Normal consciousness tends to inhibit this latent memory through the incessantly varying high degrees of volitional control of the complicated associative systems, into which the mind is disposed to arrange its ideas both through the lines of conscious experience and through its relation of dependence upon the associational structure of the brain. Accuracy o± reproduction, as "committing a thing to memory," is ordinarily brought about through repetition of the series to be remembered. This often requires great expenditure of time and effort (Ebbinghaus). Under conditions of suggestion, simple reproduction is more easily assured through the mere passive acceptance of the suggestion that certain facts will be remembered.

What we remember ordinarily, as already observed, depends more immediately upon the right associative connections of the type of contiguity. It usually happens that a little analysis will enable one to pick his way back through the various associations which have led up to the presence of this particular thing in mind. Indeed, the mechanism of memory is associated, i. e., "suggested," reproductions. Hypnotic memory, on the contrary, seems to be independent of the ordinary mechanism of association. All post-hypnotic, or deferred suggestions, for example, are performed punctually at the time suggested, though it be days or months afterward, without the subject having consciously been led through a train of ideas to the idea of those actions preceding their execution. The thought of the action "pops" into the head impulsively, as it is described, and remains there until its realization is effected with more or less hesitancy. In the meantime, the thought has been absent from the mind. It is this relation of memory to suggestion which offers the principles underlying the value of suggestion for the improvement of memory and the refinement of character.

Purposes and resolves in normal consciousness are the phenomena most nearly allied to this relation.

In a state of suggestibility approaching perfection, memory seems to lose its intensity, and the suggestion or command does not arouse conflicting images or ideas. No difficulties are presented to the subject in this state, and as a result, one finds all sorts of hallucinations and absurdities taking place. Each suggestion tends to give the mind over to a certain group of ideas. This reign leads the attention to an almost systematic disregard of all stimulations which do not readily coalesce with those ideas. In this manner recollection tends to place definite limitations upon the efficiency of a suggestion to invade the whole sphere of consciousness.

A last feature of memory to be noticed in this connection under the conditions of suggestion, is the tendency revealed on the part of the mental states experienced under it, at successive times, to build up the succession into a cluster of such memories-to be known, sooner or later, as another consciousness or person (Janet's Lucie). "Double" consciousness and alternation of memory have their psychological causes chiefly in this feature of the aggregation of states experienced under like conditions. This trait of hypnotic memory does not advance beyond, nor fall short of a corresponding feature of normal memory. The hypnotic ego and the empirical ego have similar histories functionally considered. Memory essentially requires more than the mere reinstatement of ideas into consciousness and a bare recognition of the projective meaning of the idea, or an interpretation of the content of the representation. This something more is found in the feeling of familiarity which arises with some ideas and is absent from others. It is the cognition of the idea as a representative of one that has been experienced before. This activity secures the continuity of consciousness, and projects a world of facts and relations into the time behind the ever-present moment.

Here we have the basis of our feelings of personal identity. "When thrown into the hypnotic trance a second or a third time the subject tends to revive memories of the first and the second trances.

Recurring to the foregoing analysis of memory, it may be concluded that suggestion has definite influence in most cases upon the retention of the idea or action contained in the suggestion. The mind forgets, usually, the occurrences during the trance, unless fortified by a definite suggestion to the contrary. All deferred suggestions are also illustrative of this truth. The modus of this retention in the associative fibres and memory functions of various brain centers is not known. Contrary effects can be produced; namely, effacement of memory traces through suggestion, as in anaesthesia and amnesia. It cannot be maintained so easily that suggestion, as a cause, has any definite influence upon the processes of revival. An analysis of many records tends to reveal the ordinary mechanism of association as operative in the revival. There are extreme cases which seem to defy this interpretation. Such are the re-awakening of childhood scenes, recalling the forgotten language of one's boyhood. Janet's Lucie No. 3 remembered the first nine years of her life; but as Lucie No. 1 she remembered nothing of this period of years.

Further, it cannot be shown that suggestion has any influ ence upon the ordinary processes of the recognitive elements in memory. Where lapses occur, due to positive suggestion, as in forgetting certain names, letters, or cards, in a given series, they are probably caused by the distraction of the attention from any shadow of an image which might be related to the items disregarded. The time-relations of suggested performances are quits analogous. The subject wakes up punctually at the stated time. The deferred action is not late. Likewise in normal life, at a resolution before falling asleep, the sleeper will awaken at a predetermined hour. The explanation for this mental action is wanting; but no light is thrown upon the question by maintaining that the processes of recognition are definitely under the control of suggestion.

Although the phenomena of memory seem so fully to be subject to the direction and intensity of suggestion in both normal and hypnotic conditions, it would be erroneous to rest in the belief that this influence is unlimited. The first and constant limitation is to be found in the dependence of suggestion for its material, so to speak, upon the resources set up by normal memory. Suggestion alone cannot evoke the ability to speak in "unknown tongues," nor the use of a language to which wakeful attention has never been directed. This dependence of suggestibility upon the prior limitations of ordinary experience is beautifully illustrated in the case of "Dolinin" (Kandisky). The confidence of the subject in the operator or in the suggestions, also determine? the extent of their influences upon the processes of memory. As is well known, skeptical, critical subjects arc unfit for the usual tests. The scope of a suggestion's effects is no less often bounded by the constant tendency of the mind, in the fainter stages of suggestibility, to carry on an indiscriminate inweaving of facts remembered from normal life, (Carpenter's "C"). This interaction of memory and suggestion is also abundantly illustrated in the play of animal-games by children.

Suggestions lose their power when they tend to contradict the habitual modes of the subject's thought and action. This is particularly true in nearly all cases of double consciousness.

A consideration of the limitations of suggestion by remembering ideas, actions, and impulses from ordinary life, and conversely, the limitations of memory due to definite sugggestion, throws a flood of light upon the practical importance of suggestion in the improvement of memory and the development of character. This didactic topic is, however, beyond the scope of the present discussion, and cannot be taken up here.