This section is from the book "Hypnotism", by Dr. Albert Moll. Also available from Amazon: Hypnotism.
I shall enter into a criticism of the whole question later on in the section dealing with Art in relation to Hypnosis.
From all the phenomena hitherto discussed it must have been gathered that there can be no question of loss of consciousness in hypnosis. Of course, I mean loss of consciousness as it is understood in psychology, and not in the penal code. In the latter, according to Schwartzer, Casper, and Liman, it means about the same as abnormalities of consciousness; but according to the view more generally held (Krafft-Ebing and others), it implies abnormalities of self-consciousness. Of course we can only talk of loss of consciousness from a physiological point of view when no kind of psychical process takes place, as is the case in a deep faint, or coma, or the death-agony. We have seen that the subject in hypnosis remembers the events of earlier hypnoses. Consequently impressions were received into the consciousness in these earlier hypnoses. We cannot, therefore, talk of loss of consciousness because loss of memory exists after the awakening (Forel), apart from the fact that post-hypnotic suggestion in hypnosis will prevent the loss of memory. This temporary loss of memory is often erroneously considered a proof of loss of consciousness. It is just as erroneous to assume that the fact that a hypnotic sometimes does not obviously respond to external influence is a proof of unconsciousness.
We have only to consider the case in which the hypnotic is in rapport with one person only, but at the same time is quite unconscious as far as other persons are concerned. The fact that a hypnotic responds promptly to the suggestions of the hypnotizer only proves how intensely the attention of the former is directed to the latter.
Even the states mentioned on page 78, in which no response could be obtained to questions and demands, do not prove loss of consciousness; for (1) post-hypnotic suggestions could be made, and were effectual, which proves that there was consciousness; (2) these subjects woke up directly they were told to do so (Bernheim), which also shows that they were conscious. The forms of lethargy also have to be considered - the lethargy which Charcot describes as such, and the lethargy termed hysterical, of which I have already spoken (p. 48). As concerns the latter, it must be absolutely distinguished from hypnosis; it has nothing to do with the phenomena of hypnosis. With Charcot's lethargy the case stands thus: apart from the numerous cases of lethargy here described, and which even the pupils of Charcot admit are associated with movements caused by command, there remain very few cases worthy of consideration. I doubt, however, whether there is the loss of consciousness in these cases which Charcot describes. The cases which I saw in Paris convinced me of the contrary.
The quickness with which these lethargic subjects fell into catalepsy when Charcot touched their eyelids, showed that these apparently unconscious persons had been attentively waiting for the moment in which they were expected to become cataleptic. Consequently the loss of consciousness seems to me more than questionable. This point is of great importance, because Charcot's pupils maintain that the phenomena of the muscles and nerves in the lethargic state are not induced by suggestion.
Of course, we shall occasionally come across cases in which any evidences of consciousness are too obscure to be readily demonstrated, but that does not justify the assumption of loss of consciousness. At all events, loss of consciousness has nothing whatever to do with hypnosis.
But though we cannot speak of a loss of consciousness in hypnosis, we must, however, often suppose an abnormal state of consciousness; for if some one believes he sees things that are not present, or fails to see things that are present, he is certainly in an abnormal state of consciousness. If a man forty years old believes he is ten years old, or somebody else, his consciousness is certainly abnormal. We find such phenomena continually among the second group of hypnotic subjects, and we must consequently here suppose a material abnormality of consciousness.
But even in such cases we occasionally find a certain degree of consciousness. For instance, many hypnotics have a distinct feeling that they are asleep, or in an altered state (Richet, Pierre Janet) - a phenomenon of ordinary sleep, for we are occasionally conscious in dreams that we are asleep and dreaming. Many hypnotics of the second group have this consciousness of being asleep, and when they are asked if they are asleep or awake, they give the right answer. When, as sometimes happens, the awakening is incomplete, they also rightly say that they are not quite awake. Many people have a feeling of deep hypnosis if they are incapable of resisting certain suggested ideas. I say to X., "You cannot lift your arm!" "Yes I can," he answers, and experiment shows that he is right. But the contrary sometimes happens; the subject often knows exactly the minute when his power to resist is at an end, when he must obey. X. announces after a time that he is at this point: "Now the hypnosis is deep enough," he says. I say to a person thirty years old, whom I have often hypnotized, "Now you are a little child." The subject replies, "It is not enough yet; you must wait a little." After a time, when I ask, he says that he is now at the right point.
In other cases a remarkable amount of judgment is displayed in hypnosis. Many hypnotics, even those of the second group who are open to sense-delusions, say that they know quite well how suggestion works and that the influence exercised on them is a purely mental one. One in whom all kinds of sense-delusions can be induced, said to me, "I know that you do not exercise any extraordinary magnetic faculty; it is my own imagination which deprives me of my will and obliges me to obey you; but I cannot help it."
Even delusions of the senses brought about by suggestion are sometimes corrected purely by a reasoning process. A subject declines to believe that there is a wolf in my room; or, rather, he explains that he sees an image of a wolf plainly enough, and could point out the exact spot. But he knows quite well that it must be a delusion, as I should certainly not allow a wolf to come into my consulting-room. Macnish says that people can guard themselves against bad dreams and control them in sleep by a process of thought. This control often causes delusions of the senses to disappear more quickly; in other cases they may persist, in spite of the correction made by the reason. If the correction is complete, the delusions will have no results; they will not influence the actions following.
 
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