Again, memory proves a unit center because each soul remembers its own experiences only. It cannot encroach upon those of another, which would be the case if there were any general remembrance possible in nature. No chasm can be more abrupt or impassable than the line which divides conscious experiences; and no theory will account for this except that of permanent, conscious unit-centers, or souls. It is granted that impressions are registered not only in the brain, but in every tissue of the body as well, for each organ has its memory, but - "For that spiritual activity which actually puts together in consciousness the sensations, there can not even be suggested the beginning of a physical explanation." *

* Loc. Cit., p. 558.

This is to be found in a unifying center, or soul, alone. Memory, then, is a conscious reproduction by a permanent center of consciousness, an "I am myself," of past experiences. Especially will this be apparent when the relation of will to memory is considered. We consciously and deliberately will to reproduce past events - an impossible process were there not within us the subject of those experiences we will to recall.

In the Will, also, we find a power native to the soul, and one unthinkable except as the action of a conscious entity. As well predicate thought without a Thinker as will without a Willing Entity. This faculty is entirely without a physical basis, or at least it has no physical organs, but pervades the entire structure of the body, apparently as the agent of an inner, controlling essence. Nor is an organ necessary; for the simple, homogenous speck of protoplasm known as the atnceba, structureless and entirely destitute of organs, exercises this faculty undeniably in those changes it makes "which can not be wholly explained by reference to any change in its environments." Its superiority to and control over the body as a purely physical mechanism is shown by the fact, pointed out by Duchenne and others, that the will is the very first agent to act upon restored nerve fibers after their injury. It is the active agent of consciousness in selecting what sensations and perceptions, among the vast number continuously clamoring for the soul's attention, shall be attended to. It can even change the very reports, so to speak, of those sense organs, upon whose action materialism would fain have us base its coming into existence. Willing, too, is a purely mental activity.

No passing - over of force from spiritual to physical realms accompanies its action. There is positively no physical energy expended in willing. All the apparent effort is entirely the result of the physical mechanism carrying out, or attempting to carry out, the mandates of the will, as pronounced by the Ego.

* Loc. Cit., p. 556.

Like the memory, too, the will is always specialized. There is no general willing; it can only act with a definite object. Its sole material connection is that when a fiat of the will issues certain molecules, associated with the line of action willed, move. But this shows an extraneous mover. It is a physical correlation of molecules with an act of consciousness; not an origination in such motion of either will or consciousness. Were there no other evidence, the undoubtedly genuine cases of recovery from deep- seated diseases under the action of the will would be sufficient to show that it is either the agent of the mind, or the mind itself, in activity, and quite superior to the physical body which it controls. It is true that, primarily, acts of the will arise out of sensations and perceptions depending upon environment; but the choosing among these of the particular perception or sensation to which the attention shall be directed is a new element, which can not be relegated to mere experiences, or a combination of any other mental activities.

It is a deliberate choice of a tool by an artisan having more than one at his disposal.

For if we examine these very sensations themselves, which materialism claims have arisen out of mechanical motion among physical molecules, we find that they are located in the mind itself, and not in the body. They evade all attempts to reduce them to the domain of physics by measurement. There is no standard in all molecular physics to determine the amount of sensation involved in a "severe" pain or a "highly pleasurable" feeling. Being activities of the mind alone, and only correlated with, not transmuted from, molecular activities, they can only be expressed in terms of consciousness, not in those of physics.

We have several sense organs, also, each carrying a distinct class of impressions to the mind. To synthesize these widely varying activities into a harmonious whole, recognized by the "I am I" as its experiences, requires that this "I am I" should be separate from and superior to any one or all of them. And upon this ability to associate different classes of sensations is built the mind's power to project and locate in space those objects which its sense organs bring into its environment. The sensations themselves can not be extended within the brain; it requires a power potent in the soul itself to project into space certain sensa tions depending, as has been pointed out, upon molecular activities entirely unlike them in action and essence. The presence of this synthesizing center is shown unquestionably by the fact that a synthesis does take place - that two or more distinct sensations are unified in the mind as one object. Were there not this synthesizing center, different senses, such as sight, hearing, and touch, might all report the same object; but how could any knowledge arise that all these reports referred to the same thing without a synthesizer? Except for synthesis, also, there could be but one sensation at a time actively present in a consciousness compounded only of varying states.

And were there but one sense organ, which would be practically the case if but one could act at once, our concepts of time and space would be so changed that we would be as unlike our present selves as an oyster, whose consciousness, indeed, must be largely similar to that which ours would be under such circumstances.