To rights of common, etc.

Period for which possession must be proved in evidence of title.

(m) See 1 C. M. & R. 222.

(n) Dewhurst v. Wrigley, 1 C. P. Coop. 329.

(o) Liberty for grantee, his heirs and assigns with servants or otherwise, to enter upon lands, and there to hawk, hunt, fish, and fowl, held to be such; (Wickham v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63;) and see authorities there cited. A right to dig coal, or other minerals (Paddock v. Forrester, 3 Man. & Gr. 903) on another man's land, may be claimed by prescription; but an exclusive right to any particular stratum of mineral is a right to land, and must so be claimed, whether the mine be open or unopened (Wilkinson v. Proud, 11 M. & W. 33). Whether the right to the sole and several herbage and pasturage of land is within the Act seems doubtful; see Welcome v. Upton, 5 M. & W. 398, 403.

(p) Supra, n. (k).

(q) Sect. 1. See Welcome v. Upton, 5 M. & W. 393.

In all the above cases, (except that of a claim to light,) the enjoyment must have been uninterrupted (u), "as of right," and must have been subsisting within, at most, a year before the commencement of the action in which it is relied on (v): the claim, therefore, may be defeated by showing that, for the whole or a part of a period relied on, the enjoyment was by parol licence, or was exercised by stealth or without the knowledge of the parties interested in opposing the claim (w), or that the party exercising it was himself, during all or any part of such period, entitled to the possession of the property sought to be affected (x): and in cases falling under sections 1, 4, and 7 of the Act, an enjoyment, as of right, may be proved, by showing enjoyment for several periods, amounting together to the statutory time; and that during the entire intervals between such periods, and between the last of them and the action, (if such interval intervened,) the estate sought to be affected was in the hands of a tenant for life or for years exceeding three years (y).

Enjoyment must have been uninterrupted and as of right.

(r) Sect. 8.

(s) See Bright v. Walker, 1 C. M. & R. 219.

(t) S. C.; and note, that as respects the prima facie title which is gained by a thirty or twenty years' possession, under sects. 1 and 2 of the Act, the time during which there may have been any disability, or a subsisting life estate, is altogether excluded by sect. 7.

(u) Onley v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 500.

(v) See Parker v. Mitchell, 11 A.

& E. 788; and Flight v. Thomas, 8 Cl. & Fin. 231.

(w) See Bright v. Walker, 2 C. M. & R. 219; Tickle v. Brown, 4 Ad. & E. 369; Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220.

(x) Onley v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 500; Clayton v. Corby, 2 Ad. & E. N. S. 813; Clay v. Shackeray, 2 Moo. & R. 244. As to the non-extinguishment of a necessary easement by unity of seisin, see Pheysey v. Vicary, 16 M. & W. 484.

But, as respects the easement of light, the mere fact of uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years, otherwise than by consent given by deed or writing, confers an absolute title; the enjoyment need not be as of right; so that proof of a parol licence is immaterial (z); nor does the existence of disabilities or particular estates make any difference: it has, however, been recently determined by the Court of Exchequer, that the enjoyment of the access of light must have been in the character of an easement, distin ct from the enjoyment of the land sought to be affected; so that sixty years' enjoyment of lights looking out upon a garden which the owners of the house had held during that period, as tenants from year to year, was held insufficient to confer a title (a).

By interruption, it may be observed, is meant an adverse obstruction, and not a mere discontinuance of user (b); but the question, whether a discontinuance was voluntary or otherwise, is one for a jury (c); so that, as between vendor and purchaser, it would seem to be necessary to give evidence of (so near as may be) continuous user. It has been recently decided by the House of Lords (d), confirming the decisions of the Courts of Queen's Bench and Exchequer Chamber, that, under the 4th section of the Statute, which provides that no act shall be deemed an interruption unless submitted to or acquiesced in for one year, a party who has uninterruptedly enjoyed or used the easement or right for any period exceeding one year short of the term which would be sufficient to confer a statutory title, can, upon being disturbed in his enjoyment or user at any time within the last year of the statutory term, at once claim the benefit of the statute.

Except in cases of light.

Interruption-what it is.

(y) Clayton v. Corby, 2 Ad. & E. N. S. 813.

(z) Mayor, &C. of London v. Pew-terers' Company, 2 Moo. & R. 409; Flight v. Thomas, 11 Ad. & E. G88, see p. 695.

(a) Harbidge v. Warwick, 3 Exch. R.552

(b) Carr v. Foster, 3 Ad. & E., N. S.581.

(c) S. C.

(d) Flight v. Thomas, 8 Cl. & Fin. 231.

By the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, the time within which proceedings can be commenced, at Law or in Equity (e), for the recovery of any land (f), (which expression includes all corporeal hereditaments, and also tithes (g), except tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole,) and any share, estate, or interest therein, or of any rent, (which includes heriots, and all services and suits for which a distress may be made, and all annuities and periodical sums of money charged upon or payable out of any land, except moduses or compositions belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole (h),) is restricted to a period of twenty years (i), or, in case of continuous disabilities (j), forty years, from the time at which the right to proceed for the recovery of such land or rent first accrued to the plaintiff, or to the party through whom he claims (k).

Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27.