This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
The power of an infant in respect to marriage settlements has been much discussed. It seems to be determined, that a marriage settlement upon a female infant, and her release of dower in consideration of such settlement, are valid. (i) But whether she can bind herself by a settlement of her own estate in contemplation of marriage, seems still to be regarded as an open question. (j) was held that the infant was entitled to recover for this breach of the agreement. Lord Ellenborough, C. J.: "It occurred to me at the trial on the first view of the case, that as an infant could not trade, and as this was an executory contract, he could not maintain an action for the breach of it; but if I had adverted to the circumstance of its being in part executed by the infant, for he had paid .£40, and therefore it was most immediately for his benefit, that he should he enabled to sue upon it, otherwise he might lose the benefit of such payment, I should probably have held otherwise. And I certainly was under a mistake in not adverting to the distinction between the case of an infant plaintiff or defendant. If the defendant had been the infant, what I ruled would have been correct; but here the plaintiff is the infant, and sues upon a contract partly executed by him, which it is clear that he may do. It is certainly for the benefit of infants, where they have given the fair value for any article of produce, that they should have the thing contracted for. And it is not necessary that they should wait until they come of age in order to bring the action. A huu-dred actions have been brought by infants for breaches of promise of marriage, and I am not aware that this objection has ever been taken since the case in Strange."
(g) Eubanks v. Peak, 2 Bailey, 497.
(h) Bac. Abr. Infancy and Age (A.).
(i) Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden, 39; Earl of Buckinghamshire v. Drury, 2 Eden, 60; Wilmot Opinions, p. 177; McCartee v. Teller, 2 Paige, 511.
(j) Previous to Milner v. Harewood, 18 Ves. 259, the weight of authority seemed to be in favor of her having such power. See Atherley, Treatise on Marriage Settlements, pp. 18-45. But in that case Lord Eldon held that she was not so bound by such conveyance or agreement to convey as that she might not avoid it on coming of age.
It is certain that a female infant may marry; and therefore it might be supposed that a prudent settlement of her property, in view of marriage, would come within the reason of the rule which makes valid the contracts of an infant for necessaries. Of course such a settlement would be within the power of chancery, for correction or avoidance, on the ground of fraud, mistake, or undue influence, and any injurious effect would be prevented. And the court would always pay due regard to the youth and immature judgment of the infant wife. But to say that a young woman may marry, but, because she is an infant cannot use valid precautions to secure her property against waste, and for her own benefit, would give an effect to her legal incapacity entirely opposed to the principle that the disability of an infant is a privilege allowed as a shield and a protection, not as a burden and an injury. It has therefore been held that such settlement is, at all events, only voidable, and that no one but herself can avoid it, and she need not; but may affirm or avoid it when of full age. The * question then occurs, whether she can so disaffirm it after majority, if still married; and it has been said that the preponderance of opinion is that she cannot. (k) So whether a male infant may bind himself irrevocably by a marriage settlement of his own estate is not quite certain. (l) It is not, however, easy to find any very good reason which would draw a distinction between the sexes in this particular, and make such settlement by a male infant absolutely binding, and leave that by a female voidable by her at her majority. But we consider this whole subject open for further adjudication.1
(k) Temple v. Hawley, 1 Sandf. Ch. 153.
(l) In Slocomb v. Glubb, 2 Bro. Ch. 645, it seems to be the doctrine that a male infant may bar himself by covenants before marriage of his estate by curtesy, and of all right in or to his wife's personal property. And that both male and female infants can settle their personal estate before marriage, definitively. See Strickland v. Coker, 2 Ch. Cas. 211; and Warburton v. Lytton, cited in Lytton v. Lytton, 4 Bro. Ch. 441.
1 There are statutory provisions in some jurisdictions, allowing infants to bind themselves under certain circumstances by marriage settlements. 18 & 19 Victoria, c. 43; Georgia, Code §§ 1784, 2734; Texas, Paschal's Dig. §4640.
 
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