(2.) Whether the vendor has any remedy if estate has been sold at an undervalue; - or more has been conveyed than was intended.

The vendor, after conveyance, has no remedy, if the property prove to be, either as respects quantity or quality, more valuable than was imagined; for instance, where the residue of a lease, of which twenty years were in fact unexpired, was sold under the impression that only eight years were to run, and the price was fixed on that supposition, the vendors, although trustees, were held bound by the conveyance: Lord Cottenham, in affirming the decree of V. C. K. Bruce dismissing the vendors' bill, observed, "Suppose a party proposed to sell a farm, describing it as 'all my farm of 200 acres,' and the price was fixed on that supposition; but it afterwards turned out to be 250 acres, could he afterwards come and ask for a reconveyance of the farm or payment of the difference?

Lien merely equitable: vendor cannot at once sue at law and in equity.

Is a protection against purchaser's judgment-creditors, when purchase-money remains on mortgage.

Vendor has no claim for mis-calculated interest.

Nor in respect of mistake as to extent or value of the property; or the extent of his interest therein.

(s) Barker v. Smark, 3 Beav. 64.

(t) Harding v. Ambler, 3 Mee. & W. 279.

Clearly not; the only equity being that the thing turns out more valuable than either of the parties supposed. And whether the additional value consists in a longer terra or larger acreage is immaterial" (u).

Nor, where several persons have joined in conveying an estate to a purchaser for a full consideration, can one of them be afterwards heard to say that he was under a misapprehension as to the extent of his interest in the property (v).

But the above cases must be distinguished from those where the conveyance, by mistake, comprises more than either party intended to deal with (w); as if, upon a contract for sale of farm A., the conveyance were by mistake to include lands parcel of farm B.; the difference between the cases is this, viz., that in the latter the parties never intended to deal with the property which was conveyed; while, in the former (x), " the vendors did intend to sell all their remaining interest in the lease, but by their own mistake they misdescribed what that interest was (y):" so, in the case put by Lord Cottenham, the vendor would really intend to sell the entire farm, and the only mistake would be as to the quantity. We may here remark, that, at Law, evidence cannot be received to contradict the conveyance by showing that property, which would prima facie pass under general words, was not intended to be included in the purchase (z).

A liter, if property not intended to be dealt with is conveyed.

(u) Okill v. Whittaker, 2 Phill. 338.

(v) Maiden v. Merick or Menil, 2 Atk. 8; Marshall v. Collett, 1 Y. & C. 232; and see also Sturge v. Starr, 2 Myl.& K. 195, where a woman, who had a life interest settled to her separate use, joined with her supposed husband (who was in fact married to another woman) in assigning it to a purchaser, and was held bound by the assignment: as to which it is difficult to understand how any fair question could be raised, since the woman assigned the property not qua. a feme covert, but as being, in regard thereto, a feme sole, in contemplation of a Court of Equity.

(w) Tyler v. Beversham, Rep. t. Finch, 80; see Beaumont v. Brantley, Turn. & R. 41; Marquess v. Marchioness of Exeter, 3 Myl. & Cr. 321; Mortimer v. Shortall, 2 Dru. & W. 363.

(x) Okill v. Whittaker, ubi supra.

(y) 2 Phil. 341.

If, however, the vendor in fixing the price have altogether relied upon information furnished to him by the purchaser, and such information turn out to have been (even unintentionally) materially incorrect, this, it appears, may entitle the vendor, even after conveyance, to have the contract set aside (a).

And the same relief has been afforded, where a purchaser knowingly obtained, for an inadequate consideration, a conveyance from a vendor in humble circumstances and ignorant of his rights (b), and, in other cases, where advantage has been taken of the vendor's distress to procure an unfair bargain (c). And in a case where a person, who well knew the value of the property, obtained from a young man, a common sailor, lately come ashore and much pressed for money, an estate for a grossly inadequate price, the Court, even as against the devisees of the purchaser, appointed a receiver before the hearing (d).

It was laid down by Lord Langdale in a recent case (e), that a man who is in distress may nevertheless contract; and if, being in distress, he procure other persons to consent to an agreement which he would not himself have requested or consented to if he had not been in distress, and afterwards successfully urges and obtains the performance of that agreement, and, after that, acquiesces for a length of time in the performance, without any notice of dissatisfaction or complaint, he is not entitled to set aside the transaction on the mere ground of his poverty or distress, in the absence of any deception or fraud proved to have been practised on him.

Or if vendor in fixing price rely on purchaser's information.

Or if purchase were at undervalue from vendor ignorant of his rights or whose distress has been taken advantage of.

General rule as to distress.

(z) Doe d. Norton v. Webster, 4 Per. & Dav. 270.

(a) Carpmael v. Powis, 11 Jur. 158; 10 Beav. 36.

(b) Evans v. Llewellyn, 2 Bro. C. C. 150; see Groves v. Perkins, 6 Sim. 576; and Sturge v. Sturge, 14 Jur. R. 159.

(c) See Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd.

417; Gordon v. Crawford, and other cases, cited Sug. 313.

(d) Stilwell v. Wilkins, Jac. 280; see Farmer v. Farmer, 1 H. L. C. 724, where the vendor was deaf and dumb, but under the circumstances relief was refused.

(e) Knight v. Marjoribanks, 11 Beav.; see p. 349.