This section is from the book "A Compendium Of The Law And Practice Of Vendors And Purchasers Of Real Estate", by J. Henry Dart. Also available from Amazon: A compendium of the law and practice of vendors and purchasers of real estate.
(x) See Cooke v. Cooke, 2 Vera. 36; Cope v. Parry, 2 Jac. & W. 538.
(y) See and consider Fulham v. M'Carthy, 1 H. L. C. 703.
(z) 1 Dan. Ch. P. by H. 205; Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & Cr. 134; and see Nelthorpe v. Holyate, 1 Coll. 217, 218; where it was held that an agent might join as co-plaintiff.
If the vendor die before completion, his personal representatives, as being entitled to the purchase-money, are prima facie the proper plaintiffs: if the personal estate has been vested in trustees under an order of the Court, and a bill is filed by such trustees, the personal representative is still a necessary party (d); and unless the plaintiffs have power to convey the vendor's interest in the estate (e), the person in whom the same is vested, or who has power to convey it, must also be made a party (f): but if there are devisees, or if the executors are empowered to sell, the heir is said to be an unnecessary party (g), as the purchaser has no right to insist on proof of the will against the heir (h): however, in a recent case, although special circumstances, tending to impeach the validity of the will, were held to entitle the purchaser to this protection, it does not appear to have been considered that the heir should have been made a party; but the cause stood over that the vendor might file a bill against him to establish the will (i). If the vendor have devised the estate in strict settlement, the trustees;, the persons (if any) in whom the first estate of inheritance is vested (k), and the intermediate tenants for life (l), and the owners (if ascertained) of any intermediate contingent or executory estates (m), must be made parties.
Auctioneer, when and why made a party.
Agent, when an improper party.
Death of vendor - who then entitled to sue purchaser, and who are proper parties to suit.
Heir, when an unnecessary party.
(a) Small v. Attwood, 1 Younge, 457; the words " suit" and "contract" in lines 10 and 11, should evidently be transposed.
(b) See Dan. Ch. P. by H. 205, 207.
(c) King of Spain v. Machado, 4 Russ. 225, 240; Kingsley v. Young, cited Daniell's Ch. P. by H. 207.
(d) See Cave v. Cork, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 130, 133.
(e) I. e., the estate, whether legal or merely equitable, which the vendor held subject to the contract; see Roberts v. Marchant, 1 Ha. 547.
(f) Roberts v. Marchant, 1 Ha. 547.
(g) See Calvert on Parties, 327. (h) Cotton v. Wilson, 3 P. Wms.
192; Bellamy v. Liversidge, Sug. 464; and see Morrison v. Arnold, 19 Ves. 673.
So, the personal representatives of the vendor, and the persons who have power to convey his estate, are the proper parties to a purchaser's bill (n).
So, if the vendor have, by act inter vivos, assigned his interest under the contract, he, or, if he be dead, his personal representative, must be a party to the assignee's bill as defendant; or, if such interest be recoverable at Law, either as defendant or as co-plaintiff (o); so, if subsequently to the contract the vendor have aliened or incumbered the estate contracted for, the weight of authority seems to show that the alienees or incumbrancees, if they took with notice of the contract, may be made defendants to the purchaser's bill (p).
When the estate is vested in trustees in trust to sell and pay the proceeds to specified persons with power to give receipts, the cestuis que trust are not necessary parties to the suit (q).
If the purchaser die before completion, his heir or devisee, (if the estate be one of inheritance,) is the party entitled to sue for specific performance, making the personal representatives parties, if he seek payment of the purchase-money out of the personal estate (r); so, on a bill filed by the vendor, the heir or devisee of the purchaser is a necessary party to the suit (s); so, if the bill be filed against the heir or devisee of the purchaser, the personal representatives must be made parties, because the purchase-money is primarily payable out of the personal estate (t).
Who, in such case, are proper parties to purchaser's bill.
Alienation of vendor's interest by act inter vivos - who are proper parties to suit either against or by purchaser.
Cestuis que trust, when unnecessary parties.
Death of purchaser (i) Grove v. Bastard, 2 Phill. 619; the heir appears to have been made a defendant in Colton v. Wilson, 3 P. Wms. 192.
(k) Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 590.
(l) Gore v. Stacpoole, 1 Dow. 18, 31.
(m) Dan. Ch. P. by H. 263.
(n) See Calv. on Part. 327.
(o) See Fulham v. M'Carthy, 1 H. L. C. 703, 722; Dan. Ch. P. by H. 208; Ryan v. Anderson, 3 Madd.
174; and see 5 Ha. 554; Padwick v. Platt, 11 Beav. 503.
(p) See Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249; Echliff v. Baldwin, ib. 267; Spence v. Hogg, 1 Coll. 225; Collett v. Hover, ib. 227; Potter v. Sanders, 6 Ha. 1; Dan. Ch. P. by H. 233; but see contra, Cutis v. Thodey, 1 Coll. 223; Calv. on Part. 325.
(q) Wakernan v. Duchess of Rutland, 3 Ves. 233; Binks v. Lord Rokeby, 2 Madd. 227.
If the purchaser have assigned the benefit of the contract, the suit against the vendor for specific performance should, it would seem, be by the assignee (v); making the purchaser a defendant: if, however, the purchaser merely enter into an ordinary agreement for a sub-purchase, agreeing himself to convey the estate, and not that the original vendor shall convey it, such sub-purchaser is not a necessary party to a suit for the performance of the original contract (w).
And where the purchaser's assignee has been accepted in his place by the vendor, the original purchaser should not be made a party to the vendor's suit (x).
 
Continue to: