2. Mortgage: A mortgage is a conveyance of an estate by way of pledge for the security of a debt and becomes void upon payment of it. Goddard v. Coe, 55 Me. 385; Babcock v. Hoey, 11 La. 375.

A mortgage is a conveyance of lands by a debtor to his creditor as a pledge or security for the repayment of money due, with the proviso that such conveyance shall become void on payment of the money with interest on a certain day. Hall v. Byrne, 2 111. 140.

A mortgage is in effect a sale with a power of defeasance, which may ultimately end in an absolute transfer of title. Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Bank, 119 U. S. 191.

A mortgage conveys an estate or title defeasable on condition. If the condition is performed according to its terms, the mortgage immediately becomes void and the mortgagee is divested of his title. Weeks v Baker, 152 Mass. 20.

The terms "security" and "mortgage" are not co-extensive.

The term "security," as used by a vendee in describing a bill of sale from the vendor, which purported to be an absolute transfer, is not sufficient to fix the character of such instrument as a mortgage. Prentice v. Schirmer, 136 N. Y. 305.

In a land contract the vendee gets an equitable title, but the legal title still remains in the vendor, and is held as "security" for the purchase price. Hooper v. Van Hausen, 105 Mich. 597.

(i) Authorities Cited by Plaintiff. Brief for Plaintiff.

1. The contract in question was merely a mortgage.

An absolute deed or bill of sale may be shown to have been intended as a mortgage. Hurst v. Beaver, 50 Mich. 613; McMillan v. Bissell, 63 Mich. 66; Flynn v. Holmes, 145 Mich. 606; Pinch v. Willard, 108 Mich. 204; Perry v. Miller, 164 Mich. 429. And the rule also applies to an assignment of an executory land contract. Gamble v. Ross, 88 Mich. 315; Sun-derman v. Gunnison, 39 Mich. 313; Jackiewicz v. Siwka, 187 Mich. 165.

Parol evidence is admissible to show that a deed was intended as a mortgage. Mintz v. Soule, 182 Mich. 564; Emmerson v. Atwater, 7 Midi. 12; McMillan v. Bissell, 63 Mich. 66; Smith v. Smith, 174 Mich. 269.

It is a well established rule that the actual consideration for deeds may be shown. Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231 (234); Olney v. Brown, 163 Mich. 125.

The fact that the instrument is only given as security may be shown in equity even though there is no fraud or mistake. Flynn v. Holmes, 145 Mich. 611.

2. Statute of Frauds: The case at bar is, in some respects similar to the recent case of Edwards v. Zuch, reported in 171 Mich. 29, and involving a joint logging enterprise, wherein the court said:

"It is suggested that, as this co-partnership agreement was oral and dealt with the sale of lands, it is therefore, void as being within the statute of frauds, under the rule laid down in Nester v. Sullivan. 147 Mich. 493 (111 N. W. 85, 1033; 9 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1106). The holding of the trial court in this case is not an infringement of the rule laid down in that case, for the reason that the complainant is the owner of the title and the person for whose protection the statute exists, and he insists that defendant has paid for and is entitled to, an undivided one-half interest in the 40 acres. Such a case is not within the statute of frauds. Spalding v. Archibald, 52 Mich. 365 (17 N. W., 940; 50 Am. Rep. 253)." Id., page 32.

3. Mortgage: The word "security" is to be given such meaning as the witnesses intended in the light of all the facts and circumstances.

"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and contents according to the circumstance and in the time in which it is used." Tourne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418.