In this case, a memorandum described the property as No. 151 Wilkins Street, four family frame flat in the City of Detroit, County of Wayne and State of Michigan. This contract is peculiar in that the buyers agreed to purchase but the seller did not agree to sell. This memorandum was followed by a notice on the part of the seller that the abstract was ready, and the court held this latter construed with the memorandum was sufficient to comply with the statute of frauds.

Lyle v. Munson, 213 Mich. 250. This was the case where the parties made a lease in writing, but was void, on Sunday. This lease contained an option of purchase, but was followed by part performance, being certain improvements made on the premises.

The court held the agreement sufficient since followed by part performance.

Ogooshevitz v. Sampson, 211 Mich. 187. In this case the parties entered into the following agreement:

"Received of I. Ogooshevitz $100 as first payment on lot known as westerly 18 feet of lot seven (7) and easterly 34 feet of lot eight (8) being 52 feet on the south side of Palmer Avenue west of Beau-bien Street, for the sum of $5,720, terms as follows: $620 more on delivery of land contract or deed, and the remaining $5,000 on or before one (1) year from the date of contract, purchaser to receive an abstract brought down to date before the contract is made to show free and clear title. Six percent interest. George D. Sampson."

The court held this agreement sufficient to comply with the stat ute of frauds.

Mull v. Smith, 132 Mich. 618. "The parties met defendant, who, on being asked to fix his lowest cash price, submitted the following written proposition:

"Freemont, Mich., December 22, 1900. Forty acres for $650. Mortgage $250. Leaves balance $400. Will take cash $375 for my interest in place. Frank H. Smith."

This was Exhibit 1. Plaintiff accepted this, and paid $100 down Defendant gave him a memorandum of the contract, reading as follows:

"Freemont, Mich., Dec. 22nd, 1900. I agree to give to Mr. E. M. Mull a warranty deed of the Burns farm upon payment of $275, subject to mortgage of $250. Frank H. Smith."

This was Exhibit A. He also gave him the following receipt: "100.00. Freemont, Mich., 12-22-1900. Received of E. M. Mull, one hundred dollars to apply on payment of Burns farm. F. H. Smith."

The foregoing memoranda held sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.

Stamp v. Steele, 209 Mich. 205 (211). In the case of a deed where the property was described as "91 and 95 East Webster Avenue" the court held that a description of street numbers is sufficient.

Bushman v. Faltis, 184 Mich. 172. The complainant's bill in this case was for the specific performance of an agreement made by the defendant with the plaintiff whereby the defendant was to lease certain land in the city of Detroit for ninety-nine years The agreement acknowledged receipt by the defendant of $250 from the plaintiff as part payment on the first six months' rental; it also contained the amount of yearly rental which was to be charged but no definite time was mentioned for the payment of the rental. The argeement also contained the condition that the lessees could purchase the property from the lessor for a stated consideration at any time within ten years after the execution of the agreement. The agreement being signed by the defendant Faltis.

The defendant argued that the agreement was too uncertain and indefinite to permit of specific performance; that no time for the payment of the rent is fixed, and in the event of sale, the time for the payment of the purchase price is not stated.

The court held that this agreement was not indefinite or uncertain and that specific performance thereof will be compelled of the defendant. The contract provides that the rent shall be a certain amount "per year," this, under the authorities, is synonymous with saying that the rent will be due at the end of the year. Therefore the time for the payment of the rent is stated with sufficient certainty. The agreement here provided an option whereby the purchaser must exercise his right of purchase within a fixed time. The time of payment being fixed, this case is clearly distinguishable from Gault v. Stormont.

51 Mich. 636, and Ebert v. Cullen, 165 Mich. 75, cited above; for in both of those cases no time was fixed for the payment of the purchase price.

Ogooshevitz v. Arnold, 197 Mich. 204. In this case the complainant filed a bill against the defendant for the specific performance of an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. A clear description of the property, the amount of the purchase price, and the times of payment thereof were all clearly set forth. The defendant was to furnish an abstract brought down to date showing clear title. This the defendant did not do, the abstract he furnished showing some defect in the title. Plaintiff refused to accept title as it stood in the abstract and defendant refused to clear up the defect although it was within his power to do so. Upon plaintiff's refusal to accept the defective title the defendant declared the deal off and this bill is brought by the plaintiff as a result.

The court held that this was such an agreement as will be enforced. That there was nothing ambiguous about this agreement and that it complies with all the requirements of the statute of frauds. The parties, the property, the price, the terms of payment, the time of performance are all definitely fixed. That while it is true that this is not the land contract itself, being an agreement to execute a land contract; still a court of equity may specifically decree the per formance of an agreement to execute a land contract. This agreement being complete in itself and satisfying all the requirements of the statute of frauds will be specifically enforced.

Brin v. Michalski, 188 Mich. 400. Complainant filed a bill to compel specific performance of a land contract which he holds as assignee. According to the terms of the agreement the defendant agreed to convey certain property, which is properly described, to the original contractee for $5,400. The agreement further provided that the purchase price was to be paid $50 down on the execution of the agreement and the balance in installments, the amount and time of paying said installments being definitely set forth. The plaintiff alleges that she tendered performance in that she offered to pay the amount due on the first installment of the purchase price but that defendant refused to accept same because he had already disposed of the property to another at a higher price.