This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
The statute begins to run whenever the creditor or plaintiff could bring his action, and not when he knew he could; thus, it is said that if one promises to pay when able, as soon as he is able the statute runs, although the creditor did not know it;(k) but it is also held that the statute does not begin to run until the creditor knew that he could bring his action, if he was prevented from knowing this by the fraudulent concealment or statement of the debtor. (kk)1 And if the action rests on a breach of contract, it
(f) Huntley v. Sanderson, 1 Cromp. & M. 467; Collinge v. Heywood, 9 A. & £. 633; Ponder v. Carter, 12 Ired. 242; Sims v. Gondelock, 6 Rich. 100; Gillespie v. Creswell, 12 Gill & J. 36; Scott v. Nichols, 27 Miss. 94.
(g) Reynolds v. Doyle, 2 Scott, N. R. 45.
(h) For the cases in which a demand is necessary, see Topham v. Brad dick, 1 Taunt. 572'; Clark v. Moody, 17 Mass. 145; Coffin v. Coffin, 7 Greenl. 298; Lit-tle v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488; Stafford v. Richardson, 15 Wend. 302; Lillie v. Hoyt, 5 Hill, 395; Hickok v. Hickok, 13 Barb. 632; Lyle v. Murray, 4 Sandf. 590; Mitchell v. M'Lemore, 9 Texas, 151; M'Donnell v. Branch Bank, 20 Ala. 313; Taylor v. Spear, 3 Eng. 429; Denton v. Embury, 5 id. 228.
(i) Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488; Wen-man v. The Mohawk Ins. Co. 13 Wend.
267; Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio, 9; Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461; Wheeler v. Warner, 47 N. Y. 519.
(j) See Waters v. The Earl of Thanet,
2 Q. B. 757. See section on "notes on demand."
(jj) Thurston v. Wolfborough Bank, 18 N. H 391.
(k) Waters v. The Earl of Thanet, 2 Q. B. 757. And see Battley v. Faulkner,
3 B. & Ald. 288; Short v. M'Carthy, id. 626: Brown v. Howard, 2 Brod. & B. 73; Granger v. George, 5 B. & C. 149; Argall v. Bryant, I Sandf. 98; Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. 33; Howell v. Young, 5 B. & C. 259; Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Pet. 172; Kerns v, Schoonmaker, 4 Ohio, 331; Denton v, Embury, 5 Eng. 228; The Governor v. Gordon. 15 Ala. 72.
(kk) Campbell v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524; Bowman v. Sanborn, 18 N. H. 205. But see Nudd v. Hamblin, 8 Allen, 130.
1 Where the defendant, holding goods of the plaintiff for safe custody, wrongfully sold them, and the plaintiff, more than six years from the date of the sale and in ignorance thereof, demanded the return of the goods, which the defendant refused,- Held, that the statute of limitations ran from the date of the demand and refusal, and not from that of the sale. Wilkinson v. Verity, L. R. 6 C. P. 206. On the ground that there must be "an affirmative act, fraudulent in character, done or concealed, "Shreves v. Leonard, 56 la. 74, decided that where a judgment creditor, having failed to credit a payment made by the judgment debtor on the judgment, afterwards recovered the entire judgment on execution, the debtor's neglect for more than the statutory period accrues as soon as the contract is broken, although no injury result from the breach until afterwards. (l)1 As if one delivers goods which are not what he undertakes to sell, and the purchaser re-sells under his mistake, and is obliged to pay damages, he has a claim against the first seller, but must bring his action to enforce it within six years from the first sale, (m) So if one is guilty of gross negligence, whereby injury occurs, six years, running from the time of his neglect, will bar the action although the injury has occurred within the six. (n)
The holder of a foreign bill acquires a right of action, as against the drawer, immediately on non-acceptance, protest, and notice; and the statute then begins to run against him; *and, therefore, if he afterwards pay the bill when due, he has not six years from that payment in which he may bring his action. (o) It has been said, obiter, in New York, that a second indorser who sues a prior indorser for money paid on a note, but who has not paid the note and brought his action upon it, cannot maintain his action, if the statute has run in favor of the defendant, and against the holder of the note. (p)
If money be payable by instalments, the statute begins to run as to each instalment from the time when it decomes due; but if there be an agreement, that, upon default as to any one, all then to sue for the over-payment was a bar to the action, although he brought suit soon after the discovery of the failure to so credit the payment, see also Cook v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. 81 la. 551; Reynolds v. Hennessy, 17 R. I. 169. In Lawrence v. Norreys, 15 App. Cas. 210, however, it was held that in order to prevent the running of the statute it was necessary not only that there should be fraudulent concealment but that the facts could not have been ascertained with reasonable diligence. In Wood v. Williams, 31 Northeastern Rep. (111. 1892), it was held that the statute ran in favor of a principal whose agent, being guilty of a wrong, fraudulently concealed it.
(l) Argall v. Bryant, 1 Sandf. 98; Smith v. Fox, 6 Hare, 386. And see cases cited in preceding note.
(m) Thus, where A, under a contract to deliver spring-wheat, had delivered to B winter-wheat, and B, having again sold the same as spring-wheat, had, in consequence, been compelled, after a suit in Scotland, which lasted many years, to pay damages to the vendee, and afterwards brought an action of assumpsit against A for his breach of contract, alleging, as special damage, the damages so recovered, it was held, that although such special damage had occurred within six years before the commencement of the action by B against A, yet that the breach of the contract having occurred more than six years before that period, A might properly plead actio non accrevit infra sex annas. Battley v. Faulkner, 3 B. & Ald. 289.
(n) Sinclair v. The Bank of So. Car. 2 Strobh. 344. And see cases cited supra, n. (i).
(o) Whitehead v. Walker, 9 M. & W. 506.
(p) Wright v. Butler, 6 Wend. 284. And see Barker v. Cassidy, 16 Barb. 177; Ames, Cas. Bills and Notes, Vol. II. p. 785.
1 An action for breach of the warranty of title implied in the sale of a chattel accrues at the time of the sale, and the statute of limitations runs from that time. Perkins c. Whelan, 116 Mass. 542. Possession under an instrument which contains apt words of transfer, and so gives color of title, will set the statute to running against the true owner. Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 461. - K.
unpaid shall become payable, the statute begins to run as to all upon any default. (q)
If the demand arise from the imperfect execution of a contract to do certain work, in a certain way, and within a certain time, it is said that the six years begin to run from the time when the work was to have been completed, and not from the time when the plaintiff had received actual damage from the imperfect execution of the work.(r)
No right of action accrues against one who holds money in trust, until he has assumed a position hostile to the trust, and then the statute begins to run. (rr)l
It does not begin to run against a right to set aside a deed because of the insanity of the grantor and the fraud of the grantee, until the grantor becomes sane and knows the fraud.(rs)
It begins to run against the right of a father to recover for the loss of the .services of his daughter by seduction, when the loss takes place, and not at the time of seduction.(rt)
It begins to run against the right of an attorney against an officer for taking insufficient bail in an action, only when judgment is rendered in that action, (ru)2
If there be an injunction against the exercise of a right of action, the time during which the injunction is in force must be deducted from the period of limitation. (rv)
The statute does not begin to run anew from a payment by a
(q) Hemp v. Garland, 4 Q. B. 519.
(r) Rankin v. Woodworth, 3 Penn. 48.
(rr) Schroeder v. Johns, 27 Cal. 274, Bacon v. Rives. 106 U. S. 99; Patrick v Simpson, 24 Q B. D. 128; Lnco v. De Toro, 91 Cal. 405; People v. Oran, 121 111 650.
(rs) Crowther v. Rowlandson, 27 Cal. 376
(rt) Hancock v Wilhoite, 1 Duvall,313
(ru) Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Me. 231.
(rv) Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Me. 231.
1 This rule does not apply to constructive trusts. The statute runs on such a trust as soon as it arises. Matthews v. Simmons, 49 Ark. 468;, Newsom v. Commissioners, 103 Ind. 526; Helm v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 568; Sanford v. Lancaster, 81 Me. 434; Dole v. Wilson, 39 Minn. 330; Cooper v. Cooper, 61 Miss. 676; Zoll v. Carnahan, 83 Ma 35, 41; Kirkpatrick v. McElroy, 41 N.J. Eq. 539, 551; Middleton v Twombly, 125 N. Y. 520: Patterson v. Lilly, 90 N. C. 82; Beard v. Stanton, 15 S. C. 164; Peebles v. Green, 6 Lea, 471.
2 In England it has been held that an action for money deposited in a bank must be brought within six years from the time the deposit was made. Pott v. Clegg, 16 M. & W. 321 But in this country a demand is necessary to set the statute running. Marion Bank v. Fidelity, Ac. Co. 14 Southwestern Rep. 371 (Ky 1891); Girard Bank v Bank of Penn Township, 39 Pa. 92; Goodell v. Brandon Bank, 63 Vt. 303. In Atkinson v. Bradford Building Soc. 25 Q. B. D. 377, it was held that where money was lent to a building society, which by the terms of the loan was to be repaid only on presentation of a pass-book, the statute would only begin to run from the time of such presentation. Pott v. Clegg was distinguished. And a deposit in a savings bank would certainly not be barred till the expiration of the statutory period from a demand on the bank, or perhaps something equivalent to notice of repudiation by it-Dickinson v. Leominster Savings Bank, 152 .Mass. 49.
maker of a note, as against a surety or indorser who is not a party to the payment.(rw) And a new promise by a maker does not take the case out of the statute as to an indorser. (rx) And if an indorser pays a note, his remedy against the maker is on the note; and the statute begins to run, not from his payment, but from the maturity of the note, (ry) The statute applies to a debt filed in set-off. (rz)l It does not apply to an attorney's bill for fees, until the relation between him and his client ceases, (ra)
It would seem, both from English and American authority, that the statute does not begin to run against the claim of an attorney, for professional services, until he no longer acts in that matter as attorney; (s) but he may terminate his professional relation at his own pleasure (if he thereby does no wrong to his client), and demand payment of his bill; and the statute then begins to run (t) So it would undoubtedly be, if the services were in any way brought to an end, although no demand were made; because (except that, in England, the rule requiring a delivery of the signed bill one month before suit, might prevent it), he could bring an action for his services at once.2
 
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