This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
It is a general principle, that an authority is always revocable; the principal may at any time put an end to the relation between himself and his agent by withdrawing the authority, unless the authority is coupled with an interest, or given fur a * val- uable consideration. (y) Notice of revocation is not necessary, where the agent had only a special authority to do a special
(x) Thomas v. Joslin, 30 Minn. 388; Feeter v. Heath, 11 Wend. 477. - But in Johnson v. Blasdale, 1 Sm. & M. 1, the Court of Appeals of Mississippi held that if an agent in filling up a blank note exceed his authority, and the third party receive the note with knowledge that the authority has been transcended, the note will not be void in toto, but only for the excess beyond the sum which was authorized.
1 The weight of authority is now strongly in favor of the view supported in the text, that an agent making a contract in the name of a principal cannot be himself charged as contractor, because he lacked authority to bind his supposed principal, but must be sued in tort for deceit or on an implied warranty of authority. Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 13 Q. B. 744; Lewis v. Nicholson, 18 Q. B. 503; Collen v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647; Firbank's Ex. v. Humphreys, 18 Q. B. D. 54; Senter v. Monroe, 77 Cal. 347; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379; Taylor v. Shelton, 30 Conn. 122; Duncan v. Niles, 32 Ill. 532; McHenry v. Duffield, 7 Blackf. 41; Noyes v. Loring, 55 Me. 408; Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117; Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467; McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197.
Contrary decisions are Keener v. Harrod, 2 Md. 63, 70; Woodes v. Dennett, 9 N. H. 55; Weare v. Gove, 44 N. H. 196; Bay v. Cook, 2 Zab. 343; Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. 315. But the decisions in New Jersey and New York may be considered as overruled by the later cases in those States, cited supra.
2 Co. Lit. 258 a; Drumright v. Philpot, 16 Ga. 424; Vanada v. Hopkins, 1 J. J. Marsh. 285; Dickerman v Ashton, 21 Minn. 538; Moore v. Thompson, 32 Me. 497; Stowell v. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614.
(>/) Smith v. Cedar Fall, etc. R. Co. 30 Ia. 244; Phillips v. Howell, 60 Ga. 411; Simonton v. Minneapolis Bank, 24 Minn, 216. It is to be noticed, that many cases which in England might be understood as examples of an authority irrevocable at the pleasure of the principal, because coupled with an interest, would not in this country be classed under that head, owing to the general adoption here of the definition of a " power coupled with an interest," given in Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 201 [see post, note (d)]. All such cases, it seems, can be considered instances where the authority cannot be revoked because of the valuable consideration moving from the agent; as where the agent had begun to act under the authority, and would be damnified by its recall, or where the authority is part of a security. Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. 565; Gaussen v. Morton, 10 B. & C. 731; Hodgson v. An-derson, 3 B. & C. 842; Broomley v. Holland, 7 Ves. 28; Marryat v. Broderick, 2 M. & W. 371; Eltham v. Kingsman, 1 B. & Ald. 684; Yates v. Hoppe, 9 C. B. 541; Reed v. Anderson, 10 Q. B. D. 100; Ware, J., United States v. Jarvis, 2 Ware, 278. And see Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 479, 495; Story on Agency, §§ 466, 467, 468, where the opinions of the civilians are cited; but compare 2 Kent Com. 644. Fabens v. The Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330, seems to be the case of a power irrevocable by the principal, both because given for consideration and because coupled with an interest in the sense of Chief Justice Marshall. Whether after advances made by a factor, his authority to sell the goods of the principal to the extent of those advances is revocable at the pleasure of the principal, is a question upon which the authorities are not agreed. In Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 479, it was held that the authority to sell is not revocable in such a case. The decisions in the State courts, so far as they go, appear to be in substantial agreement with Brown v. McGran. If the original authority, on cousideration of which the advances were made, was an authority to sell at a limited price, it seems plain that the fact of the advances does not alter that authority. It continues an authority to sell on certain terms, and as such, on the doctrine of the Supreme Court, may be held irrevocable to the extent of the consideration given for it, that is, to the amount of the advances.
Some of the State courts have gone a act, and this authority is exhausted. (yy) But where third parties have dealt with an agent clothed with general powers, whose acts have therefore bound his principal, and the principal revokes the authority he gave his agent, such principal will continue to be * bound by the further acts of his agent, unless the third parties have knowledge of the revocation, or unless he does what he can to make the revocation as notorious and generally known to the world as was the fact of the agency. (z) This is usually done by advertising, and usage will have great effect in determining whether such principal did all that was incumbent on him to make his revocation notorious. And third parties who never dealt with such agent before such revocation, if they, as a part of the community, were justified in believing such agency to have existed, and had no knowledge and no sufficient means of knowledge of the revocation, may hold the principal liable for the acts of the agent after revocation; (a) as in the case of a partnership, where the dissolution or change of parties was not properly made known. (b)
Step further in this direction, and held that an authority to sell at a limited price may be converted into a general authority to sell, by the fact of advances in conjunction with the fact of the neglect of the consignor, alter reasonable notice, to repay the advances. Hallowell v. Fawcett, 30 Ia. 491; Davis v. Kobe. 36 Minn. 214; Howard v. Smith, 56 Mo. 314; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 40; Frothingham v. Everton, 12 N. H. 239. See also Blot v. Boiceau, 3 Comst. 78; Mooney v. Musser, 45 Ind. 115; Butter-field v. Stephens, 59 Ia. 596; Dalby v. Stearns, 132 Mass. 230; Hilton v. Vander-bilt, 82 N. Y. 591. This subject has recently come before the Court of Common Bench in England in Smart v. Sun-dars, 5 C. B. 895, where it was decided that a factor's authority to sell is revocable at the will of the cousignor, notwithstanding advances to the full value and a request of repayment uncomplied with. Brown v. McGran had been cited in the argument; Wilde, C. J., delivering the judgment of the court, said (p. 918): " In the present case the goods are consigned to a factor for sale. That confers an implied authority to sell. Afterwards the factor makes advances. This is not an authority coupled with an interest, but an independent authority, and an interest subsequently arising. The making of such an advance may be a good consideration for an agreement that the authority to sell shall be no longer revocable; but such an effect will not, we think, arise independently of agreement. There is no authority or principle, in our law, that we are aware of, which leads us to think it will. If such be the law, where is it to be found % It was said in argument, that it was the common practice of factors to sell, in order to repay advances. If it be true that there is a well-understood practice with factors to sell, that practice might furnish a ground for inferring that the advances were made upon the footing of an agreement that the factor should have an irrevocable authority to sell, in case the principal made default. Such an inference might be a very reasonable and proper one; but it would be an inference of fact, and not a conclusion of law." See also Raleigh v. Atkinson, 6 M. & W. 670; Hutchins v. Hebbard, 34 N. Y. 24.
 
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