Acceptance of the terms of an option requires an unconditional assent to its terms, and letter sug-

gesting a change in description, inclosing a deed describing the property by dimensions rather by the terms used in the option, was a counterproposition and did not create a contract. Weadock v. Champe, 193 Mich. 553.

In the accompanying note 62 we have collected a number of Michigan decisions where controversy has arisen over the character of the instrument.

It was fraud for the holder of an option on real property to represent to a prospective purchaser that he had an option on the property for $2,500, for which price he would sell, when in fact the option vested the purchase price at $2,000. McGough v. Hopkins, 172 Mich. 580.

Specific performance was properly denied upon a record showing that plaintiff, real estate broker, obtained from the owner of a farm an option in writing to sell the farm on terms stated therein, and that plaintiff read the instrument to the defendant, omitting the clause relating to the consideration, and a clause requiring a 60-day notice in writing of the defendant's intention to terminate his option, and that the defendant, the grantor and owner, was old, feeble, and in ill health and relied upon the plaintiff to read the paper to him and subsequently attempted to revoke the option according to the provisions as he heard it read. Van Deusen v. Brown, 167 Mich. 49.

An option given by the owner of land providing that on or before a certain date he would give a warranty deed of the property and an abstract to date, showing perfect title upon the payment of the stipulated price within the time mentioned, only entitles the purchaser to a deed and abstract when payment of the price is made within the time limited; and where the holder of the option neither accepts it in writing nor tenders the price within the time limited, his right is lost, although he demands the deed and abstract and states that payment will be made when satisfactory title is furnished. Cameron v. Shumway, 149 Mich. 634.

A, by letter, asked B for an option for six months to purchase certain real estate. B replied by letter, giving an option for six months for $2,500. A accepted and notified B that they were ready to take the deed. B then prepared the deed and brought it to A to consummate the agreement. B asked for ten days in which to procure the money. The deed was left in escrow, to be delivered upon the payment of the money, and no further steps were taken until the last day provided by the original offer. Held, that the original offer was superseded by the subsequent agreement and that A lost all right of purchase by his failure to comply with that agreement. Cleaves v. Walsh, 125 Mich. 638.

62. In a suit for the specific performances of a ninety-day option for the purchase of land, defendants' contention that the contract was void because not accepted in writing as required by the statute of frauds, cannot be sustained where, after the defendants refused to perform, suit was commenced within ninety days and the evidence showed that plaintiff paid into court the down payment called for, and tendered the note and mortgage as provided in the contract, with a written statement that he was ready to sign same when deed to him was made. Frischkorn v. Fitzgerald, 215 Mich. 106.

An oral agreement for the lease of land for two years with the option of purchase is a valid lease for one year only, and the right of purchase which ran with said oral lease was relieved of the statute of frauds by possession and part performance, and by section 11979, 3 Comp. Laws 1915 (Mich.), which preserves the power of chancery courts to compel specific performances of oral agreements relating to real estate in case of part performance, the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of his oral agreement by tender of the agreed price in a court of chancery. Lyle v. Munson, 213 Mich. 250.

A memorandum of agreement relating to the sale of land which contains no obligation to purchase and makes reference to a "prior option" with the terms of which both parties are familiar, and provides that a deed will be given on a compliance with the "terms of this option" and that on failure to make the stipulated payment the instrument will be canceled, constitutes a mere option and not an agreement for the sale and purchase of land, even though the parties are designated as seller and purchaser and other language more properly belonging in an agreement is used, since the absence of an obligation to purchase is the distinct characteristic of an option contract. Tattan v. Bryant, 198 h. 550.

The conveyance of land in consideration of a certain sum of money and an agreement by the vendee to reconvey within three years, if the vendor should so elect and tender the money, must be treated as an absolute conveyance of laud with an option to repurchase and not as a mortgage. Gogarn v. Connors, 188 Mich. 161; Sowles v. Wilcox, 127 Mich. 166; Bloomberg v. Beekman, 121 Mich 647.

A contract relating to the purchase of land wherein the owner agrees to sell, and the vendee agrees to buy, property described in the agreement at a stated purchase price of which $100 was payable at the execution of the contract, $100 when an abstract of title was passed upon, and the balance in semi-annual payments of $100 each with interest, wherein the vendor also agreed to furnish a quitclaim deed releasing the property from certain restrictions, possession to be given and the deal consummated with thirty days, was not an option by an executory contract for the sale of real estate. Solomon v. Schewitz, 185 Mich. 621.

The conduct of a prospective purchaser of land in going into possession under an instrument claimed by him to be an option merely, in making payments in accordance with its terms, and in permitting a railroad company to enter upon and construct an elevated road across the propery mentioned, amounted to an irrevocable election to purchase. Procter v. Plummer, 112 Mich. 393.

Options-Acceptance

In order to accept an option so that it becomes a binding contract either one of two things must be done. Either the consideration must be paid or a written acceptance must be made.

See Pangburn v. Sifford, 216 Mich. 163, citing Wilkinson v. Heav-enrich, 58 Mich. 574; Hollingshead v. Morris, 172 Mich. 126; Mier v. Hadden, 148 Mich. 488, 618; Agar v. Streeter, 183 Mich. 608, L. R. A. 1915 D., 196 Annotated Case 1916, E, page 518.