A little observation will probably convince anyone, that in the case of learning to make new and unfamiliar muscular movements, as in acquiring the ability to play a musical instrument, we do thus rivet our attention upon the sensations and ideas of movement. But it will also be contended, that just in the degree in which we secure mastery over the instrument, do we cease to think of the movements or attend to the sensations which they cause. Furthermore, it will be insisted, that in the more important forms of volition, in connection with which we reach decisions affecting the general trend of our lives, we are never for a moment conscious of ideas of movement, or anything remotely related thereto.

This position contains the old fallacy of attempting to understand an organic process without reference to its growth. It is true that, after we have strenuously worked with the immediate sensations and ideas of movement and succeeded in securing the rudiments of the technique of our musical instrument, the mere thought of melody, which we desire to play, may be the only idea in our minds and still be followed by all the appropriate muscular movements of hands and arms. This ability to employ the idea of the melody, as the symbol of the correct movements and the signal for their execution is, however, always a secondary phenomenon, resting invariably upon antecedent processes (now superseded because no longer necessary) in which the idea of movement were absolutely indispensable, and similarly with all cases of decisions and choices affecting the general course of our conduct, e. g., the choosing of a career. To make any such decision really affective, action will be necessary and this action will involve muscular control, even in cases where the decision may seem to affect results merely in consciousness, as in a resolution to continue a course of reflection.

So that however remote ideas of movement may seem to be from certain acts of volition, they will always be found involved in the development of the mere capacity of voluntary control and in the ultimate expression of voluntary action.

We may summarize our analysis thus far in two fundamental propositions, which we shall find of utmost value when we come to consider the bearings of hypnotism on the will. (1) Any idea attended to so firmly as to exclude other ideas from the mind, is followed invariably, apart from disease, by appropriate muscular movement. (2) In the development of voluntary action, the ideas first used are those which spring immediately from sensations of movement, but ultimately, under the law of association, any idea, however remotely connected with the movement, may be employed as the symbol and signal for the movement. Voluntary action always involves attention to some such idea for its execution.

It will, of course, be understood that in the development of our conduct and character, our emotions, instincts, desires and feelings of every kind play a most important part. But they always come to light in connection with ideas of one or another kind, and as it seems to be with these ideas that attention is chiefly busied, the description which we have just given remains entirely correct in its outlines. Whatever purchases our undivided attention results in producing an appropriate action as we have previously observed. It does not in any way lessen the accuracy of this statement, or prevent our using it for the purpose of the widest interpretation, that now and again emotions, Or pleasures, or pains, enter in to evoke or repel this attention.

Clearly, if the general conception of volition which we have now gained is correct, the man with the best disciplined will power is the man in whom action is deferred, until all the ideas and considerations which bear significantly on the case in hand are brought up from his memory and carefully weighed, but who then acts promptly and vigorously. Mental diseases illustrate most strikingly the two great defects arising from failure to conform with one part or the other of these two requirements for effective willing. On the one hand are the maniacs in whom the profuse rush of ideas is followed by immediate and tempestuous movement without affording opportunity for antagonistic and inhibiting considerations to be suggested. On the other hand are the melancholiacs, in many of whom normal action is inhibited by the presence of morbid and persistent ideas, which cannot be banished. The pendulum of sane, healthful volition swings between these extremes. Conduct cannot be wholly sound, if it results from too hasty and impulsive decision. It cannot be effective, at all, however, unless conclusions, when once reached, are put into forceful execution.

Bearing in mind the facts we have now brought out, we shall find it possible to appreciate the significance of hypnotism for volition with relative ease.

Like normal sleep, the sleep of hypnosis may vary from a Condition of mere drowsiness to a state of the most profound and lethargic slumber. * Certain of the conditions which are found, closely resemble natural somnambulism. The phenomena, which are met with in these different hypnotic conditions, so far as they concern the will, are essentially of like character, but they differ widely from one another in degree. Sometimes the subject is apparently paralyzed and entirely helpless; sometimes he displays, on the other hand, remarkable muscular power and agility; again he may perform ordinary acts in a perfectly ordinary manner, so that an uninformed onlooker would never suspect that he was hypnotized. These three forms of behavior agree in this, however, that they are in every case, practically without exception, the results of suggestions given directly or indirectly by the operator. These suggestions, nevertheless, are adopted with various degrees of readiness. Sometimes the response is prompt and unhesitating. Sometimes it is slow and reluctant. Sometimes it is absolutely inhibited.