This section is from the book "Hypnotism", by Dr. Albert Moll. Also available from Amazon: Hypnotism.
The conclusions drawn above consequently hold good for acts entailing liability for damages, but, naturally, all the special provisions of the code have to be considered as well. For instance, § 829 also under certain circumstances holds a person liable for damages, who, while in a state of unconsciousness or in such a state of morbid disturbance of his mental activity as precludes free volition, yet causes damage. At all events, there is otherwise no liability for damages for acts done in hypnosis, provided the hypnosis is deep enough. The same holds good for post-hypnotic states in which, on the grounds already mentioned, there is no capacity for business. On the other hand, any man who causes himself to be hypnotized only that he may not be responsible for his misdeeds, must make reparation for every damage. Bentivegni has pointed out that the Prussian common law contained clauses applicable in such cases, and the new Civil Code makes no exceptions, as may be seen from § 827, cited above. Ernst Schultze has pointed out that in its original form the paragraph only states that a man who got drunk intentionally would be liable for damage committed by him while in that condition.
However, Mendel, Liszt, and Schmidt had already advised that it would not be right to limit the provisions of the clause to the effects of alcohol, and Liszt, in particular, had proposed the same treatment for any one acting in the hypnotic state or while under the influence of any kind of narcotic, since omission may just as well be the object of an illegal action as commission. And this is the conclusion which has been arrived at in the present day. Therefore, any man who lets himself be hypnotized so that he may injure another must make reparation for the damage.
Just as the common law formerly held the hypnotizer responsible in certain circumstances for the damage done by the hypnotic in hypnosis or during the states following it, so in the present day would those clauses of the Civil Code that deal with illegal acts. Bentivegni recognized in a strict application of the provisions of the common law an effective preventive of those improprieties which might arise from frivolous hypnotization or the possible employment of hypnosis as a society pastime, and we may say the same for the Civil Code.
Of course, I have been unable to enter into detail on all points; but I have discussed the most important questions from the point of view of the civil law in connection with Bentivegni's Die Hypnose und ihre zivilrechtliche Bedeutung, which treats the subject exhaustively, and is still, in spite of the new Civil Code, an illuminating treatise on all points in question.
There is another direction in which hypnosis might be of importance in law; it can be used to falsify testimony. By means of retro-active hallucinations, which we discussed in an der Psychiatne. Henneberg, Koppen, Hinrichsen, Fritz Hart-mann, and others have thrown further light on the question by their analyses of cases.
As the name indicates, pathological lying is a morbid process, but the investigations of other seekers have shown that there is also an immense amount of involuntary lying perpetrated by normal, healthy people. A number of works on this question have appeared during the last few years, partly in scientific journals and partly also in the daily press, in which the question of witnesses being influenced by suggestion has frequently been discussed in connection with some sensational trial. But it is particularly the Archiv fur Kritninalanthro-pologie (edited by Hanns Gross) and the Beitrdge zur Psychologic der Aussage that have contained a number of papers dealing with some special items of the question, as, for instance, the differences arising from age and sex, the influence of the degree of culture attained, the way in which the impression affects the trustworthiness of the testimony, etc. The psychology of testimony has become a very wide field of inquiry for the investigator. Binet, Henry, L. W. Stern, Wreschner, Placzek, Jaffa, Lobsien, Lipmann, Heilberg, E. Bernheim, Hanns Gross, Minnemann, L. W. Weber, Bogdanoff, Stooss, Cramer, Pluschke, Marie Borst, Schneickert, Radbruch, Agahd, R. Sommer, Rodenwaldt, Siemens, Claparede, Schott, Gmelin, Rauschburg, and a number of other investigators have . contributed materials to the construction of the fabric.
Many of these works deal very particularly with the evidence given by children, and I must not miss this opportunity of mentioning the valuable investigations made by the Berlin Society of Child-Psychology at the request of Kemsies. The lying and the testimony of children have been made the subject of special investigation. Special mention must here be made of Kemsies himself, of Piper, Marcinowski, K. L. Schaefer, and again, quite particularly, of O. Lipmann. These works have laid the foundation of great distrust in evidence. Let us hope that Sommer may be right in his assumption that the minute analysis of each individual case will enable us to recognize, in the apparently confused mass of false testimony, that which is psychologically legitimate and thus to create a critical diagnostic.
I take this opportunity of correcting an historical error that has recently been creeping more and more into Germany. Representations are made which would lead me to believe that Binet and L. W. Stern were the first to make experiments of this kind in the psychology of testimony. Thus O. Lipmann states: - "The question whether and in what respect the context of a reproduced idea differs from the corresponding percept is no new problem in psychology. Yet these investigations referred almost invariably to experiences of colour, sound, and the like, and are consequently as good as inapplicable to daily life, in which we certainly have invariably to operate with manifold and complicated memory-images. Binet alone once attempted to institute such experiments in a way that might not ' too far remove them from the actualities of life' ('lebensfern') - i.e., so that the results obtained might be to a certain extent applicable to practical life." Lipmann mentions Stern as a second originator in this respect.
 
Continue to: