This section is from the "A Manual Of Psychology" book, by G. F. Stout. Also available from Amazon: Manual of Psychology.
One obvious objection arises from the dependence of feeling-tone on quality as well as quantity of sensation. Why should some sensations be unpleasant at a very low intensity, and others be pleasing even at a very high intensity? Why should a comparatively small degree of bitterness or acidity be disagreeable, while a comparatively high degree of sweetness is agreeable? Mr. Marshall replies that there is a great variation in storage capacity, in the case of different sensationprocesses. This explanation is probable enough in some cases. Where a function recurs with great frequency and regularity, and without much variation of intensity, as respiration does, we should not expect any large storage of energy. On the other hand, where stimuli occur irregularly, and with great variations of intensity, the organism can only provide against them by storing up a surplus in advance. But there are a large number of instances in which no such explanation appears applicable. Why should the same person dislike the smallest trace of vanilla, and keenly enjoy cloves or cinnamon? Why should the same person enjoy beef and hate mutton? To account for such differences by variation in storage capacity seems forced.
A more important difficulty is connected with, the conception of a surplus. How are we to fix what is, and what is not, surplus energy? Mr. Marshall says that there is a pleasuregiving surplus "whenever the energy involved in the reaction to a stimulus is greater than the energy which the stimulus habitually calls forth," and that pain is experienced "whenever the physical action which determines the content is so related to the supply of nutriment to its organ that the energy involved in the reaction to the stimulus is less in amount than the energy which the stimulus habitually calls forth."* There is ambiguity in this statement. The effect produced by a stimulus varies with its intensity; when Mr. Marshall speaks of "the stimulus," does he mean the same kind of stimulus in the same degree of intensity, or the same kind of stimulus in varying degrees of intensity? If he means to include varying degrees of intensity, his case obviously breaks down altogether; for when a stimulus is unusually intense, it is often unpleasant, although the effect which it produces is greater, and not less, than that which we are accustomed to. On the other hand, if he means the same stimulus in the same degree of intensity, only a comparatively small group of facts is available for verifying his hypothesis. The instances in which the same kind and intensity of stimulus yields alternately pleasure and pain to the same person are relatively infrequent. The best example, perhaps, is the gradual decrease of pleasure when a pleasing stimulus is prolonged. Here not merely the feeling-tone, but the experience itself, appears to become fainter; but it is by no means so clear that it continues to remain fainter when it becomes positively disagreeable. Unpleasant experiences may be continued for a very long time indeed before they show any appreciable diminution of unpleasantness ; and while they continue, it cannot be said that the effect of the stimulus is smaller than its habitual effect. When abatement of pain begins, the effect of the stimulus is smaller, the total experience becoming fainter. On Mr. Marshall's view we should expect, as an accompaniment of the diminishing effect of the stimulus, an increase and not an abatement of painfulness. This leads up to another objection ; the intensity of unpleasantness appears to be in general proportioned to the intensity of the unpleasant experience. If Mr. Marshall were right in affirming that unpleasant stimulation produces a smaller effect than pleasant stimulation, we should expect unpleasantness of all kinds to be very much fainter than we actually find it to be.
* Op. cit., pp. 204205.
We have discussed Mr. Marshall's views because they form a very favourable example of the theory which traces pleasure-pain to wear and repair of nervous tissue. In general, wo may conclude that a large part of the explanation, at least for sense pleasure and pain, may be found on these lines. But no theory framed on these lines has been so formulated as to cover the whole ground successfully even for sensation, and they are all beset by special difficulties. After all, it is not, à priori, likely that merely quantitative conditions will be found adequate to account for the facts. Considering the great complexity of the chemical processes in organic tissues in interaction with the bloodsupply, there may be all kinds of qualitative as well as quantitative variations. For instance, the accumulation of wasteproducts in the blood may be a very important factor. It is possible that what takes place in repose and restores the freshness of organs is rather the removal of these waste products than the actual building up of tissues. There are considerations which tend to show that the building up of tissue takes place mainly during functional activity rather than during functional repose. We know that tissues suffer atrophy or degeneration if they are long disused. "We merely refer to this point in order to show how speculative and insecure, in the present state of our knowledge, hypotheses of this kind are.
 
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