although they arc themselves married and have issue (g).

A settlement or conveyance, apparently voluntary, may be supported by any evidence, (consistent with its terms,) which proves that it was in fact made for good consideration (h): so, although originally voluntary, it may be made good by subsequent matter; e.g., the marriage of the party claiming under it beneficially (i) - even although its existence be not shown to have been considered in the marriage treaty (k), - or by a sale, for consideration, by the voluntary grantee (l); or, probably, (in the case of a creditors' deed,) by the fact of creditors having, upon the faith of it, refrained to enforce their remedies against the debtor (m).

A settlement "really fraudulent or fraudulently kept on foot" (n), would seem to be void as against a bond fide purchaser even from the heir or devisee of the settlor (o): but a mere voluntary deed cannot, it would appear, be avoided by a sale by the heir (p): and, of course, it will not be avoided by a subsequent conveyance apparently made for value but in fact voluntary (q).