(q) Lord Eldon "took the first occasion of expressing strong indignation at the frauds committed under cover of the bankrupt laws, and his determination to repress such practices. Upon this subject his lordship observed, with warmth, that the abuse of the bankrupt law is a disgrace to the country, and it would be better at once to repeal all the statutes than to suffer them to be applied to such purposes There is no mercy to the estate. Nothing is less thought of than the object of the commission. As they are frequently conducted in the country, they are little more than stock in trade for the commissioners, the assignees, and the solicitor. Instead of solicitors attending to their duty, as ministers of the court, for they are so, commissions of bankruptcy are treated as matters of traffic,-A taking out the commission, B and C to be his commissioners. They are considered as stock in trade, and calculations are made how many commissioners can be brought into the partnership. Unless the court holds a strong hand over bankruptcy, particularly as administered in this country, it is itself accessory to as great a nuisance as any known in the land, and known to pass under the forms of its law. ... His lordship added, that he was determined to make the officers of this court responsible to the justice of the country for their dealings in this court; and declared, with reference to the practice of lending a name to a person forbid by the court to take out a petition, that he would not hesitate to strike a solicitor off the roll who dared to lend his name to a person under such an interdict, and for that reason alone; but he would go further, and, whenever a case of this nature should be brought forward, would direct the Attorney-General to prosecute for a conspiracy; for no worse conspiracy can be than that, the object of which is to make what the legislature intended as a lenient process against the bankrupt, a mode of defrauding the creditors ana the bankrupt." 6 Ves. 1. It might admit of reasonable doubt, whether the practice in this country, under the national law of 1841, would not in some localities, have justified to some extent the language of Lord Eldon compulsory process, while all others had the right to make themselves bankrupt, but could not be made so by others. In this respect the first provision is that of the insolvency system; and the second, that of the bankruptcy system. But then the statute gives to all bankrupts under this law, whether voluntary or involuntary, whether traders or otherwise, a discharge from their indebtedness. It offered in fact to every debtor a discharge of his debts.

(r) As to who may he made bankrupts, or may become bankrupts of their own motion, see infra, section 5.

The condition of the country at that time demanded precisely this relief. The community was burdened with an immense amount of indebtedness, which embarrassed the debtors, and prevented their engaging in any business that might give them subsistence and promote the prosperity of the country, and at the same time it gave to creditors only hopeless and valueless claims. The act afforded, in point of fact, the very relief it was intended to give; and when this good work was accomplished, the general objection to a bankruptcy law reappeared in full force, and, on the third of March, 1843, the statute was repealed. But within this brief period, of little more than a year and a half, an immense multitude of persons availed themselves of the opportunity to discharge their debts by bankruptcy.

In March, 1867, another bankrupt law was enacted by Congress; an amendatory act in 1868, and farther acts in 1870, in 1871, and in 1872.1

* We have now insolvent laws of one kind or another in almost all the States. These differ in their provisions very much; and, although it would be impossible to point out with any distinctness all these differences in a single chapter, we shall have occasion to notice some among them.

The most difficult question to which they have given rise is, as to the operation of a State insolvent law upon creditors who live in another State. The first objection was to the constitutionality of any State insolvent law, because it necessarily "impaired the obligation of the contract" of the debtor. But this was disposed of mainly by the help of a distinction between the remedy and the right; holding the first to be within State power, but the latter not. (a) This distinction was adopted by

(s) This distinction was made by Mr. 122: "The obligation of a contract, and Hunter, in his argument for the defend- a remedy for its performance, are differ-ant, in Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. ent things." Marshall, C. J., delivering

1 By the act of June 7, 1878, c. 160, the bankrupt law of 1867, with all acts in amendment or supplementary thereto, was repealed, and took effect September 1, 1878, without invalidating or affecting in any way cases pending at the latter date.

Chief Justice Marshall, from the argument of counsel, and sustained by him with great ingenuity, and force. It certainly is very nice, and, when critically examined, becomes almost evanescent But it is now very generally admitted, perhaps on the ground that its want of exact logical reason is compensated by the absolute necessity that this clause in the Constitution should be thus qualified. But after this objection was disposed of, another arose, which is the most difficult question the State insolvent laws have ever caused. It is, as to the effect which such a law has upon creditors residing in another State. Considering the constant and very extensive commercial * intercourse between the different States of this Union, it is not surprising that this question recurs very frequently; but it is very much to be regretted that judicial opinions concerning it are so diverse and wholly irreconcilable, that it is impossible to say with certainty what the law is in relation to this subject The distinction between remedy and right has been so applied as to hold, as of the remedy only, priority of or security to any particular creditor, imprisonment, statutes of limitation and usury, laws concerning processes in State courts, exemption of particular kinds of property, or of persons engaged in particular duties, or privileges attached to any office or territory. (t) the opinion of the court in that case, said: "The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists in the' nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the State may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means, and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair its obligation. . . . Statutes of limitations relate to the remedies which are furnished in the courts. They rather establish that certain circumstances shall amount to evidence that a contract has been performed, than dispense with its performance. If, in a State where six years may be pleaded in bar to an action of assumpsit, a law should pass declaring that contracts already in existence, not barred by the statute, should be construed to be within it, there can be little doubt of its unconstitutionality. So with respect to the laws against usury." Le Rov v. Crowniushield, 2 Mason, 151. (t) Priority of payment of a particular creditor is matter relating to the remedy. Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289-298. Marshall, C. J.: " But the right of priority forms no part of the contract itself. It is extrinsic, and is rather a personal privilege dependent on the law of the place where the property lies, and where the court sits which is to decide the cause." Imprisonment, - Marshall C. J., in Sturges v. Crowninshield, above cited; Beers v Haughton, 9 Pet. 329; Pugh v. Bussel, 2 Blackf.394. See Washington, J., in Canfranque v. Burnell, 1 Wash. C C. 340. Statutes of limitation and usury, -Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 206; Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason, 151; wherein Story, J., states and defines the limits of the doctrine; Decouche v. Save-tier, 3 Johns Ch. 190. Kent, Ch.: "The plea of the statute of limitations does not touch the merits of the action. It merely bars the remedy in the particular domestic forum, and does not conclude the plaintiff in his own or any other foreign country." Processes in State courts, -United States v. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319,