Now, if the statements of witnesses were insufficient, the accused could be hypnotized. Very little, however, would be gained by that; but the hypnosis might be employed in further endeavours to ascertain the truth - I am, of course, assuming that examination and statements made in hypnosis are legally admissible. Making use of the memory in hypnosis we should, first of all, ask the accused whether he had been hypnotized previously and by whom, and who had made the criminal suggestion. If no answer was obtained - since the instigator might also have suggested loss of memory - an indirect method must be used, such as Liegeois mentions; the instigator might be discovered by means of association, if any one were decidedly suspected. He might, for instance, be told to cough, laugh, etc., when he saw the instigator or his photograph, or heard his name. I believe the instigator might be detected in this way, and that some such devices would prove successful even when suspicion attached to no one in particular. Automatic writing might also be used - in some cases with certainty of success.

I think it certain the aim could be attained by repeated efforts, in spite of loss of memory; for a suggested loss of memory must eventually disappear before repeated contrary suggestions, cleverly made.

Finally, we must endeavour to ascertain the degree of suggestibility by making fresh experiments in suggestion.

But the case would be much more complicated if the instigator of the crime had suggested that the subject should not be hypnotizable by anybody but himself. Still my own experience makes it seem probable that even such a suggestion might be made ineffectual by repeated opposed suggestions in new hypnoses, supposing, of course, that a repetition of the original suggestion could be prevented. Delboeuf has expressed the same view. He proposed that a more indirect method of hypnotization should be chosen. The subject should be prevented as far as possible from thinking of the hypnotization, and the necessary suggestions should only be made casually.

Goltdammer relates that this question of the use of hypnotism in law called up a discussion in a court of justice between the defending counsel and the counsel for the crown, in a suit at Verona thirty-seven years ago. It was a case of rape in magnetic sleep. There was loss of memory in the waking state. The defending counsel opposed the counsel for the crown, who proposed to re-magnetize the assaulted person, but the court agreed to his doing so, as it considered the induction of the magnetic sleep merely as a method of proof. The victim made important statements in the sleep artificially induced, and in consequence of these the accused was condemned. A case of Motet's was somewhat different. Motet hypnotized a person accused of unnatural offences so as to prove that the accused was probably in a state of unconsciousness when he committed the incriminating acts.

The case would be the same if a person asserted he had been the victim of a crime; here also new hypnosis must under certain circumstances be induced, and if there was loss of memory the question must be cleared up by examination in hypnosis, supposing the law allowed it.

All this shows what difficulties stand in the way of turning hypnosis to practical account in law. Hypnotization would only result in a certain degree of probability, since, as we have already seen, (1) there is intentional falsehood in hypnosis; (2) the statements may be influenced by previous suggestions; (3) there is danger that answers may be influenced by the way in which the questions are put; (4) previous suggestion may make new hypnosis very hard to induce.

As a matter of course, we should take similarly into consideration all the details of the case, such as the act itself, and the question, who might expect to benefit by the crime. This would be the only way when the person supposed to have been influenced by suggestion is already dead, as is conceivable in a will case. Such a case does not seem to be unlikely, and would be very difficult for an expert to clear up. In all cases of legal hypnotization the possibility of simulation must be considered as well as the possibility of a purposely false accusation (Ladame).

Many proposals have been made for avoiding the possible dangers of hypnosis to health as well as to morality. As early as 1880 Friedberg demanded that hypnotic experiments should only be allowed in the presence of a doctor. Grasset and others joined him in this contention later on. Delacroix, in France, propounded a law making hypnotization legal only for doctors, and then only when at least two are present. It would be difficult to carry out such regulations: to begin with, the exact limitation of the idea "hypnosis" is still a matter of dispute, and then again, as Preyer thought, other difficulties would be raised by the fact that many people can hypnotize themselves.

All experts - medical men, psychologists, lawyers (Drucker, Lilienthal, Liegeois, etc.) - agree that difficulties should not be thrown in the way of the use of hypnosis by doctors for therapeutic purposes. This is recognized in the law that was passed in Belgium at the special instigation of the Minister of Justice, Le Jeune. It certainly does not restrict the permission to hypnotize to doctors. The original draught contained a paragraph according to which the hypnotizing of minors and the insane was only to be entrusted to physicians. When this question came to be discussed Merveille expressed the opinion that the courts might wink at an evasion of the law should a layman hypnotize such a patient at the hitter's request. Finally, on the motion of Soupart, it was agreed that by special authorization an exception might be made in favour of those who were not physicians. The first exception made - it was in favour of Astere Denis - certainly raised a storm of indignation in the Belgian Academy of Medicine, Brasseur having described the authorization in a pamphlet as state support of Charlatanism.