3. Contract dated October 19, 1915, made and executed by and between Moore & Veale Real Estate Corporation, as first party, and Thomas B. Townsend as second party, and wherein Thomas B. Townsend and Mayo M. Townsend assigned their interest to the defendant Meister on January 29, 1916.

3. Contract dated October 19, 1915, made and executed by and between Moore & Veale Real Estate Corporation, as first party, and Thomas B. Townsend as second party, and wherein Thomas B. Townsend and Mayo M. Townsend assigned their interest to the defendant Meister.

4. Contract dated October 19, 1915, made and executed by and between Moore & Veale Real Estate Corporation, as first party, and Thomas B. Townsend as second party, and wherein Thomas B. Townsend and Mayo M. Townsend assigned their interest to the defendant Meister.

5. The property in said land contracts is described as follows: Lots 15, 16, 17 and 18, of the Moore & Veale's Subdivision of the south part of lot 2 of the Jonas Goodell Estate, Subdivision Private Claim 226, Village of Ecorse, Wayne County, Mich.

Henry A. Mandell. A true copy. Circuit Judge.

Walter Buhl,

Deputy Clerk.

(f) Authorities Cited by Plaintiff. Brief for Plaintiff.-The right of plaintiff to bring this suit to quiet title is clearly established in Donnelly v. Lyons, 173 Mich. 515. To give plaintiff a decree it was only necessary to recognize, not to enforce, a forfeiture. Equity will recognize a forfeiture when it is simply an incident of a past transaction.

Brown v. Brown, 196 Mich. 684.

Eberts v. Fisher, 44 Mich. 551.

Plaintiff's contention is, that under such contracts as are herein involved, due notice of forfeiture followed by valid summary proceedings, where no appeal or suit in equity is had, and the amount found due is not paid within the 30 days allowed by statute, effectually terminates all right of the vendee in or to the premises, and cuts off all right to a re-instatement or specific performance.

Compiled Laws of 1915, 13240-57.

Public Acts of 1917, No. 243.

Notice of forfeiture in such cases terminates the contract relations of the parties. LaFrance v. Griffin, 160 Mich. 240. The defendant must tender the amount due within the time allowed by the statute. Smith v. Nelson, 165 Mich. 438. In case of vacant property it has been held that notice of forfeiture alone is sufficient. Donnelly v. Lyons, 173 Mich. 515. Oakman v. Esper, 206 Mich. 316. Where the notice of forfeiture is insufficient, this defense must be set up in the summary proceedings. Mills v. Drueke, 172 Mich. 394. The case of Lozon v. McKay, 203 Mich. 366, was cited by the trial court and relied upon, but in that case no summary proceedings were had, and the vendee commenced a suit for specific performance a short time after notice of forfeiture. The amount of the vendee's equity is not material and the summary statute makes no exception, and there is no authority for the statement in Davis on Circuit Court Commissioners that where the equity is large, foreclosure should be had in equity, and the amendment of 1917 clearly settles the question, providing for the recording of writs of restitution, adding the significant words that when so recorded "shall be notice to all persons of the termination of the rights of the vendee in and to such lands." Public Acts of 1917, Act 243.

After a forfeiture has been declared on a land contract for the default of the vendee, especially where time is of the essence of the contract, and it is expressly agreed in case of default the vendor shall retain the moneys paid in, the vendee is not entitled either in law or equity to a refund.

39 Cyc, page 2035, and cases cited; 27 R. C. L., paragraph 378, and cases cited: 35 L. R. A. 532 and cases cited; L. R. A., 1918, B. 540 general review of the authorities, 50 Amer. Dec. 680. Satterlee v. Cronkhite, 114 Mich. 634.

In Godspeed v. Dean, 12 Mich. 352, it was held that when the vendor has declared a forfeiture he cannot afterwards recover the purchase price. It follows that if the vendor's right under the contract is cut off, so is the vendee's.

Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 131, gives the reason for this rule in such apt language that counsel is constrained to quote the same:

"It is declared in this court in Havens v. Paterson, 43 N. Y. 218 (equity case), that it is never permitted in law or equity for one to recover back money paid on an executory contract that he has refused or neglected to perform. The plaintiff in the action before us sues for the whole amount of the money paid by the vendee. The defendant came by it rightfully, in pursuance of a contract lawfully made, by competent parties. He has made no breach of contract. He has failed in no duty to the vendee. Wherefore, then, should he give up that which was rightfully his own? When and whereby did it cease to become his and to be due to the vendee? If the contract had been kept by both parties, the money paid would be his by right. The contract would have been kept, but for a breach by the vendee. To allow a recovery of the money would be to sustain an action by a party on his own breach of contract, which the law does not allow. When we declare that the vendor had done all that the law asked of him we also declare the vendee has not done his part. And when to maintain an action would be to declare that a party may violate his agreement, and make an infraction of it a cause of action. (See Ketchum v. Evert-son, 13 Johns, 359.) Nor can the specious view be taken that defendant is entitled to no more than he was actually damaged. That was substantially the question in Stevens v. Bland, 4 Wend. 604, and the answer was against it."

(g) Authorities Cited by Defendants. Brief for Defendants.-The right of a court of equity to grant the relief prayed for in defendants' cross-bill is well settled. Gregar v. Olde, 209 Mich. 50. The contention of plaintiff that neither in the above case nor in Davis on Circuit Court Commissioner is any authority given for the statement is true, but the reason is given quite clearly in the following paragraph from the Gregar case: