Equity of redemption, when to be barred.

Acknowledgment.

If mortgagee is entitled to possession as being interested in equity of redemption, time does not run.

(w) Sug. 634. (x) See sect. 28.

(y) Batchelor v. Middleton, 6 Ha. 75.

(z) Sect. 28.

(a) Raffety v. King, 1 Keen, 601; Tull v. Owen, 4 Y. & C. 201; Hyde v. Dallaway, 2 Ha. 528; 2 Ph. 303.

No spiritual eleemosynary corporation sole is to recover any lands or rents but within two successive incumbencies and six years, or sixty years, (whichever be the longer period,) from the time when the right accrued (b).

No advowson is to be recovered, or right of presentation enforced, but within three successive adverse incumbencies, or sixty years, (whichever be the longer period,) reckoning therein incumbencies by lapse but not incumbencies after promotions to Bishoprics (c); and a patron claiming in respect of an estate in remainder on an estate tail, is, for the purposes of the statutory bar, to be considered as claiming through the person entitled to such estate tail (d): successive adverse incumbencies extending over one hundred years form an absolute bar, unless the benefice has been since enjoyed under a rightful presentation; and in calculating this period a presentation adverse to the owner of a particular estate is considered adverse to remaindermen (e).

No money charged upon, or payable out of any land or rent, nor any legacy (f), is to be recovered but within twenty years next after a present right to receive the same (g) shall have accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for or release of the same; unless there has been some interim payment in respect of principal or interest, or acknowledgment of right given in writing (h); from the above period must be excluded the time (if any) during which the person entitled to the charge has been also entitled to the possession of the land or rent (i): and where a term was vested in trustees, in trust to raise portions for younger children, and subject thereto the estate was limited in strict settlement, it was held by Lord Lyndhurst, C, that the possession of the estate by the parties in reversion was consistent with the trust, and that the statutory bar did not apply (j).

Time allow-ed for action, etc, by spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole.

For recovery of advowson or right of presentation.

For recovery of money charged on land.

(i) Sect. 29.

(c) Sects. 30 and 31.

(d) Sect. 32.

(e) See sect. 33.

(f) Which includes a residue or share of a residue; see Christian v. Devereux, 12 Sim. 264; see also Phillipo v. Munnings, 2 Myl. & C. 309; Sheppard v. Duke, 9 Sim. 567; Prior v. Horniblow, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 200; Adams v. Barry, 2 Coll. 290. Under the 36 Geo. III. c. 52, s. 27, a verified copy of the entry in the Stamp Office book, of payment of the duty on a legacy, is evidence of payment of the legacy; Harrison v. Borwell, 10 Sim. 380.

(g) See Faulkner v. Daniel, 3 Ha. 212. Legatees, whose legacies are charged on land subject to prior charges, held not to be affected by lapse of time while any prior charge subsisted.

(h) Sect. 40.

It has been held that a foreclosure suit is a suit for the recovery of money charged upon land, within the 40th section (k): so, also, is a vendor's suit for the recovery of his unpaid purchase-money (l): it seems probable that the statutory bar would not apply, where the bill was filed before, although no decree was made until after, the passing of the Act (m).

Arrears of dower (n), rent, or interest, are not recoverable for more than six years (o), unless a prior incumbrancer has been in possession within one year before the commencement of the proceedings for the recovery of such arrears, in which case they may be recovered for the whole period of such possession (p); that is, if the prior incumbrance affect the estate or interest upon which the subsequent incumbrance is a charge (q). It was held by Sir J. Wigram, V. C, that if the interest on a mortgage debt is secured by bond or covenant, arrears for twenty years can be recovered as against the mortgaged estate (r); but this decision, which was opposed to the opinion of Sir E. Sugden (s), has been overruled (t): the position of the grantee of an annuity charged on land, which has been duly paid, where the grantor has retained possession of the estate without acknowledgment of title, for a period exceeding the statutory limit, seems to be doubtful (u).

What suits are considered to be such.

For recovery of periodical payments.

(i) Burrell v. Lord Egremont, 7 Beav. 205.

(j) Young v. Lord Waterpark, 13 Sim. 204; S. C. on appeal, 10 Jur. 1.

(k) See Dearman v. Wyche, 9 Sim. 570; and Du Vigier v. Lee, 2 Ha. 334; but see contra, Wrixon v. Vise, 2 C. & L. 138.

(l) Toft v. Stephenson, 7 Ha. 1.

(m) Ravenscroft v.Frisky, 1 Coll. 16.

(n) Bamford v. Bamford, 5 Ha. 203.

(o) Sects. 41 and 42; Francis v. Groxer, 5 Ha. 39; the expression "rent," includes a fee-farm rent; Humfrey v. Gery, 7 C. B. 567.

(p) Sect. 42.

(g) Vincent v. Goring, 1 J. & L. 697.

It has been decided, in Ireland, by Sugden, C, that a purchaser under a decree of the Court can be compelled to accept a title depending upon adverse possession, verified, like any other fact, in the Master's Office (v); and the general principle would probably be maintained by the English Courts in a suit for specific performance. Its beneficial application, as between vendors and purchasers, is, however, in the case particularly of missing instruments, materially affected by the difficulty which exists of determining the time when the right of action may have accrued to the supposed adverse claimants: for instance, where forty years have elapsed since the death intestate of a former owner seised in fee simple in possession, the statute may be safely relied on as against the claim of any latent heir, as his right of action must have accrued at the death: but if the intestacy itself be in dispute, and there is reason to apprehend the existence of a will whose contents are unknown, here the statute is evidently a very slight protection; as limitations may have been created under which a right of action may exist for an indefinite period.